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California Supreme Court Survey
December 1992 - December 1993
The California Supreme Court Survey provides a brief synopsis of recent decisions by the supreme court. The purpose of the survey is to inform the reader of
the issues that have been addressed by the supreme court, as well as to serve as a
starting point for researchingany of the topical areas. The decisions are analyzed in accordance with the importance of the court's holding and the extent to
which the court expands or changes existing law. Attorney discipline and judicial misconduct cases have been omittedfrom the survey.
I.

APPELLATE REVIEW

A.

Under the California Constitution, appellate courts
are required to apply harmless error review to any
conviction obtained in a trial during which an
"involuntary"or "coerced"conession was admitted:
People v. Cahill ..............................

B.

An appellate court may not employ the "general
verdict rule" when reviewing a general verdict containing special interrogatories:
Tavaglione v. Billings .........................

I.

251

260

CIVIL PROCEDURE

Evidence Code section 1157(a) precludes a plaintiff
suing for medical malpracticefrom discovering a
physician's applicationor reapplicationfor medical
staff privileges:
Alexander v. Superior Court....................
III.

263

COMMUNITY PROPERTY

The death of one spouse, after final judgment dissolving marital status but before allocation of assets
in a bifurcated dissolution proceeding, does not
abate the proceeding or vest jointly held marital
property in the surviving former spouse by right of
survivorship where the trial court, upon bifurcation, reserves jurisdiction to determine all remaining issues:
In re Marriage of Hilke ........................

269

IV.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

A.

B.

The Boykin-Tahl requirement that the defendant
must be specifically notified of the constitutional
rights he or she is waiving when entering a plea
equivalent to a guilty plea is not applicable in a
case where the defendant merely stipulates to evidentiaryfacts and the People still have the burden of
proving the crime:
273
People v. Adams . ...........................
Section 5463 of the Business and Professions Code,
which authorizes the California Department of
Transportation,on ten days' notice, to revoke any
permit for off-premises billboardsfailing to comply
with the CaliforniaOutdoor Advertising Act, and to
remove and destroy any such noncomplying billboards, affords billboard owners adequate procedural due process under both the state and federal constitutions:
Traverso v. People ex rel. Department of
276
Transportation..............................

V.

CRIMINAL LAW
A. A criminal defendant cannot face conviction for
more than one offense in furtherance of a single
criminal act:
281
People v. Latimer. ..........................
B. Evidence of excessive intoxication, prior drunk
driving convictions, unsafe driving speed, and other
facts are admissible to support a finding of gross
negligence in a vehicular manslaughter case:
286
People v. Ochoa . ...........................
C. Proceedings to determine the truth of prior conviction allegations held after a jury returns its verdict
and has been discharged are permissible when the
defendant fails to object before the court determines
the truth of the priorconviction allegations or gives
a jury waiver as to those allegations:
290
People v. Saunders . .........................

VI.

FAMILY LAW
Under section 361.5 of the California Welfare and
Institutions Code, a biologicalfather is not entitled
to receive state reunification services with a child
in court custody unless the father can also establish
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that he is the presumed father of the child, and the
request is made within of the eighteen-month statutory limit; under section 361.2 of the code, a noncustodial parent may obtain custody of a dependent
child only at a time immediately following the
child's first removal from the home of the custodial
parent, and only if the noncustodialparent qualifies
as a presumed parent:
In re Zacharia D . ...........................
297
VII.

INSURANCE LAW
A. When an attorney's commission of separate acts of
negligence occurs within the same matter, thereby
resulting in his client's inability to recover, the
attorney's malpractice insurer is liablefor only one
claim under the policy:
Bay Cities Paving & Grading, Inc. v. Lawyers'
Mutual Insurance Co..........................
303
B. Extrinsic evidence to the underlying complaint is
admissible to defeat an insurer'sduty to defend. The
duty to defend, however, arises upon a showing of
the "possibility"or '!potential" that the underlying
suit falls within the policy coverage, and is not
confined to a "reasonable"possibility standard:
Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Superior Court........
312

VIII.

JUVENILE LAW

An order terminating reunification services and
setting a selection and implementation hearing is
reviewable on appealfrom a final order made at a
Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26
hearing:
In re Matthew C .............................
315
IX.

PUBLIC IMPROVEMENTS

The Landscaping and Lighting Act of 1972 authorizes special assessments on residentialproperty for
maintaining public improvements constructed or
installedprior to the Act when the property receives
benefits from the maintenance of the improvement
equivalent to the amount of the assessment:
Knox v. City of Orland. ......................
323

X.

RECORDS LAW

Neither the California Public Records Act nor the
Brown Act compel public disclosure of letters from
the city attorney to the city counsel that express
legal opinions on matters before the city counsel:
328
Roberts v. City of Palmdale ....................
XI.

SECURITIES LAW
When pleading a cause of action for deceit, securities investors must plead actual reliance upon alleged misrepresentations;plaintiffs may not assert
the 'fraud-on-the-market"theory to establish a presumption of reliance:
: ... 333
Mirkin v. Wasserman .....................

XII.

TORT LAw
A. Business landlords do not have a duty to hire security guards to protect patrons, tenants, or tenants'
employee's against the criminal acts of third parties
unless the landowners have notice of prior similar
incidents of violent crimes on the premises:
Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center..........
B. A court should not rule as a matter of law for specific disclosure requirements in an informed consent case because the ruling would invade the province of the jury; informed consent does not take into
account nonmedical interests; and experts may be
used to explain decisions on the withholding of
information:
Arato v. Avedon .............................
C. Under Government Code section 835, a person injured while working on public grounds may not use
res ipsa loquitur to establish a prima facie case
against a public entity without demonstrating that
the public entity had actual or constructive notice of
the allegedly dangerous condition:
Brown v. Poway Unified School District ...........
D. A cause of actionfor damagesfor fear of cancer,in
the absence of physical injury, must include proof
that it is more likely than not that cancer will develop in the future, unless toxic exposure results from
fraud, oppression or malice:
Potter v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co ...........
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I. APPELLATE REVIEW
A.

Under the California Constitution, appellate courts
are required to apply harmless error review to any
conviction obtained in a trial during which an
"involuntary"or "coerced"confession was admitted:
People v. Cahill.
I. INTRODUCTION

For many years the United States Constitution has compelled automatic reversal of criminal convictions resulting from trials during which
"involuntary" or "coerced" confessions' were admitted.2 In Arizona v.
Fulminante,' however, the United States Supreme Court reversed a long
line of decisions requiring automatic reversal, holding that courts should
review the wrongful admission of an involuntary confession under the
"harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" standard.4
In light of this federal law development, the Supreme Court of California, in People v. Cahill,' addressed whether the California Constitu-

1. "Involuntary" or "coerced" confessions include those confessions "obtained by
physical or psychological coercion, by promises of leniency or benefit, or when the 'totality of circumstances' indicate the confession was not a product of the defendant's
'free and rational choice.'" People v. Cahill, 5 Cal. 4th 478, 482 n.1, 853 P.2d 1037,
1040 n.1, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 582, 585 n.1 (1993) (citing 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H.
ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 6.2 (1984); 1 B.E. WITaIN, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE, The
Hearsay Rule §§ 614-623 (3d ed. 1986)).
2. See, e.g., Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 568 (1958) (holding that a coerced
confession obtained from a nineteen-year-old defendant with fifth grade education compelled automatic reversal of conviction "even though there may have been sufficient
evidence, apart from the coerced confession, to support a judgment of conviction");
Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 621 (1961) (finding that a coerced confession
elicited from an illiterate and mentally defective man required the reviewing court to
set aside the conviction, "however convincingly supported by other evidence").
3. 499 U.S. 279 (1991). For criticisms of this decision, see Dale W. Aronson, Note,
ConstitutionalLaw-Harmless Constitutional ErrorAnalysis-Are Coerced Confessions
Fundamentally Different from Other Erroneously Admitted Evidence? Arizona v.
Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991), 27 LAND & WATER L. REV. 581 (1992); Charles J.
Ogletree, Jr., Comment, Arizona v. Fulminante: The Harm of Applying Harmless Error
to Coerced Confessions, 105 HARV. L. REV. 152 (1991).
4. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 312; see also Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22
(1967) (overruled on other grounds) (holding that the violation of a federal constitutional right at trial was harmless error where the error did not influence the "substantial rights of the parties.").
5. 5 Cal. 4th 478, 853 P.2d 1037, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 582 (1993). Justice George deliv-

tion, independent of the United States Constitution, requires automatic
reversal in such cases.6 The court held that the California Constitution
compels appellate courts to review these cases under a "harmless error"
standard, overruling the line of decisions that interpreted the state constitution as requiring automatic reversal
II. BACKGROUND
Prior to 1911, if a "substantial error" occurred during trial,8 appellate courts presumed prejudice and automatically reversed the trial court
decision without inquiring into whether the error was harmless.' In 1911,
however, article VI, section 4 1/2 was added to the California Constitution.'" This provision requires appellate courts to affirm criminal convic-

ered the opinion for the court, in which Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Panelli, Arabian, and Baxter concurred. Id. at 481, 853 P.2d at 1039, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 584. Justice Mosk wrote a dissenting opinion. Id. at 511, 853 P.2d at 1060, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
605. Justice Kennard wrote a separate dissenting opinion, in which Justice Mosk concuffed. Id. at 553, 853 P.2d at 1088, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 633.
6. Id. at 482-83, 853 P.2d at 1040, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 585.
7. Id. at 509 & n.17, 853 P.2d at 1059 & n.17, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 604 & n.17. In
Cahill, the defendant, Mark Steven Cahill, was convicted of numerous offenses including, among others, first-degree murder, rape, and first-degree burglary. Id. at 483, 853
P.2d at 1040, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 585. The defendant was sentenced to life in prison
without the possibility of parole. Id.
The defendant appealed the conviction, asserting that confessions obtained by
police shortly after his arrest were wrongfully admitted at trial. Id. The court of appeal
reversed the murder-related convictions, finding that the confessions were "involuntary,"
and invoked the rule of automatic reversal as enunciated in numerous federal and state
court decisions. Id. at 483-84, 853 P.2d at 1041, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 586.
The Attorney General sought review by the California Supreme Court, and while
the petition was pending, the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in
Fulminante. Id. at 484, 853 P.2d at 1041, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 586. The California Supreme Court remanded the case to the court of appeal for reconsideration in light of
Fulminante. Id. The California Court of Appeal reaffirmed its prior decision, holding
that California law, independent of the federal constitution, required reversal. Id. The
California Supreme Court then granted review. Id.
8. The admission of an involuntary or coerced confession would clearly fall within
the "substantial error" category. The California Constitution absolutely prohibits such
confessions from admission into evidence at trial. Id. at 485, 853 P.2d at 1042, 20 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 587.
9. See People v. O'Bryan, 165 Cal. 55, 63-64, 130 P. 1042, 1045 (1913) (the "prejudice presumed" rule arose from article VI, § 4 of the California Constitution, which
limited appellate court review to questions of law only).
10. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 4 1/2 (amended 1966). Section 4 1/2 later became article
VI, § 13. As originally adopted, § 4 1/2 read:
No judgment shall be set aside, or new trial granted in any criminal case on
the ground of misdirection of the jury or the improper admission or rejection
of evidence, or for error in any matter of pleading or procedure, unless, after
an examination of the entire cause including the evidence, the court shall be
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tions, even if the trial court erred, when the error did not result in a
"miscarriage of justice.""
The California Supreme Court first addressed section 4 1/2 in People
v. O'Bryan." The court suggested that while section 4 1/2 abolished the
"prejudice presumed" requirement and permitted harmless error review
in most cases, certain trial errors could result in an automatic miscarriage of justice, even when the evidence established the defendant's guilt
beyond question. 3 This limited category of cases which evaded harmless
error review involved errors depriving the defendant of an "orderly legal
procedure." 14 Section 4/12 required appellate courts to apply the generally applicable harmless error test for all other errors. 5
From the adoption of section 4 1/2 in 1911 until the late 1950s, California appellate courts reviewed convictions based on wrongfully admitted confessions under the harmless error standard. 6 These early interof the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of
justice.
Id.
11. O'Bryan, 165 Cal. at 63-65, 130 P. at 1046. Section 4 1/2 was adopted to alleviate the adverse effect on law enforcement caused by the prejudice presumed requirement. Id. In O'Bryan, the California Supreme Court emphasized that "to grant new
trials to defendants on account of technical errors or omissions, even though a review
of the evidence . . . would have shown that the guilt of the accused had been established beyond question and by means of a procedure that was substantially fair and
just" produced unsatisfactory results "in not a few instances," and undermined the
public's confidence in the criminal justice system. Id.
12. 165 Cal. 55, 130 P. 1042 (1913).
13. Id. at 65-66, 130 P. at 1046.
14. Id. The court suggested that denying a defendant his right to trial by jury, or
subjecting him to double jeopardy, would constitute a per se miscarriage of justice. Id.
Other cases finding a miscarriage of justice without inquiry into whether the evidence
otherwise established guilt include: People v. Mroczko, 35 Cal. 3d 86, 672 P.2d 835, 197
Cal. Rptr. 52 (1983) (potential conflict of interest); People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258,
583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978) (jury selection discrimination); People v. Douglas, 61 Cal. 2d 430, 392 P.2d 964, 38 Cal. Rptr. 884 (1964) (denying right to separate
counsel); People v. Holmes, 54 Cal. 2d 442, 353 P.2d 583, 5 Cal. Rptr. 871 (1960) (improper waiver of right to jury).
15. O'Bryan, 165 Cal. at 65-66, 130 P. at 1046. In People v. Watson, 46 Cal. 2d 818,
299 P.2d 243 (1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 846 (1957), the California Supreme Court
refined the test for determining whether an error at trial resulted in a miscarriage of
justice: A miscarriage of justice results when after reviewing the evidence, the court
finds "that it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party
would have been reached in the absence of the error." Id. at 836, 299 P.2d at 254.
For a good discussion of harmless error review of criminal convictions in California, see 22 CAL JUR. 3D Criminal Law §§ 3769-3778 (1985 & Supp. 1993).
16. See, e.g., People v. Stroble, 36 Cal. 2d 615, 623-24, 631, 226 P.2d 330, 335-36, 340

pretations of section 4 1/2 did not construe the wrongful admission of involuntary or coerced confessions as an automatic miscarriage of justice."
Starting in the late 1950s, however, California courts began holding
that the admission of an involuntary confession required automatic reversal without regard to its prejudicial effect."8 These holdings were consistent with federal law in force at the time which compelled automatic
reversal in such cases. 9 In a number of decisions, the California Supreme Court addressed whether the federal or state law required the reversible per se rule set forth in these cases,n0 and repeatedly suggested
that both the federal and state constitutions compelled automatic rever2
sal. '
In People v. Jacobson,' the court discussed -the rationale underly-

(1951), affd sub nom. Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952); People v. Gonzales, 24
Cal. 2d 870, 877-78, 151 P.2d 251, 255 (1944); People v. Jones, 24 Cal. 2d 601, 604, 150
P.2d 801, 802 (1944); People v. Ferdinand, 194 Cal. 555, 565-70, 229 P. 341, 343-47
(1924); People v. Sourisseau, 62 Cal. App. 2d 917, 930-31, 145 P.2d 916, 923-24 (1944);
People v. Mellus, 134 Cal. App. 219, 220-26, 25 P.2d 237, 238-40 (1933); People v. Day,
125 Cal. App. 106, 110-11, 13 P.2d 855, 857 (1932); People v. Dye, 119 Cal. App. 262,
271-73, 6 P.2d 313, 316-17 (1931); People v. Reed, 68 Cal. App. 19, 20, 228 P. 361, 362
(1924).
17. Cahil, 5 Cal. 5th at 494, 853 P.2d at 1047-48, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 592-93.
18. See, e.g., People v. Jimenez, 21 Cal. 3d 595, 614, 580 P.2d 672, 683, 147 Cal.
Rptr. 172, 183 (1978), overruled in part by Cahill, 5 Cal. 4th 478, 853 P.2d 1037, 20
Cal. Rptr. 2d 582; People v. McClary, 20 Cal. 3d 218, 230, 571 P.2d 620, 627, 142 Cal.
Rptr. 163, 170 (1977); People v. Randall, 1 Cal. 3d 948, 958, 464 P.2d 114, 120-21, 83
Cal. Rptr. 658, 664-65 (1970); People v. Fioritto, 68 Cal. 2d 714, 720, 441 P.2d 625, 628,
68 Cal. Rptr. 817, 820 (1968); People v. Sears, 62 Cal. 2d 737, 743-44, 401 P.2d 938,
942, 44 Cal. Rptr. 330, 334 (1965); People v. Schader, 62 Cal. 2d 716, 728-31, 401 P.2d
665, 672-74, 44 Cal. Rptr. 193, 200-02 (1965); People v. Dorado, 62 Cal. 2d 338, 356-57,
398 P.2d 361, 373, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169, 181, cert. denied, 381 U.S. 937 (1965); People v.
Matteson, 61 Cal. 2d 466, 469-70, 393 P.2d 161, 163-64, 39 Cal. Rptr. 1, 3-4 (1964); People v. Brommel, 56 Cal. 2d 629, 634, 364 P.2d 845, 848, 15 Cal. Rptr. 909, 912 (1961);
People v. Trout, 54 Cal. 2d 576, 585, 354 P.2d 231, 236-37, 6 Cal. Rptr. 759, 764 (1960);
People v. Berve, 51 Cal. 2d 286, 290, 832 P.2d 97, 99 (1958).
19. See supra note 2.

20. See, e.g., Schader, 62 Cal. 2d at 728-31, 401 P.2d at 665, 672-74, 44 Cal. Rptr. at
200-02; People v. Jacobson, 63 Cal. 2d 319, 329-31, 405 P.2d 555, 562-63, 46 Cal. Rptr.
515, 521-23 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1015 (1966); Berve, 51 Cal. 2d at 290, 332
P.2d at 99.
21. See, e.g., Schader, 62 Cal. 2d at 728-31, 401 P.2d at 672-74, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 20002 (finding that article VI, § 4 1/2 of the California Constitution compelled automatic
reversal).
22. 63 Cal. 2d 319, 405 P.2d 555 (1965), 46 Cal. Rptr. 515, cert. denied, 384 U.S.
1015 (1966). Jacobson concerned a trial in which the court admitted a total of 10 confessions made by the defendant. Id. at 327-29, 331, 405 P.2d at 560-62, 563, 46 Cal.
Rptr. at 520-23. Although eight were validly admitted, the remaining two violated the
defendant's right to counsel. Id. The question presented was whether the two invalid
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ing the rule of automatic reversal in California.' The Jacobson court
reasoned that because confessions provide extremely "'persuasive evidence of guilt,'" and it is generally very difficult for appellate courts to
accurately determine the extent of their prejudicial effect, reviewing
courts should refrain from inquiring into the prejudicial effect of wrongfully admitted confessions.'
In 1991, the United States Supreme Court abolished its reversal per
se rule for the erroneous admission of confessions.' In People v. Cahill,
the California
Supreme Court decided whether California should do the
26
same.
III.

ANALYSIS

Justice George began the opinion by discussing the relevant background principles in California governing the reversal of convictions
when involuntary or coerced confessions are admitted at trial.' The
court acknowledged that its decisions since the late 1950s interpreted the
California Constitution as requiring automatic reversal for such convictions, and addressed whether it should reconsider California's indepen-

dent reversible per se rule in light of Fulminante.' For numerous rea-

confessions compelled reversal of the conviction despite the existence of eight validly
admitted confessions. Id. at 329, 405 P.2d at 562, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 522. While acknowledging that the wrongful admission of a confession normally required automatic
reversal, the court went on to hold that reversal was not warranted under the facts
presented in Jacobson. Id. at 333, 405 P.2d at 564, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 524. The court reasoned that because eight of the confessions were validly admitted, the two invalid confessions were only cumulative and could not plausibly have altered the outcome of the
trial. Id. at 331, 405 P.2d at 563, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 523. Thus, Jacobson set forth a specific exception to the reversible per se rule for multiple confessions when some of the
confessions are lawfully admitted.
23. Id. at 329-30, 405 P.2d at 562, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 522.
24. Id. (quoting People v. Parham, 60 Cal. 2d 378, 385, 384 P.2d 1001, 1005, 33 Cal.
Rptr. 497, 501 (1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 945 (1964)). The court expressly rejected
the rationale found in many federal decisions that one objective underlying the automatic reversal rule is to deter police misconduct. Id. at 329-30, 405 P.2d at 562, 46
Cal. Rptr. at 522; see also infra note 42 and accompanying text.
25. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 312 (1991).
26. CahiU, 5 Cal. 4th at 482-83, 853 P.2d at 1040, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 585.
27. Id. at 487-93, 853 P.2d at 1043-47, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 588-92.
28. Id. at 500, 853 P.2d at 1052, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 596-97. Because the prior California decisions relied in part on the California Constitution and Fulminante interpreted only the federal constitution, Fulminante did not by its own force abrogate the
California rule for involuntary confessions. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.

sons, the court found reconsideration appropriate.'
The court first examined California's constitutional provision governing reversible error.' While determining that on its face, the provision would subject all trial errors, including the admission of an involuntary confession, to a quantitative "prejudicial error" analysis, the court
specifically acknowledged that some errors which deprive a defendant of
"an orderly legal procedure" would result in a miscarriage of justice without examining the evidence admitted at trial.' The question, then, was
whether admitting an involuntary or coerced confession into evidence
was an error that would deny the defendant an orderly legal procedure,
and thereby place such errors within the purview of California's automatic miscarriage of justice rule.'
The court noted that for more than forty years after the enactment
of section 4 1/2 in 1911, California courts did not construe these errors
as warranting automatic reversal.' Only after the U.S. Supreme Court
first required automatic reversal in the late 1950s' did California courts
begin construing such errors as an automatic miscarriage of justice under
the California Constitution.35 Therefore, the court observed that even if
the California provision did require automatic reversal, California courts
were compelled to reverse such convictions automatically under the
federal constitution.
The court next addressed the validity of the reasoning in the Califor-

29. Id,at 501, 853 P.2d at 1053, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 598. In his dissent, Justice Mosk
criticized the majority's decision to review California's automatic reversal rule in light
of Fulminante. Id. at 512, 853 P.2d at 1060, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 605 (Mosk, J., dissenting). According to Justice Mosk, not only was the Fulminante decision wrong, but it
had absolutely no effect on California's independent reversible per se rule for involuntary confessions. Id. at 512 & n.1, 853 P.2d at 1060 & n.1, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 605 &
n.l (Mosk, J., dissenting). He concluded that the policy against admitting illegal confessions was to protect the defendant's fundamental right against self incrimination, and
that this interest requires automatic reversal to assure fairness in the contest between
the government and the individual. Id. at 515, 853 P.2d at 1063, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 608
(Mosk, J., dissenting) (quoting 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2251 (McNaughton rev.
ed. 1961)).
30. Id. at 501, 853 P.2d at 1052, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 597; see also CAL. CONST., art.
VI, § 13. For the text of the original article VI, § 4 1/2 enacted in 1911, see supra
note 10.
31. Cahill, 5 Cal. 4th at 501, 853 P.2d at 1052, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 597. The court
emphasized, for example, that errors denying one's right to trial by jury or an unbiased
judge are "structural defects" which deny the defendant a fair trial. Id. at 501, 853
P.2d at 1053, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 598; see also note 14 and accompanying text.
32. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
33. Cahill, 5 Cal. 4th at 502, 853 P.2d at 1053, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 598; see also supra note 16 and accompanying text.
34. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
35. Cahill, 5 Cal. 4th at 502, 853 P.2d at 1053, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 598.
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nia decisions requiring automatic reversal under the California Constitution.' The court noted that these holdings were based on the extremely
persuasive nature of confessions and the difficulty in determining their
precise effect on the jury.' The court criticized this reasoning as contrary to the purpose of California's reversible error provision which was
enacted to avoid "such a prophylactic approach to reversible error."'
None of these decisions suggested that the admission of an involuntary
confession deprived a defendant of an "orderly legal process."' Thus,
the only rationale discussed in these decisions, the prejudicial nature of
confessions alone, did not justify automatic reversal under the California
Constitution.'
The court then explored other rationales advanced for maintaining a
reversible per se rule in California.4' One objective for such a rule con-

36. Id.
37. Id. at 502-03, 853 P.2d at 1054, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 599. This rationale was succinctly stated in People v. Parham, where the California Supreme Court stated:
"Almost invariably ...
a confession will constitute persuasive evidence of
guilt, and it is therefore usually extremely difficult to determine what part it
played in securing the conviction. These considerations justify treating involuntary confessions as a class by themselves and refusing to inquire whether
in rare cases their admission in evidence had no bearing on the result."
People v. Parham, 60 Cal. 2d 378, 385, 384 P.2d 1001, 1005, 33 Cal. Rptr. 497, 501
(1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 945 (1964) (citations omitted).
38. Cahill, 5 Cal. 4th at 503, 853 P.2d at 1054, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 599. The court
also noted that these later decisions did not attempt to place involuntary confessions
into the limited category acknowledged under People v. O'Bryan, which included only
errors constituting a "structural defect" in the trial that denied a defendant his right to
an orderly legal procedure. Id.; see supra note 14 and accompanying text.
39. Id. at 502, 853 P.2d at 1054, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 599. In dissent, Justice Mosk
argued that depriving a defendant of his right against self incrimination, in and of
itself, undermines the policy of preventing government overreaching. Id. at 55, 853 P.2d
at 1063, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 608 (Mosk, J., dissenting); see supra note 29. But Justice
Mosk did not explicitly state that improper admission of a confession fell within the
limited category of trial errors constituting a per se miscarriage of justice as enunciated in O'Bryan. Cahill, 5 Cal. 4th at 512, 853 P.2d at 1060, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 605
(Mosk, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 503, 853 P.2d at 1054, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 599.
41. Id. at 506, 853 P.2d at 1056, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 601. In her dissent, Justice
Kennard argued that abolishing the rule of automatic reversal would send "the wrong
signal to police, to prosecutors, and to trial courts," emphasizing that the automatic
reversal rule put governmental officials on notice that courts will not tolerate "the use
of overbearing tactics to secure- confessions." Id. at 558-59, 853 P.2d at 1092, 20 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 637 (Kennard, J., dissenting).

cerns the deterrence of police misconduct.42 Both the California and federal constitutions prohibit eliciting involuntary or coerced confessions,
and law enforcement officials may refrain from eliciting involuntary or
coerced confessions if the confessions obtained could not sustain a criminal conviction. The court rejected this rationale for many reasons, including the fact that some involuntary confessions result from conduct
less egregious than other forms of police misconduct not warranting
automatic reversal,' and that the California reversible per se rule was
never based on an attempt to deter police misconduct.'
Finally, after concluding that the foregoing reasons did not justify
an automatic reversal rule in California, the court addressed whether
principles of stare decisis required continuance of the reversible per se
rule given its application in numerous decisions spanning a total of thirty
five years beginning in the late 1950s.' The court found that before
Fulminante,there was no need for California courts to closely scrutinize
California's constitutional provision governing reversal in these cases
because the U.S. Constitution required automatic reversal regardless of
state law.' In addition, the court noted that the California decisions
suddenly requiring automatic reversal in the late 1950s and 1960s did not
distinguish prior California decisions covering a span of more than forty
years which applied harmless error analysis when reviewing such convictions." The court also emphasized that the public policy underlying the
enactment of the reversible error provision, to maintain confidence in the
judicial system, is still of vital importance today.' Thus, the court held
that stare decisis principles did not preclude abolishing the reversible per
se rule in California.49
Therefore, there is no compelling justification for an automatic reversal rule in California.' The court held that California appellate courts
42. Id. at 506, 853 P.2d at 1057, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 602.
43. The court noted that admission of evidence resulting from unlawful searches or
seizures, which is often more egregious than involuntary confessions, has not warranted
automatic reversal by the courts. Id. at 506, 853 P.2d at 1056, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 601.
44. Id. at 506, 853 P.2d at 1057, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 602; see also supra note 24 and
accompanying text.
45. Id. at 508, 853 P.2d at 1057, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 602.
46. Id. at 508, 853 P.2d at 1058, 20 Cal: Rptr. 2d at 603. In light of Fulminante,
however, the proper interpretation of California's Constitution is now critical to
whether automatic reversal is required in California.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. In her dissent, Justice Kennard argued that principles of stare decisis should
prevent reconsideration of California's automatic reversal rule to facilitate "stability in
the law" and "'certainty of adjudication.'" Id. at 557, 853 P.2d at 1091, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 636 (Kennard, J., dissenting) (quoting 6 B.E. WITHIN, CAUIFORNIA PROCEDURE § 758
(3d ed. 1985)).
50. Other reasons which purportedly necessitate a rule of automatic reversal not
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must assess the erroneous admission of coerced or involuntary confessions under the general harmless error test," thereby overruling the long
line of California decisions holding that such an admission automatically
constituted a miscarriage of justice.'
IV.

CONCLUSION

Cahill stands for the proposition that, under California law, appellate courts must apply a harmless error analysis to the wrongful admission of confessions at trial. To restore confidence in the criminal justice
system, and to comply with the mandates of the California Constitution,
California now joins the U.S. Supreme Court in abolishing the rule of

automatic reversal.

DOUGLAS J. DENNINGTON

specifically discussed by the majority, include preventing the erosion of the harmless
error standard, providing a bright line rule that would conserve appellate resources,
and remedying the wrong caused by the wrongful admission of a confession. Id. at
558-59, 853 P.2d at 1091-92, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 636-38 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 509-10, 853 P.2d at 1059, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 604. In California, this test
has come to be known as the "reasonable probability" test as set forth in People v.
Watson, 46 Cal. 2d 818, 837, 299 P.2d 243, 255 (1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 846
(1957). Although this test is less rigorous than the federal harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard, the federal requires that reviews of such convictions comply with
the guidelines set forth in Fulminante. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 312
(1991).
52. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.

B.

An appellate court may not employ the "generalverdict
rule" when reviewing a general verdict containing special interrogatories:Tavaglione v. Billings.

In Tavaglione v. Billings,' the California Supreme Court considered
whether an appellate court may affirm a lower court decision arising out
of a general verdict with special interrogatories using the "general verdict
rule."2 The court granted review to determine whether the court of appeal correctly affirmed a trial court decision based on a single theory of
recovery,
and dismissed issues on appeal raising other theories of recov3
ery.
In Tavaglione, the plaintiff filed a lawsuit after being ousted as a
member of Riverside National Bank's (RNB) board of directors by several other members of RNB's board.4 The trial court ordered a general
verdict with special interrogatories,6 directing the jury to allocate damages on various theories of liability identified in the complaint.' The jury
returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, finding RNB and other defendants liable for damages
The defendants appealed the judgment claiming erroneous jury in-

1. 4 Cal. 4th 1150, 847 P.2d 574, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 608 (1993). Chief Justice Lucas
delivered the majority opinion, with Justices Panelli, Kennard, Arabian, Baxter, and
George concurring. Id. at 1152, 847 P.2d at 576, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 610. Justice Mosk
dissented in a separate opinion. Id. at 1160, 847 P.2d at 581, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 615
(Mosk, J., dissenting).
2. Id. at 1152, 847 P.2d at 576, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 610. The general verdict rule is
discussed infra note 10.
3. Id.

4. Id. The plaintiff borrowed money from RNB and occasionally failed to make
timely payments on loans. The board of directors of RNB subsequently enacted a bylaw disqualifying any borrower in default for 30 days or more from acting as a director. As a result, the board dismissed the plaintiff prompting him to sell his interest in
RNB to another bank. Id. at 1152-53, 847 P.2d at 576, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 610. The
plaintiff pleaded seven causes of action: illegal ouster, defamation; wrongful disclosure
of confidential information; tortious breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing; intentional interference with contractual relations; interference with prospective
economic advantage; and negligent interference with relations with financial institutions.
Id. at 1153-54, 847 P.2d at 576-77, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 610-11.
5. See 7 B.E. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Trial §§ 323-25 (3d ed. 1985 & Supp.
1994) (providing a general description and overview of the use, procedure, and form of
special interrogatories contained within general verdicts).
6. Tavaglione, 4 Cal. 4th at 1154, 847 P.2d at 577, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 611.
7. Id. at 1154-55, 847 P.2d at 577-78, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 611-12. The jury returned
a verdict finding the defendants liable for the plaintiffs removal from the board, defamation, breach of the implied covenant of good faith, conspiring to interfere, and
actual intentional interference with contractual relations. Id. at 1154, 847 P.2d at 577,
17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 611.
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structions and insufficient evidence supporting the various causes of
action.8 The court of appeal applied the general verdict rule' and, consequently, limited its review to the supporting evidence relating to one
cause of action."0 In upholding the judgment below, the court of appeal
stated that the "'plaintiff was entitled to recover the same amount of
damages under any theory alleged and proved at trial.'"" Therefore, the
appellate court deemed the special interrogatories "'meaningless and...
irrelevant"' and upheld the judgment based solely on the evidence supporting the defamation cause of action.'"
On review, the supreme court relied upon section 625 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, 3 thereby giving effect to the jury answers to the special interrogatories. " In disapproving the use of the general verdict rule,
the court distinguished the cases the appellate court cited because the
verdict supplied by the jury in the instant case contained special interrogatories." Recognizing that the award for the defamation cause of action

8. Id. at 1155, 847 P.2d at 578, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 612.
9. For a definition of the "general verdict rule," see Crogan v. Metz, 47 Cal. 2d

398, 403, 303 P.2d 1029, 1032 (1956) (stating that a general verdict with various causes
of action may be upheld on review by relying on only one cause of action); see also,
7 B.E. WITIGN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Trial § 331 (3d. ed 1985) ("Where there are
several counts or causes of action, a general verdict will stand if the evidence supports
it on any one sufficient count") (emphasis in original).
10. Tavaglione, 4 Cal. 4th at 1155, 847 P.2d at 578, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 612.
11. Id. at 1156, 847 P.2d at 578, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 612 (quoting the court of appeal).
12. Id. (quoting the court of appeal).
13. Section 625 of the Code of Civil Procedure states in pertinent part: "Where a
special finding of facts is inconsistent with the general verdict, the former controls the
latter, and the court must give judgment accordingly." CAL CIv. PROC. CODE § 625
(West 1976 & Supp. 1993).
14. Tavaglione, 4 Cal. 4th at 1156-57, 847 P.2d at 579, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 613. The
court relied on this part of the code to refute the appellate court's statement that the
special findings were "meaningless and . . . irrelevant." Id. For an example of inconsistent findings with general verdicts, see Hasson v. Ford Motor Co., 19 Cal. 3d 530,
540, 564 P.2d 857, 863-64, 138 Cal. Rptr. 705, 711-12 (1977) (discussing the application
of California Code of Civil Procedure § 625 to inconsistent answers to special interrogatories relating to defects and negligence in the manufacturing of automobiles).
15. Tavaglione, 4 Cal. 4th at 1158, 847 P.2d at 580, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 614. The
court noted that the general verdict rule is based on the assumption that juries find
for the theory on which there was substantial evidence, but that this assumption may
be refuted by the use of special interrogatories. Id. at 1157, 847 P.2d at 579, 17 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 613 (citing McCloud v. Roy Riegels Chem., 20 Cal. App. 3d. 928, 935-36, 97
Cal. Rptr. 910, 915 (1971) (defining the rationale for the general verdict rule)). The
court noted that both Crogan v. Metz, 47 Cal. 2d 398, 303 P.2d 1029 (1956), and

amounted to only a fraction of the total jury award, the court held that
limiting review to defamation in order to substantiate the general verdict
was improper.'" The court also dismissed the plaintiffs argument that
the defendants waived their right to assert inconsistencies in the findings.'7 The court further discredited the appellate court's statement that
the plaintiff was entitled to recover the same amount regardless of the
theory relied upon.'8 Accordingly, the court dismissed the use of the
general verdict rule and remanded the case for a thorough review of
each issue of recovery. "
As the dissent noted, the application of the general verdict rule is
rooted in statutory and case law," and this decision only clarifies the
proper use of the general verdict rule. In the future, courts below must
review a general verdict on all theories of recovery when there are special interrogatories relating to each cause of action.

ERIC MASAKI TOKUYAMA

Gilman v. Nemetz, 203 Cal. App. 2d 81, 21 Cal. Rptr. 317 (1962), applied the general
verdict rule to verdicts without special interrogatories where specific dollar amounts
were assigned to the different theories of recovery. Tavaglione, 4 Cal. 4th at 1158, 847
P.2d at 580, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 614.
16. Id. at 1158, 847 P.2d at 579-80, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 613-14. The court observed
that the award for defamation amounted to only $604,787, while the total verdict
awarded to the plaintiff was $2,254,787. Id.
17. Id. at 1157-58, 847 P.2d at 579-80, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 613-14. The court emphasized that the only issue on appeal is the use of the general verdict rule and not the
reconciliation of the special findings with the verdict. Id. at 1158, 847 P.2d at 579-80,
17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 613-14.
18. Id. at 1158-59, 847 P.2d at 580, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 614. The court explained that
the plaintiff is not entitled to double recovery for one compensable damage; therefore,
the reviewing court should ensure that substantial evidence, through the use of special
findings, supports each award of damages. Id.
19. Id. at 1159, 847 P.2d at 580-81, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 614-15. The majority disregarded Justice Mosk's dissenting opinion by stating that, on remand, the appellate court
can dismiss issues either on procedural or substantive matters. Id. at 1159, 847 P.2d at
581, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 615. Justice Mosk adamantly concluded, however, that the defendants failed to abide by procedural rules, and therefore, the affirmation by the appellate court should be upheld. Id. at 1160-63, 847 P.2d at 581-83, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at
615-17 (Mosk, J., dissenting). Justice Mosk stated that the defendants failed to point
out and to support the alleged error in their brief to the court of appeal. Id. at
1160-61, 847 P.2d at 581-82, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 615-16 (Mosk, J., dissenting). Therefore,
Justice Mosk concluded that the court of appeal, when considering the case on remand, should affirm the decision based on the defendants' procedural error. Id. at
1162, 847 P.2d at 582-83, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 616-17 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
20. Id. at 1160, 847 P.2d at 581, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 615; see supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
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I.

CIVIL PROCEDURE
Evidence Code section 1157(a) precludes a plaintiff suing for medical malpractice from discovering a
physician's applicationor reapplicationfor medical staff
privileges: Alexander v. Superior Court.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Alexander v. Superior Court,1 the California Supreme Court considered whether Evidence Code section 1157(a) prevents a medical malpractice plaintiff from discovering a physician's application or reapplication for hospital medical staff privileges.2 The court unanimously held
that medical staff applications and reapplications are within the scope of
Evidence Code section 1157(a) and are, therefore, undiscoverable' It
reasoned that the legislative purpose underlying the statute is to promote

1. 5 Cal. 4th 1218, 859 P.2d 96, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 397 (1993). Chief Justice Lucas
wrote the unanimous opinion, with Justices Mosk, Panelli, Kennard, Arabian, Baxter,
and George concurring. Id. at 1220, 859 P.2d at 97, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 398.
2. Id. at 1223-28, 859 P.2d at 99-102, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 400-03. Section 1157(a) of
the California Evidence Code provides in pertinent part: "Neither the proceedings nor
the records of organized committees of medical . . . staffs in hospitals, or of a peer
review body . . . having the responsibility of evaluation and improvement of the quality
of care rendered in the hospital . .. shall be subject to discovery." CAL. EVID. CODE
§ 1157(a) (West Supp. 1994).
It should be noted that subdivision (c) of § 1157 is not relevant to the issue addressed by the court. Subdivision (c) states that "[tlhe prohibition relating to discovery
or testimony does not apply . . . to any person requesting hospital staff privileges." Id.
§ 1157(c). This means that a physician who is requesting staff privileges may obtain
medical staff committee records in an administrative action against the hospital. California Eye Inst. v. Superior Court, 215 Cal. App. 3d 1477, 1481, 264 Cal. Rptr, 83, 85
(1989).
See generally 27 CAL. JUR. 3D Discovery and Depositions § 32 (1987 & Supp.
1994) (discussing the privilege of hospital medical staff committee records against discovery); 2 B.E. WITKIN, CAUFORNIA EVIDENCE, Witnesses § 1096 (3d ed. 1986 & Supp.
1993) (discussing the scope of Evidence Code § 1157).
3. Alexander, 5 Cal. 4th at 1228, 859 P.2d at 102, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 403. The
supreme court reversed the court of appeal. Id. The court also disapproved Hinson v.
Clairemont Community Hosp. to the extent that it is inconsistent with the court's view.
Id. at 1228 n.10, 859 P.2d at 102 n.10, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 403 n.10. In Hinson, the
court concluded that an application for staff privileges did not fall within the scope of
Evidence Code § 1157 because an "application is neither necessarily a 'proceeding' nor
a 'record' of a committee; it is a document prepared and completed by an individual
physician." 218 Cal. App. 3d 1110, 1128, 267 Cal. Rptr. 503, 514 (1990); see supra note
2 for the statutory text of Evidence Code § 1157(a).

the free and candid exchange of information among physicians.4 If mal-

practice plaintiffs could gain access to medical staff applications, doctors
seeking hospital privileges would be reluctant to disclose negative information that could be critical to the protection of patients.'
The supreme court also considered whether the court of appeal
erred by processing the petitioner's writ application for review of discovery matter under the accelerated procedure authorized by section 1088 of
the Code of Civil Procedure rather than processing it under the ordinary
alternative writ procedure.' The supreme court reversed the court of
appeal, holding that it improperly proceeded under section 1088 of the

Code of Civil Procedure.!
II.

A.

TREATMENT OF THE CASE

The Court of Appeal Improperly Processed the Writ Application
Under the Expedited ProcedureAuthorized by Section 1088 of
the Code of Civil Procedure

The expedited procedure authorized by section 1088 allows for an
issuance of a peremptory writ of mandate in the first instance.' The

4. Alexander, 5 Cal. 4th at 1226-28, 859 P.2d at 101-02, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 402-03;
see CAL. JuR. 3D, supra note 2, at § 32 (stating that the "statute was enacted to encourage candor and objectivity in peer investigations by hospital medical staff committees.").
5. See infra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
6. Alexander, 5 Cal. 4th at 1222-23, 859 P.2d at 98-99, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 399-400.
California Code of Civil Procedure § 1088 provides in pertinent part: "When the application to the court is made without notice to the adverse party, and the writ is allowed, the alternative must be first issued; but if the application is upon due notice
and the writ is allowed, the peremptory may be issued in the first instance." CAL Cw.
PROC. CODE § 1088 (West 1980 & Supp. 1994). See generally Ng v. Superior Court, 4
Cal. 4th 29, 840 P.2d 961, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 856 (1992) (discussing the issuance of preemptory writ); Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc., 36 Cal. 3d 171, 681 P.2d 893,
203 Cal. Rptr. 626 (1984) (involving the use of preemptory writ under § 1088).
7. Alexander, 5 Cal. 4th at 1223, 859 P.2d at 99, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 400.
8. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1088 (West 1980) (stating that "if the application is upon
due notice and the writ is allowed, the peremptory may be issued in the first instance"); see also id. § 1087 (distinguishing between a peremptory writ and an alternative writ). Section 1087 provides:
The writ may be either alternative or peremptory. The alternative writ must
command the party to whom it is directed immediately after the receipt of
the writ, or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be performed, or to show cause before the court at a time and place then or
thereafter specified by court order why he has not done so. The peremptory
writ must be in a similar form, except that the words requiring the party to
show cause why he has not done as commanded must be omitted.
Id. See generally 8 B.E. WITIUN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Extraordinary Writs §§ 4, 65,
94 (3d ed. 1985 & Supp. 1994) (discussing the writ of mandate in general and as an
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court explained that this accelerated procedure is an exception and
should not be used generally.! The court further explained that the procedure is only justified when (1) there is an "'unusual urgency'" for resolution of petitioner's writ application, or (2) when the "'petitioner's entitlement to relief [is] so obvious'" that no purpose would be served by
consideration of the issue; such as, when entitlement to discovery has
been conceded or when there has been "'clear error under well-settled
principles of law.'""0
The court held that the court of appeal erred in processing the
petitioner's writ application for review of discovery matter under section
1088." It reasoned that the record did not suggest any "unusual urgency" requiring acceleration of the normal process." Moreover, the
"petitioners' 'entitlement to relief [was not] 'so obvious' that no purpose
could reasonably be served by plenary consideration of the issue' or that
the matter involved 'conceded or clear error under well-settled principles
of law."'.. In fact, the court concluded that the petitioners were not entitled to relief because the documents sought to be discovered were protected by medical staff committee privilege. 4 Therefore, the supreme
court held that the court of appeal incorrectly applied section 1088 of the
Code of Civil Procedure. 0

appropriate remedy to compel discovery or to prevent improper discovery); 8 B.E.
WIMN, CAUFORNIA PROCEDURE, Extraordinary Writs § 195 (3d ed. 1985 & Supp. 1994)
(discussing the peremptory writ without an alternative writ).
9. Alexander, 5 Cal. 4th at 1223, 859 P.2d at 98, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 399 (citing Ng,
4 Cal. 4th at 35, 840 P.2d at 964, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 859).
10. Id. (quoting Ng, 4 Cal. 4th at 35, 840 P.2d at 964, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 859). The
Ng court stated that "[i]f there is no compelling temporal urgency, and if the law and
facts mandating the relief sought are not entirely clear, the normal writ procedure, including issuance of an alternative writ should be followed." 4 Cal. 4th at 35, 840 P.2d
at 964, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 859 (citations omitted).
11. Alexander, 5 Cal. 4th at 1223, 859 P.2d at 99, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 400.
12. Id. (quoting Ng, 4 Cal. 4th at 35, 840 P.2d at 964, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 895).
13. Id. at 1223, 859 P.2d at 98-99, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 399-400 (quoting Ng, 4 Cal.
4th at 35, 840 P.2d at 964, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 859).
14. See infra notes 16-29 and accompanying text.
15. Alexander, 5 Cal. 4th at 1223, 859 P.2d at 99, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 400.

B.

Evidence Code Section 1157
1. Applications and Reapplications for Staff Privileges Qualify
as "Records" Under Section 1157 of the Evidence Code

Section 1157(a) states that "[n]either the proceedings nor the records of organized committees of medical... staffs in hospitals, or of a
peer review body... shall be subject to discovery."" The court addressed the issue of whether applications and reapplications for staff
privileges qualify as "records" under this provision."7 The petitioners argued that section 1157(a) does not protect applications for staff
privileges from discovery because such applications are not "generated
by" the committee.'8 The court rejected this interpretation of the statute,
stating that nothing in section 1157(a) suggests a legislative intent to
draw a distinction between records that are "generated by" the medical
staff committee and materials that are "submitted to" the committee."
The court also explained that because the legislature has defined the
term "record" broadly in other contexts, "it is unlikely the legislature
intended a narrow or limited definition of 'records' in section 1157(a)"'
2.

The Legislative Purpose Underlying Section 1157(a)

The legislature enacted section 1157(a) on the theory that allowing
malpractice plaintiffs access to peer investigations would stifle candor
and inhibit objectivity.2' The court asserted that the petitioners' interpre16. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1157(a) (West Supp. 1994).
17. Alexander, 5 Cal. 4th at 1223-24, 859 P.2d at 99, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 400.
18. Id. at 1225, 859 P.2d at 100, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 401. The petitioners relied on
Hinson v. Clairemont Community Hosp., 218 Cal. App. 3d 1110, 267 Cal. Rptr. 503
(1990). Id. The Hinson court stated that "[t]he privilege contained in Evidence Code
section 1157 'applies only to records of and proceedings before medical investigative
committees' [and that] '[i]nformation developed or obtained by hospital administrators
or others which does not derive from an investigation . . . by a medical staff committee . . . is not rendered immune from discovery under section 1157 merely because it
is later placed in the possession of a medical staff committee.'" 218 Cal. App. 3d at
1127-28, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 513 (quoting Schulz v. Superior Court, 66 Cal. App. 3d 440,
446, 136 Cal. Rptr. 67, 71 (1977) and Santa Rosa Memorial Hosp. v. Superior Court,
174 Cal. App. 3d 711, 724, 220 Cal. Rptr. 236, 245 (1985)). The court of appeal agreed
with the reasoning in Hinson. Alexander, 5 Cal. 4th at 1225, 859 P.2d at 100, 23 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 401.
19. Alexander, 5 Cal. 4th at 1225, 859 P.2d at 100, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 401.
20. Id. at 1225 n.6, 859 P.2d at 100 n.6, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 401 n.6. For example,
under the State Records Management Act, Government Code § 14741, "record" is defined as "all papers ...
and other documents produced, received, owned or used by
an agency." Id. (quoting CAL GOV'T CODE § 14751 (West 1980 & Supp. 1994)). Evidence
Code § 1560(a)(2) states that a "business record 'includes every record maintained
by . . . a business.'" Id. (quoting CAL. EVID. CODE § 1560(a)(2) (West 1966 & Supp.
1993)).
21. Alexander, 5 Cal. 4th at 1227, 859 P.2d at 101, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 402 (citing
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tation of section 1157(a), which distinguished materials submitted to the
committee from those generated by the committee, undermined the legislative purpose underlying the statute.' It explained that a legislative policy promoting the truthful exchange of information among physicians
applies equally to materials "submitted to" a hospital's medical committee as it does to materials "generated by" the committee. 2 It is crucial
that physicians seeking hospital privileges disclose all pertinent information to the committee, including negative information.' The court suggested that a physician might withhold information critical to the protection of patients, fearing that the application might someday be used
against him by a third party.'
Moreover, allowing discovery of medical staff application materials
would permit the disclosure of letters of reference, which often contain
negative information regarding a physician's competence." As a result,
physicians might not provide constructive criticism about their colleagues in order to protect one another from adverse decisions in malpractice lawsuits.' If physicians did not provide negative information or
constructive criticism about themselves or their peers, medical staffs
would not know when to restrict privileges, require monitoring, or require further education.' Therefore, the court found that section 1157(a)
includes materials submitted to the committee, ultimately concluding that
staff applications and reapplications are protected from discovery in a
medical malpractice suit.'

Matchett v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. App. 3d 623, 629, 115 Cal. Rptr. 317, 320 (1974)).
In Matchett, the court stated, "[slection 1157 was enacted upon the theory that external
access to peer investigations conducted by staff committees stifles candor and inhibits
objectivity. It evinces a legislative judgment that the quality of in-hospital medical practice will be elevated by armoring staff inquiries with a measure of confidentiality." 40
Cal. App. 3d at 629, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 320.
22. Alexander, 5 Cal. 4th at 1226, 859 P.2d at 101, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 402.
23.. Id. at 1227, 859 P.2d at 101, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 402.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1227, 859 P.2d at 101-02, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 402-03.
26. Id. at 1227-28, 859 P.2d at 102, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 403.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1228, 859 P.2d at 102, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 403.
29. Id.

III.

CONCLUSION

In an effort to promote the legislative policy of encouraging the truthful exchange of information among physicians, the California Supreme
Court interpreted Evidence Code section 1157(a) broadly. The Alexander
decision may potentially make it more difficult for a plaintiff to recover
in a malpractice suit by making recorded evidence of physician incompetence unavailable."0 However, section 1157(a) does not prevent a
plaintiff from otherwise discovering the information.3' For example, a
plaintiff may depose a physician and ask whether he or she was previously denied staff privileges, or a plaintiff may review public records to
determine whether the physician has been subject to a malpractice judgment or a disciplinary action.'

APRIL LERMAN

30. In Matchett, the court asserted that the confidentiality requirement impairs a malpractice plaintiffs access to evidence. "Section 1157 represents a legislative choice
between competing concerns. It embraces the goal of medical staff candor at the cost
of impairing plaintiffs' access to evidence." 40 Cal. App. 3d 623, 629, 115 Cal. Rptr.
317, 320-21.
31. Alexander, 5 Cal. 4th at 1223-24 n.4, 859 P.2d at 99 n.4, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 400
n.4.
32. Id.
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III.

COMMUNITY PROPERTY
The death of one spouse, after final judgment dissolving
marital status but before allocation of assets in a bifurcated dissolution proceeding, does not abate the proceeding or vest jointly held maritalproperty in the surviving
former spouse by right of survivorship where the trial
court, upon bifurcation, reserves jurisdiction to determine all remaining issues: In re Marriage of Hilke.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Former Civil Code section 4800.1 creates a presumption that property acquired by marital partners and held in joint tenancy is community
property.' In In re Marriage of Hilke,2 the California Supreme Court

1. In re Marriage of Hilke, 4 Cal. 4th 215, 217, 841 P.2d 891, 892, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d
371, 372 (1992). Former Civil Code § 4800.1(b) stated:
For the purpose of division of property upon dissolution of marriage or legal
separation, property acquired by the parties during marriage in joint form,
including property held in . . . joint tenancy . . . is presumed to be community property. This presumption is a presumption affecting the burden of
proof and may be rebutted by either of the following:
(1) A clear statement in the deed or other documentary evidence of title
by which the property is acquired that the property is separate property
and not community property.
(2) Proof that the parties have made a written agreement that the property is separate property.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800.1(b) (West 1983), repealed and replaced by CAL. FAM. CODE
§§ 2580-81 (West 1994). Effective January 1, 1994, Family Code §§ 2580, 2581 replaced
Civil Code § 4800.1. These sections continue former Civil Code § 4800.1(a), 4800.1(b)
"without substantive change." CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 2580, 2581 (West 1994) (Law Revision
Commission Comments). Th4 court's holding in Hilke thus has continuing validity when
interpreting similar issues under the new Family Code.
2. 4 Cal. 4th 215, 841 P.2d 891, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 371 (1992). Justice Panelli wrote
for the unanimous court.
Mr. and Mrs. Hilke acquired a house in 1969 and held it in joint tenancy. Twenty
years later Mrs. Hilke filed for divorce. The parties stipulated to a bifurcated proceeding in which the court would first dissolve the marriage and later divide the property
at issue. After the trial court entered judgment dissolving the marriage but before the
division of property, Mrs. Hilke died.
After Mrs. Hilke's death, the trial court divided the jointly held house as if it were
community property, applying the presumption of Civil Code § 4800.1. The court of
appeal reversed, reasoning that the intervening death of the wife before the court divided marital assets, and thus before the statutory presumption could be applied, vested the jointly held property in the husband by right of survivorship. In re Marriage of

considered whether property held jointly vests in the surviving spouse by
right of survivorship when one spouse in a bifurcated dissolution proceeding dies after the entry of judgmefit but before the division of community and separate assets.3 The court held that with respect to a party's
death after judicial determination of marital status but before property
disposition, marital property jointly held does not vest in the other party
by right of survivorship if the court reserved jurisdiction to decide the
property issue.4
II.

DISCUSSION

The court first addressed whether the presumption in Civil Code
section 4800.1 applied to property disposed of subsequent to the death of
a party in a bifurcated dissolution proceeding.5 The surviving party argued that his former spouse's intervening death abated the dissolution
proceeding, and therefore the trial court lacked jurisdiction to determine
the nature of marital property held in joint tenancy.6 The supreme court

Hilke, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 333, 336 (Ct. App. 1992) revd, 4 Cal. 4th 215, 841 P.2d 891, 14
Cal. Rptr. 2d 371 (1992). The supreme court granted review and unanimously reversed
the judgment of the court of appeal. See 11 B.E. WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW,
Community Property § 191 (Supp. 1993) (briefly discussing In re Marriage of Hilke);
Susan Freinkel, Community Property Trumps Right of Joint Tenancy, THE RECORDER,
Dec. 18, 1992, at 2 (same).
3. Hilke, 4 Cal. 4th at 217-18, 841 P.2d at 892-93, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 372-73. The
supreme court granted review to resolve an important question of law and the apparent conflict between the courts of appeal. See also, CAL R. CTY. 29(a) (including the
resolution of both an important question of law and an apparent conflict in the courts
of appeal as grounds for supreme court review); 11 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Community Property § 188-201 (9th ed. 1990) (providing a historical perspective on the development of the presumption that property acquired during the marriage
and held in joint form is community property); Recommendation Relating to Civil
Code Sections 4800.1 and 4800.2, 18 CAL. L. REV. COMM'N REP. 1 (1993) (same); 32
CAL JUR. 3D Family Law 88 443-44 (1977 & Supp. 1993) (citing practice aids and case
authority interpreting and applying Civil Code §§ 4800.1 and 4800.2.
4. Hilke, 4 Cal. 4th at 221, 841 P.2d at 895, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 375; see also CAL
FAM. CODE § 2337(c) (West 1994) (requiring the same mandatory reservation of jurisdiction as former Civil Code § 4515(c)).
5. Hilke, 4 Cal. 4th at 220, 841 P.2d at 895, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 375. All further
statutory references are to the Civil Code unless otherwise indicated.
6. Id. at 220, 841 P.2d at 895, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 375; see also 11 B.E. WITKIN,
SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Husband and Wife § 127 (9th ed. 1990) (stating the general rule in divorce, separate maintenance, dissolution, and legal separation cases "that
the action abates on the death of either spouse prior to entry of final judgment"); 1
CAL. JUR. 3D Actions § 145 (1972) (stating that a dissolution proceeding and appeals
thereto abate at the death of either party prior to entry of final judgment because
dissolution is purely a personal action to determine the status of the parties). But see
id. at § 83 (explaining that an action or proceeding does not abate because of the
death or disability of a party if the cause of action survives); CAL FAM. CODE § 2346
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rejected this argument, reasoning that because the trial court reserved
jurisdiction to determine property issues after adjudicating marital status,
the spouse's intervening death did not abate the proceeding.7
The court also addressed the surviving former spouse's contention
that section 4800.1 violated due process protections against retroactive
application of laws which impair vested property rights.8 The couple acquired their house in the form of joint tenancy in 1969; however the
statutory presumption against joint tenancy was not given effect until
1986."
The supreme court stated that section 4800.1(c)(3) mandated retroactive application and must be applied absent constitutional barriers."
Retroactive legislation is unconstitutional when it creates an ex post
facto law or when it impairs either an existing contract right or a vested
property right." The court quickly dismissed the first two grounds as
inapplicable and only addressed whether retroactive application of section 4800.1 impaired a vested property right. 2 The court stated that in
order for the surviving spouse to have had a vested property right, he
needed to have survived his wife while at the same time remaining married. 3 Because the former wife did not die until after dissolution, the
court concluded that the surviving spouse had not fulfilled the condition
precedent of remaining married. Therefore, the court constitutionally
applied the statutory presumption against jointly held marital property in
this case. 4

(West 1994) (stating that after final judgment, if mistake, negligence or inadvertence
results in a failure to sign, tile or enter the dissolution order, it may be corrected with
a nunc pro tunc entry).
7. Hilke, 4 Cal. 4th at 220, 841 P.2d at 895, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 375.
8. Id. at 221, 841 P.2d at 895, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 375.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 222, 841 P.2d at 896, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 376.
11. Id.

12. Id.
13. Id. The joint-tenancy presumption is only applicable when determining property

issues in dissolution and legal separation proceedings.
14. Id. Cf. 11 B.E. WrIuaN, SUMMARY OF CAIFORNIA LAW, Community Property § 198201 (9th ed. 1990) (discussing the retroactivity problems found in In re Marriage of

Buol, 39 Cal. 3d 751, 705 P.2d 354, 218 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1985) and In re Marriage of
Fabian, 41 Cal. 3d 440, 715 P.2d 253, 224 Cal. Rptr. 333 (1986), based upon the fact
that the statutory writing requirement interfered with a vested right in both cases). But
cf. 11 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Community Property § 201 (9th ed.
1990) (discussing the unconstitutionality of retroactively applying Civil Code §§ 4800.1
and 4800.2, despite the legislature's enactment of an emergency statute, which counter-

III.

CONCLUSION

The California Supreme Court's decision of In re Marriageof Hilke
held that the death of a party between the court's determination of marital status and property disposition does not vest jointly held marital
property in the other party by right of survivorship if the court reserved
jurisdiction to decide property issues when it bifurcated the dissolution
proceeding.'5 The court further held that the statutory presumption did
not violate due process by being retroactively applied in this case because the trial court dissolved the marriage before the former spouse
died."6 This result is fair because the status quo of the respective parties'
rights to marital property is preserved as of the date of dissolution."

MICHAEL E. MURPHY

acts judicial decisions that find retroactive application of the writing requirement unconstitutional when it interferes with a vested right); 11 B.E. WITIaN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Community Property § 191 (Supp. 1993) (stating that the legislature enacted Family Code § 2580 to avoid constitutional retroactivity problems).
15. Hilke, 4 Cal. 4th at 221, 841 P.2d at 895, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 375.
16. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
17. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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IV.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A. The Boykin-Tahl requirement that the defendant
must be specifically notified of the constitutional
rights he or she is waiving when entering a plea
equivalent to a guilty plea is not applicable in a
case where the defendant merely stipulates to evidentiaryfacts and the People still have the burden of
proving the crime: People v. Adams.

In People v. Adams', the California Supreme Court addressed the
application of the Boykin-TahlV requirements to California Penal Code

1. 6 Cal. 4th 570, 862 P.2d 831, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 831 (1993). Justice Baxter
authored the majority opinion, with Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Mosk, Panelli,
Kennard and George concurring. Id. at 572-83, 862 P.2d at 831-40, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
831-40. Justice Arabian wrote a separate concurring opinion. Id. at 583-84, 862 P.2d at
840, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 840.
2. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). In Boykin, the Supreme Court found
that a trial court judge must proactively determine that a defendant who pleads guilty
to a crime is fully aware of the constitutional rights that he or she is forfeiting. Id. at
243-44. A defendant's rights include the right to a jury trial, the right to confront one's
accusers, and the right against self incrimination. Id. at 241, 243 (citing Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147-58 (1968); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403-06 (1965);
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964)). The Court noted that a guilty plea is "more
than a confession which admits that the accused did various acts; it is itself a conviction . . . ." 395 U.S. at 242 (citing Kercheval v. U.S., 274 U.S. 220, 223 (1927)). The
Court reasoned that because a guilty plea is the practical equivalent of a conviction,
the voluntariness of the plea must meet constitutional standards. Id. Accordingly, the
Court explained that it was impermissible to presume a waiver from a silent record.
Id. at 242. Rather, the Court pointed out that "[the record must show ...
that an
accused was offered counsel but intelligently and understandingly rejected the offer."
Id. (quoting Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516 (1962)).
3. In re Tahl, 1 Cal. 3d 122, 460 P.2d 449, 81 Cal. Rptr. 577 (1969), cert. denied,
398 U.S. 911 (1970). In Tahl, the California Supreme Court took the Boykin ruling a
step further by concluding that in order to meet the constitutional standard of a voluntary and intelligent plea, the trial judge must show on the face of the record that
the defendant was made aware of his constitutional rights as well as the nature of the
charge and the consequences of his plea. Id. at 132, 460 P.2d at 456, 81 Cal. Rptr. at
584; see supra note 2. Each right must be specifically enumerated and waived by the
defendant. Tahl, 1 Cal. 3d at 132, 460 P.2d at 456, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 584; see supra note
2. However, this strict mandate was later curbed in People v. Howard, 1 Cal. 4th 1132,
824 P.2d 1315, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 268, cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 383 (1992). In Howard, the
California Supreme Court re-examined its determination in Tahl and found that the
Court could use a totality of the circumstances standard to determine whether a defendant did in fact voluntarily and intelligently enter a guilty plea, even absent a spe-

section 12022.1.

Under section 12022.1, a court can enhance a

defendant's sentence by two years for committing a crime (secondary
offense) while released on bail or released on one's own recognizance
from a prior conviction (primary offense).' In Adams, the state charged
the defendant with six felony counts, three of which the state alleged
occurred while he was released on bail from a primary offense.6 The
defendant, Adams, for tactical reasons', chose to stipulate to the fact
that he was out on ball at the time of the alleged secondary offenses.'
The trial judge advised Adams such an admission would make the section 12022.1 charge easier to prove, but that the People still had to prove
Adams committed the primary and secondary offenses.' After his conviction, Adams argued on appeal that the court failed to properly advise
him of his constitutional rights as mandated by Boykin-Tahl.'

cific waiver of the three constitutional rights. Id. at 1178, 824 P.2d at 1341-42, 5 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 294-95; see supra note 2 for a listing of these three rights.
4. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022.1 (West 1992). This sections states:
Any person arrested for a secondary offense which was alleged to have
been committed while that person was released from custody on a primary
offense shall be subject to a penalty enhancement of an additional two years
in state prison which shall be served consecutive to any other term imposed
by the court.
Id. § 12022.1(b).
5. Adams, 6 Cal. 4th at 572, 862 P.2d at 832, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 832; see CAL.
PENAL CODE § 12022.1(b) (West 1992).
6. Id. at 574, 862 P.2d at 833, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 833.
7. Id. at 575 n.4, 862 P.2d at 834 n.4, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 834 n.4. The court noted
that evidentiary stipulations are standard trial tactics which do not come under the
purview of Boykin-TahJ. Id. at 578, 862 P.2d at 836, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 836 (citing
Linsk v. Linsk, 70 Cal. d 272, 277, 449 P.2d 760, 762-63, 74 Cal. Rptr. 544, 546-47
(1969)); see also People v. Chasco, 276 Cal. App. 2d 271, 273-76, 80 Cal. Rptr. 667, 66971 (1969) (stating that attorneys have the discretion to stipulate to certain facts and
holding that an attorney's stipulation which led to the defendant's conviction did not
constitute a denial of the defendant's constitutional rights), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1052
(1970); People v. McCoy, 40 Cal. App. 3d 854, 857-58, 115 Cal. Rptr. 559, 560-61 (1974)
(reasoning that counsel's stipulation to the fact that the defendant had drugs on his
person, which resulted in a conviction on possession charges, was a tactical decision
not subject to Boykin-Tahl standards).
8. Adams, 6 Cal. 4th at 574-75, 862 P.2d at 833-34, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 833-34.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 575, 862 P.2d at 834, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 834. The People relied largely on
People v. Stuckey, 199 Cal. App. 3d 876, 245 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1988) which is closely
analogous to Adams. The Stuckey court found the Boykin-Tahi requirements did not
apply in a § 12022.1 case in which a defendant had stipulated to being out on bail
from the primary offense when the alleged secondary offense occurred. Id. at 833, 245
Cal. Rptr. at 229. Because the Stuckey decision was in conflict with the appellate
court's reasoning in Adams, the California Supreme Court granted the People's petition
for review. Adams, 6 Cal. 4th at 573, 862 P.2d at 833, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 833. See
generally 4 B.E. WrrKIN & NORMAN L EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Proceedings
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The Adams court noted
plea situations." In its In re
Court found that courts must
to any defendant who admits

that Boykin-Tahl extends beyond guilty
Yurko decision, 2 the California Supreme
give Boykin-Tahl constitutional warnings
to prior convictions that the state intro-

duced to adjudge him a habitual criminal.'3 The supreme court distinguished Adams from Yurko, however, explaining that the stipulation by
Adams did not itself admit to anything that increased the defendant's
penalty because the People still maintained the burden to prove the facts

of the primary offense to a jury." The court observed that the purpose
of Boykin was to warn a defendant before he involuntarily relinquished
his constitutional rights by admitting to facts that conceded his guilt.'5
Because the defendant in Adams merely admitted to evidentiary facts
that alone could not convict him, the court held that the standards set
forth in Boykin-Tahl did not apply.'"

MARLEE ADAMS SNOWDON

Before Trial §§ 2149-52 (2d ed. 1989) (providing a general review of California law regarding Boykin-Tahl requirements); 21 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 2816 (1984 &
Supp. 1994) (same); Kevin C. McMunigal, Disclosure and Accuracy
in the Guilty Plea Process, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 957 (1989) (discussing the guilty plea process).

11. Adams, 6 Cal. 4th at 576, 862 P.2d at 835, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 835.
12. 10 Cal. 3d 857, 519 P.2d 561, 112 Cal. Rptr. 513 (1974).
13. Adams, 6 Cal. 4th at 576-77, 862 P.2d at 835, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 835. The Adams court clearly distinguished Yurko, however, from cases involving a mere admissions to evidentiary elements that "did not admit every element necessary to conviction
of an offense or to imposition of punishment on a charged enhancement .... ." Adams, 6 Cal. 4th at 577, 862 P.2d at 835-36, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 835-36; see, e.g., People
v. Ramirez, 50 Cal. 3d 1158, 1183-84, 791 P.2d 965, 981, 270 Cal. Rptr. 286, 302 (1990)
(holding that a defendant who admitted to past convictions at the penalty phase was
not protected by Boykin-Tahl), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1110 (1991); People v. Hovey, 44
Cal. 3d 543, 567, 749 P.2d 776, 789, 244 Cal. Rptr. 121, 134 (finding Boykin-Tahl inapplicable in a case where the defendant admitted being the individual who kidnapped
and committed the offense that killed the victim because the stipulation did not deprive the defendant of any affirmative defenses), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 871 (1988).
14. Adams, 6 Cal. 4th at 581, 862 P.2d at 838, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 838. The court
stated, "Unless [the defendant) stipulates both to the bail/own recognizance element of
the enhancement and that he is guilty of or has been convicted of the primary offense, his stipulation to the former will not necessarily lead to imposition of the enhanced penalties . . . ." Id. (emphasis added).
15. Id. at 580-81, 862 P.2d at 838, 24 Cal Rptr. 2d at 838.
16. Id. at 573, 862 P.2d at 833, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 833.

B.

Section 5463 of the Business and Professions Code,
which authorizes the CaliforniaDepartmentof Transportation, on ten days' notice, to revoke any permit for
off-premises billboardsfailing to comply with the California Outdoor Advertising Act, and to remove and destroy any such noncomplying billboards, affords billboard owners adequate procedural due process under
both the state and federal constitutions:
Traverso v. People ex rel. Department of Transportation.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Section 5463 of the California Business and Professions Code' gives
the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) the authority to
enforce the California Outdoor Advertising Act (the Act).' The first paragraph of section 5463 authorizes Caltrans, on ten days' notice, to revoke
any permit for off-premises billboards failing to comply with the Act, and
to physically remove or destroy any such billboards.? In Traverso v. Peo4 the California Supreme Court
ple ex rel. Department of Transportation,
addressed whether the first paragraph of section 5463' comported with
procedural due process as mandated by the California and United States
on its
Constitutions.' The court upheld the validity of section 5463 both
7
face and as applied to the circumstances presented in Traverso.

1. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 5463 (West 1990). All statutory references are to
the Business and Professions Code unless otherwise indicated.
2. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 5200-5499.30 (West 1990 & Supp. 1994).
3. The first paragraph of § 5463 reads in pertinent part:
The director may revoke any license or permit for the failure to comply with
the provisions of this chapter and may remove and destroy any advertising
display placed or maintained in violation of this chapter after 10 days' written notice posted on such structure or sign and a copy forwarded by mail to
the display owner at his last known address.
CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE § 5463 (West 1990).
4. 6 Cal. 4th 1152, 864 P.2d 488, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 217 (1993). Chief Justice Lucas
delivered the opinion for the court, in which Justices Mosk, Panelli, Arabian, Baxter,
and George concurred. Id. at 1156, 864 P.2d at 489, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 218. Justice
Kennard wrote a separate dissenting opinion. Id. at 1168, 864 P.2d at 497, 26 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 226.
5. Hereinafter, the first paragraph of § 5463 will be referred to as "section 5463,"
even though the court did not address the validity of the section's remaining provisions. 1raverso, 6 Cal. 4th at 1156, 864 P.2d at 489, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 218.
6. Id.
7. Id. In 1959, Richard Traverso, licensed to do business as Adco Outdoor Advertising (Adco), received two permits to maintain a billboard along Highway 101 in
Cotati, California. Id. at 1157, 864 P.2d at 490, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 219. Although Adco's
billboard was rendered "nonconforming" by virtue of the 1986 amendments to the Act,
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Under both the California and United States Constitutions, an individual' may not be deprived of "life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law."9 This "procedural due process," which requires notice of
the deprivation and the opportunity to be heard on the matter,0 must be
given prior to the deprivation of any protectible interest." The right to
use real or personal property is a protected interest 2 to which procedural due process must be afforded even if the property interest may
ultimately be taken under the police power of the state." Thus, proce-

Adco was allowed to maintain the billboard under the grandfather clause set forth in
§ 5360. Id.
Early in 1984, Adco's billboard fell down due to undetermined causes, and on
February 10, 1984, Caltrans wrote a letter to Adco indicating its intention to revoke
the permits unless Adco responded within 30 days. Id. at 1158, 864 P.2d at 490, 26
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 219. This letter also apprised Adco of its right to reconstruct the billboard and the procedure for doing so. Id. It was disputed whether Adco actually responded to this letter. Id. On April 30, 1984, Caltrans wrote another letter to Adco
indicating the revocation of the permits. Id.
In June of 1986, Adco reconstructed the billboard without obtaining a permit. Id.
On June 11, 1986, Caltrans posted a notice on Adco's billboard stating that the sign
was in violation of the Act because, among other things, it was constructed without a
valid permit. Id. Caltrans sent a copy of this notice to Adco. Id. at 1158, 864 P.2d at
490-91, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 219-20. On August 31, 1987, Caltrans began removing the
billboard. Id. at 1158, 864 P.2d at 491, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 220. Adco subsequently filed
suit challenging the constitutionality of § 5463 and the actions taken by Caltrans. Id.
The trial court granted Caltrans' motion for summary judgment, upholding the constitutionality of § 5463. Id. The California Court of Appeal reversed the decision, and the
California Supreme Court granted review. Id. at 1159, 864 P.2d at 491, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 220.
8. For purposes of procedural due process, an "individual" includes both natural
and unnatural persons. Thus, a corporation is also entitled to the protection afforded
by procedural due process. See 7 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CAUFORNIA LAW, Constitutional Law § 482(a) (9th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1994).
9. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; see CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.
10. For a discussion of the essential requirements of procedural due process, see 7
B.E. WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CAUFORNIA LAW, Constitutional Law §§ 499-502 (9th ed. 1988
& Supp. 1994).
11. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975); see also Grannis v. Ordean, 234
U.S. 385, 394 (1914) (noting that "[tihe fundamental requisite of due process of law is
the opportunity to be heard," which necessarily requires that an individual be "informed that the matter is pending and can choose for himself whether to . . . contest").
12. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972).
13. See, e.g., Kash Enter. v. City of Los Angeles, 19 Cal. 3d 294, 562 P.2d 1302, 138
Cal. Rptr. 53 (1977) (requiring due process in connection with the seizure of newspaper racks violating city ordinance); Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96

dural due process guards "against the arbitrary deprivation of property,"
and does not speak to the ability of government to deprive an individual
of his property. 4
I.

TREATMENT

In Traverso, the California Supreme Court addressed whether section 5463 provided adequate protection against the arbitrary deprivation
of permits and billboards used for off-premises advertising." Chief Justice Lucas first examined whether the billboards governed by section
5463 constituted protectible property interests.'8 Acknowledging that the
billboards possessed great advertising revenue generating capacity and
that the physical structure of the billboards had inherent open-market or
salvage value, the court found protectible property interests to subsist
therein."
The court next examined whether the permits issued to operate
such billboards also constituted protectible property interests. Caltrans
argued that because billboard operators are required to renew their permits annually, an operator who failed to renew his permit had no
protectible property interest in the expired permit." The court rejected

Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971) (holding that due process must accompany the seizure of a refrigerator pursuant to the state's delivery statute); Bryte v. City of La Mesa, 207 Cal. App.
3d 687, 255 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1989) (requiring due process prior to confiscating a mental
patient's firearms); Menefee & Son v. Department of Food & Agric., 199 Cal. App. 3d
372, 228 Cal. Rptr. 166 (1988) (mandating due process in connection with the seizure
of crops treated with unauthorized pesticide); Phillips v. San Luis Obispo Dep't of Animal Reg., 183 Cal. App. 3d 372, 228 Cal. Rptr. 101 (1986) (requiring due process in
connection with the destruction of a vicious dog); Hughes v. Neth, 80 Cal. App. 3d
952, 146 Cal. Rptr. 37 (1978) (requiring due process before destroying a motorcycle
having an illegally altered serial number). But see Department of Transp. v. Durden,
471 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 1985) (noting the absence of a property interest in a billboard
constructed in knowing violation of state law).
14. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80-82 (1972) (stating that procedural due
process "raises no impenetrable barrier to the taking of a person's possessions").
15. Traverso, 6 Cal. 4th at 1159, 864 P.2d at 491, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 220.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 1160, 864 P.2d at 492, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 221.
18. Id. at 1161, 864 P.2d at 493, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 222.
19. Id. at 1162, 864 P.2d at 493, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 222. Caltrans relied on two
United States Supreme Court decisions which held that procedural due process concerns were not implicated where the property interest may have been terminated by a
self-executing statutory condition. See Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 526 (1982)
(upholding an Indiana statute which abolished all mineral interests unused for a period
of twenty years); United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 104 (1985) (validating a federal
statute which abolished all mining claims where the owner failed to register or file a
notice of intent to hold the claim on a yearly basis). The court distinguished these
decisions on the basis that, unlike § 5463, the statutes at issue in these decisions auto-
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Caltrans' argument, stating that because the permit did not automatically
expire upon the failure to renew, the revocation thereof required substantial state involvement.' Thus, Caltrans' discretionary power to revoke the permit amounted to government action necessitating compliance with procedural due process."' The court therefore held that the
permits governed by section 5463 constituted protectible property interests entitled to due process protection.'
After concluding that both the permits and billboards constituted
protectible property interests, the court next examined whether section
5463 offered billboard operators adequate protection under the California
and United States Constitutions.' The court acknowledged that the
statute's ten day notice period was "relatively short," but nevertheless
found it to meet the notice requirement.' The court reasoned that most
billboard operators were "sophisticated business entities" and could
make an "adequate investigation" within the notice period. 5
In addition, although the statute did not expressly provide for the
right to a hearing, the court found such a right could be implied from the
language of the statute." The majority emphasized that statutes are to
be construed in favor of their constitutionality, and when statutes require
a "quasi-judicial" fact-finding determination, they are to be interpreted to
require a hearing unless expressly indicated otherwise.' Thus, because
section 5463 contemplated a fact-finding determination by Caltrans and
did not expressly preclude a hearing, the court held that section 5463
contained an implied right to a hearing.' Therefore, the notice and hearing attributes of section 5463 complied with the dictates of procedural
due process, thereby validating the statute on its face.'
Finally, the court considered whether section 5463, as applied to the

matically terminated the interests without any state involvement. Traverso, 6 Cal. 4th at
1163, 864 P.2d at 493, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 222.
20. Id. at 1163, 864 P.2d at 493-94, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 222-23.
21. Id. at 1163, 864 P.2d at 494, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 223.
22. Id. at 1164, 864 P.2d at 494, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 223.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1164, 864 P.2d at 494-95, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 223-24.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1164, 864 P.2d at 495, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 224.
27. Id. at 1165, 864 P.2d at 495, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 224.
28. Id. at 1167, 864 P.2d at 497, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 226. The court also noted that
the notice period itself suggested that a hearing could be implied by the statute. Id.
29. Id.

circumstances presented in Traverso, complied with procedural due
process.' The majority noted that procedural due process only requires
that an individual be given the opportunity to be heard, but does not
require that a hearing actually take place.3 1 Thus, the court found that
Adco's decision not to request a hearing was fatal to its constitutional
challenge.' Therefore, the court held that section 5463, as applied to
Adco, did not violate procedural due process.'
III.

CONCLUSION

In light of Traverso, billboard owners may find comfort in the fact
that both their billboards and permits 'constitute protectible property
interests entitling them to due process protection. On the other hand,
Traverso validated section 5463, which authorizes Caltrans to revoke any
permit for off-premises billboards failing to comply with the Act, and to
remove and destroy such billboards upon ten days' notice. Although the
opportunity for a hearing must be provided, billboard operators should
be warned that the notice need not expressly inform them of their right
to be heard.

DOUGLAS J. DENNINGTON

30. Id. at 1168, 864 P.2d at 497, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 226.
31. Id. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Kennard criticized the majority's finding that
Caltrans' notice provided adequate due process. Id. at 1170, 864 P.2d at 498, 26 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 227 (Kennard, J., dissenting). Justice Kennard argued that the notice must
inform the owner of his right to a hearing. Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting). She stated
that the notice to Adco was not "reasonably calculated" to apprise it of "the availability of an administrative procedure," and therefore it did 'not comport with the mandates
of procedural due process. Id. at 1170-71, 864 P.2d at 499, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 228
(Kennard, J., dissenting) (quoting Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1,
22 (1978)).
32. Id. at 1168, 864 P.2d at 497, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 226.
33. Id.
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V.

CRIMINAL LAW

A.

A criminal defendant cannot face conviction for
more than one offense in furtherance of a single
criminal act: People v. Latimer.

I.

INTRODUCTION

In People v. Latimer,1 the California Supreme Court held that a
criminal defendant cannot be punished for multiple offenses that were in
furtherance of a single criminal offense.2 The decision expressly upheld
the interpretation4 of section 654 of the California Penal Code' set forth
in People v. Neal.

Justice Arabian, writing for the majority, sharply criticized the Neal

1. 5 Cal. 4th 1203, 858 P.2d 611, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 144 (1993). Justice Arabian wrote
the majority opinion of the court, in which Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Panelli,
Kennard, Baxter, and George joined. Id. at 1205, 858 P.2d at 612, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
145. Justice Mosk filed a separate concurring opinion. Id. at 1217, 858 P.2d at 620, 23
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 153 (Mosk, J., concurring).
2. The facts of the case showed that while the defendant and the victim were
running errands, the defendant drove the victim into the desert where he hit and
choked her, raped her, and forced oral copulation. Id. at 1206, 858 P.2d at 613, 23 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 146. Afterwards, the defendant drove the victim "about 50 to 75 yards"
further into the desert and raped her again. Id. The victim, fearing for her life, jumped
out of the car, and the defendant drove away. The victim suffered multiple injuries,
including a broken jaw. Id. The defendant, Derek Latimer, plead nolo contendere to
two counts of forcible rape and one count of kidnapping. Id. at 1206, 858 P.2d at
612-13, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 145-46. The defendant was sentenced to a total of 18 years
and eight months in prison, 20 months of which were for the kidnapping conviction.
Id. at 1206, 858 P.2d at 613, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 146. The defendant appealed his conviction. Id.
A divided court of appeal held that the defendant could face punishment for both
rapes, but not for the kidnapping since the defendant perpetrated it in furtherance of
the defendant's "intent and objective" to effect the rapes. Id. at 1206-07, 858 P.2d 613,
23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 146.
3. Penal Code § 654 provides:
An act or omission which is made punishable in different ways by different
provisions of this code may be punished under either of such provisions, but
in no case can it be punished under more than one; an acquittal or conviction and sentence under either one bars a prosecution for the same act or
omission under any other.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 654 (West 1988).
4. 55 Cal. 2d 11, 357 P.2d 839, 9 Cal. Rptr. 607 (1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 823
(1961).

holding.' However, the court upheld Neal on stare decisis grounds,' proclaiming that the legislative process was the only proper avenue for overruling Neal.7 Justice Mosk issued a concurring opinion in which he supported the Neal holding.'

II. TREATMENT
The court began its discussion by analyzing section 654 of the California Penal Code which forbids multiple punishment for offenses "'made
punishable in different ways by different provisions of ...
[the penal]
code .... ."",In Neal, the court determined that "[w]hether a course of
criminal conduct is divisible and therefore gives rise to more than one
act within the meaning of section 654 depends on the intent and objective of the actor.""0 The Neal test superseded In re Chapman," which
held that section 654 applied only when "the two offenses are committed
by the same act or when that act is essential to both .... '"'
Members of the judiciary have continued to severely criticize the
intent-based approach to section 654." The court looked to one of the
most vocal critics of the intent-based approach, Justice Schauer, for
arguments against an intent-based application of section 654." Justice

5. Latimer, 5 Cal. 4th at 1211-12, 858 P.2d at 616-17, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 149-50. In
Neal, a defendant threw gasoline in the bedroom of the victims and then ignited the
gasoline. The defendant was convicted of two counts of attempted murder and one
count of arson. Neal, 55 Cal. 2d at 15, 357 P.2d at 840, 9 Cal. Rptr. at 609. The Supreme Court of California held that under § 654, the defendant could not be punished
for the arson. Id. at 21, 357 P.2d at 845, 9 Cal. Rptr. at 613. The court reasoned:
[Wihether a course of criminal conduct is divisible and therefore gives rise to
more than one act within the meaning of section 654 depends on the intent
and objective of the actor. If all of the offenses were incident to one objective, the defendant may be punished for any one of such offenses but not for
more than one.
Id. at 19, 357 P.2d at 843, 9 Cal. Rptr. at 611-12. See generally 22 CAL. JUn. 3D Criminal Law §§ 3358-61 (1985); 3 B.E. WITEIN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL
LAW, PUNISHMENT FOR CRIME § 1382 (2d ed. 1989); Luke McKissack, Included Offense
Doctrine in California, 10 UCLA L. REV. 871, 883-93 (1963).
6. Latimer, 5 Cal. 4th at 1216, 858 P.2d at .619, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 152.
7. Id. at 1216, 858 P.3d at 619-20, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 152-53.
8. Id. at 1217, 858 P.2d at 620, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 153 (Mosk, J., concurring).
9. Id. at 1207, 858 P.2d at 613, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 146 (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 654 (West 1988)).
10. Neal, 55 Cal. 2d at 19, 357 P.2d at 843, 9 Cal. Rptr. at 611.
11. 43 Cal. 2d 385, 273 P.2d 817 (1954).
12. Id. at 390, 273 P.2d at 819.
13. See Phillip E. Johnson, Multiple Punishment and Consecutive Sentences: Reflections on the Neal Doctrine, 58 CAL. L. REV. 357 (1970); Gerald M. Schneider, Penal
Code Section 654: The Prosecutor's Dilemma, 17 HASTINGS L.J. 53 (1965).
14. Latimer, 5 Cal. 4th at 1209-10, 858 P.2d at 615-16, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 148-49.
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Schauer hypothesized that a smart criminal could escape prosecution for
a multitude of criminal acts simply by forming the intent that the criminal acts be in furtherance of a single criminal offense. 5
The court also noted Justice Dabney's criticism of the Neal approach, which acknowledged that "Neal could direct a punishment which
minimizes... culpability for a night of terrorization of the victim."'" The
court conceded that the criticisms of Neal by Justices Schauer and
Dabney had "some merit."7
The court in Latimer, expressing its reservations about the Neal
test, claimed that it did not comport with the purpose of section 654: "to
insure that a defendant's punishment will be commensurate with his
culpability." 8 Looking at the result of the Neal test in the case before it,
the court determined that the defendant, who was convicted of both
kidnapping and rape, was "clearly more culpable than a defendant who
rapes without kidnapping" and therefore should be punished for both
crimes."
Having criticized the philosophical underpinnings of the Neal decision, the court turned to the issue of whether it should uphold Neal on
stare decisis grounds." The court described the issue as one of "statutory interpretation"2' which placed a greater burden on the party seeking to overrule because "the legislative power is implicated."' Recognizing that the legislature can overrule the courts on matters of statutory
interpretation,' the court maintained that legislative silence on an issue

15. Id. at 1210, 858 P.2d at 615, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 148 (quoting Seiterle v. Superior
Court, 57 Cal. 2d 397, 403, 369 P.2d 697, 701-02, 20 Cal. Rptr 1, 5 (1962) (Schauer, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)). In Seiter/e, Justice Schauer called the
Chapman test "better law . . . [and] . . . better penology." Seiterle, 57 Cal. 2d at 404,

369 P.2d at 701, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 5 (Schauer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in

part).
16. Latimer, 5 Cal. 4th at 1211, 858 P.3d at 616, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 149 (quoting
People v. Latimer, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 883 (Ct. App.) (Dabney, J., dissenting), vacated, 5
Cal. 4th 1203, 858 P.2d 611, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 144 (1993)).
17. Id. at 1211, 858 P.2d at 616, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 149.
18. Id. (quoting People v. Perez, 23 Cal. 3d 545, 550-51, 591 P.2d 63, 66-67, 153 Cal.
Rptr. 40, 43 (1979)).
19. Id. at 1211, 858 P.2d at 616, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 149.
20. Id. at 1212, 858 P.2d at 617, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 150.
21. Id. at 1213, 858 P.2d at 617, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 150.
22. Id. (quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1989))
23. Id.

does not necessarily suggest approval."
The court stated that one key factor in guiding stare decisis questions is reliance.25 The court observed that while the legislature had not
expressly approved the Neal holding, it had relied upon the holding in
enacting subsequent legislation.26 The California Legislature has enacted
legislation demonstrating its acknowledgment of the Neal holding.27
Since the Neal decision, the legislature has enacted the Determinate Sentencing Act,' developed sentence enhancements,' and generally increased the length of sentences.' Noting that the legislature had enacted a statute which enhanced sentences for rapes involving kidnapping,
the court held that under the principle of stare decisis, such legislation
effectively prevented the overrule of Neal because the legislature had developed its own remedy for the limitations imposed by Neal.3
Applying Neal to the present case, the court found no evidence to
suggest that the kidnapping was for any purpose other than to effect the
rape.' The court held that the defendant could not be prosecuted for
both rape and kidnapping,' and thus affirmed the judgment of the court
of appeal.4
Justice Mosk, in a concurring opinion, wrote to defend the Neal
decision, which he claimed "does not merit an additional critique at this
late date."

24. Id. at 1213, 858 P.2d at 618, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 151.
25. Latimer, 5 Cal. 4th at 1213-14, 858 P.2d at 618, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 151.
26. Id. at 1214-15, 858 P.2d at 618-19, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 151-52.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1214-16, 858 P.2d at 618-19, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 151-52.
29. Id. at 1215-16, 858 P.2d at 619, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 152.
30. Id. at 1214-15, 858 P.2d at 618-19, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 151-52.
31. Id. at 1215, 858 P.2d at 619, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 152. The court recognized that
the enactment of Penal Code § 667.8 "was originally designed to eliminate the partial
sentence reduction that might be gained by application of . . . the prohibition against
multiple punishment contained in section 654." Id. (quoting People v. Hernandez, 46
Cal. 3d 194, 203, 757 P.2d 1013, 1017, 249 Cal. Rptr. 850, 854 (1988)).
Penal code § 667.8(a) provides in pertinent part: "[Any person convicted of a
felony violation of Section 261, 264.1, 286, 288a, or 289 who, for the purpose of committing that sexual offense, kidnapped the victim in violation of section 207, shall be
punished by an additional term of three years." CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.8 (West 1988).
32. Latimer, 5 Cal. 4th at 1216, 858 P.2d at 620, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 153.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1217, 858 P.2d at 620, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 153; see supra note 2.
35. Latimer, 5 Cal. 4th at 1217, 858 P.2d at 620, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 153 (Mosk, J.,
concurring).
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III.

CONCLUSION

Although the California Supreme Court upheld People v. Neal on
stare decisis grounds,' the court in Latimer made clear that it did not
agree with the Neal holding. 7 Noting over thirty years of legislative reliance on Neal, the court recognized that the responsibility of overturning
Neal rested with the legislature.' Thus, the court held that a defendant
cannot be tried for multiple criminal offenses in furtherance of a single
criminal activity.'
Because overruling Neal would upset the sentencing scheme enacted by the legislature, the court exercised judicial restraint, but made it
clear that the legislative overrule of Neal would be welcome.'

SANFORD A. TOYEN

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1215, 858 P.2d at 619, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 152.
at 1211, 858 P.2d at 616, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 149.
at 1215, 858 P.2d at 619, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 152.
at 1211, 858 P.2d at 616, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 14.

B.

Evidence of excessive intoxication, prior drunk driving
convictions, unsafe driving speed, and other facts are
admissible to support a finding of gross negligence in a
vehicular manslaughtercase: People v. Ochoa.

I.

INTRODUCTION

In People v. Ochoa,' the California Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether evidence presented in the prosecution of Albert Ochoa
for gross vehicular manslaughter was sufficient to sustain a conviction.2
The court of appeal ruled that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support a finding of gross negligence, and set aside the verdict.' The supreme court then granted review.4
II. TREATMENT
A.

Majority Opinion

The majority overruled the court of appeal's evidentiary ruling,
which excluded evidence of the defendant's prior drunk driving conviction and subsequent education on that subject.' The court of appeal stated that the gross negligence standard is an objective one6 because "evi-

1. 6 Cal. 4th 1199, 864 P.2d 103, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 23 (1993). Chief Justice Lucas
authored the majority opinion, in which Justices Kennard, Arabian, Baxter, and George
concurred. Id. at 1202, 864 P.2d at 104, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 24. Justice Panelli filed a
separate concurring and dissenting opinion. Id. at 1208, 864 P.2d at 108, 26 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 28.
2. Id. at 1202, 864 P.2d at 104, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 24. Ochoa was arrested following an accident in which he collided with another car, causing it to hit a tree, and
killing two people. His blood alcohol level two hours after the accident was measured
at .128 percent, and a criminologist estimated that it may have been as high as .15 at
the time of the accident-close to twice the legal limit. It was also alleged that Ochoa
was driving approximately 15 miles per hour over the posted speed limit of 55 miles
per hour at the time of the accident.
In 1988, Ochoa had been convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol
(DUI), and had attended an extensive "alcohol awareness class, which included discussion of the dangers of drinking and driving." Id. at 1203, 864 P.2d at 104-05, 26 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 25. At the time of his arrest, Ochoa admitted knowing he was on probation
and also that he was not supposed to be driving.
3. Id. at 1203, 864 P.2d at 105, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 25. "In the majority's view, the
evidence showed at most that defendant drove at high speeds while intoxicated, conduct amounting to simple negligence." Id. The court of appeal also held that the evidence relating to Ochoa's prior DUI conviction and subsequent treatment was
inadmissible. Id. at 1204, 864 P.2d at 105, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 25.
4. Id. at 1202, 864 P.2d at 104, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 24.
5. Id. at 1205-06, 864 P.2d at 106, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 26-27.
6. "Gross negligence is the exercise of so slight a degree of care as to raise a pre-
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dence of... [the defendant's] state of mind was irrelevant and unduly
prejudicial."7 The supreme court disagreed, and insisted that the jury
should have been given all "relevant facts as to what [the] defendant
knew, including his actual awareness of those risks."'
After concluding that this evidence was properly admitted by the
trial court, the court addressed the issue of whether the evidence presented was sufficient to support a finding of gross negligence.' The court
considered two persuasive factors supporting the conviction; the blood
alcohol level of the defendant, which was nearly twice the legal limit, as
well as the high rate of speed at which the defendant was driving." The
majority also noted that the court of appeal's determination that defendant was driving prudently was "entirely speculative and inappropriate,
drawing an inference favorable to defendant rather than in support of the
judgment of conviction."" Finally, the majority dismissed the
defendant's claim that he slept for two hours after drinking and before
driving, largely because the evidence tended to rebut such a claim.
After reviewing these facts, the supreme court was convinced that
the defendant "exercised so slight a degree of care as to exhibit a conscious indifference or 'I don't care attitude' concerning the ultimate consequences of his actions." 3 Based on the weight of the evidence, 4 the

sumption of conscious indifference to the consequences." Id. at 1204, 864 P.2d at 105,
26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 25. "The test is objective: whether a reasonable person in the
defendant's position would have been aware of the risk involved." Id. (quoting People
v. Bennett, 54 Cal. 3d 1032, 1036, 819 P.2d 849, 852, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 8, 11 (1991)); see
17 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 277 (1984 & Supp. 1993) (discussing gross negligence
and vehicular manslaughter); 46 CAL. JuR. 3D Negligence § 88 (1978) (discussing gross
negligence in general).
7. Ochoa, 6 Cal. 4th at 1205, 864 P.2d at 106, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 26.
8. Id.; see Bennett, 54 Cal. 3d at 1038, 819 P.2d at 853, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 12 (stating that "the jury should . . . consider all relevant circumstances . . . to determine if
the defendant acted with a conscious disregard of the consequences rather than with
mere inadvertence"); see also People v. Costa, 40 Cal. 2d 160, 166, 252 P.2d 1, 5 (1953)
(finding relevant a warning as to danger of high speed driving given by a police officer
shortly before accident).
9. Ochoa, 6 Cal. 4th at 1206, 864 P.2d at 106, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 27.
10. Id. at 1206-07, 864 P.2d at 107, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 27.
11. Id. at 1207, 864 P.2d at 107, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 27. The supreme court emphasized that it was required to "view the evidence in the light most favorable to the People." Id. at 1206, 864 P.2d at 107, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 27.
12. Id. at 1207, 864 P.2d at 107, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 27.
13. Id. at 1208, 864 P.2d at 108, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 28.
14. In Bennett, the court states that "the finding of gross negligence . . . may be

supreme court ruled that the court of appeal erred in reaching the conclusion that the conviction was not supported by the evidence, and remanded the case to determine the remaining issues.15
B.

Justice Panelli's Concurring and Dissenting Opinion

Justice Panelli concurred with the majority, but believed that the
evidence of the defendant's subjective awareness of the risk should have
been excluded."8 Justice Panelli maintained that the majority misinterpreted the "conscious indifference" portion of the gross negligence test,
and replaced it with a subjective test.'7 According to Justice Panelli, this
test was not supported by the cases cited by the majority. 8 Finally, Justice Panelli argued that if the evidence were admitted, the defendant
should have been allowed to introduce evidence to show that he was not

subjectively aware of the risk.'9
III.

CONCLUSION

In its holding in Ochoa, the supreme court has gone from a purely
objective standard to a more subjective standard when determining what
constitutes gross negligence. In its application to drunk driving prosecutions, this standard will make it more difficult for defendants with previous drunk driving convictions to escape prosecution for subsequent
drunk driving incidents. While this departure will likely result in a greater
number of convictions, the threat it imposes may deter persons with DUI
convictions from driving while intoxicated in the future. It will certainly

based on the overall circumstances surrounding the fatality. Intoxication is one of
those circumstances and its effect on the defendant's driving may show gross negligence." People v. Bennett, 54 Cal. 3d 1032, 1040, 819 P.2d 849, 854, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 8,
13 (1991).
15. Ochoa, 6 Cal. 4th at 1208, 864 P.2d at 108, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 28.
16. Id. at 1208-09, 864 P.2d at 108, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 28 (Panelli, J., concurring
and dissenting).
17. Id. at 1209-10, 864 P.2d at 108-09, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 29 (Panelli, J., concurring
and dissenting). Justice Panelli stated that the new test is whether "'a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have been aware of the risk involved.' The end
result is a test that is no longer truly objective." Id. at 1209, 864 P.2d at 108-09, 26
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 29 (Panelli, J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting Bennett, 54 Cal. 3d
1032, 1036, 819 P.2d 849, 852, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 8, 11 (1991)).
18. Id. at 1210-11, 864 P.2d at 109-10, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 29-30 (Panelli, J., concurring and dissenting). In Justice Panelli's opinion, none of the cases relied on by the
majority "authorize the admission of such evidence." Ochoa, 6 Cal. 4th at 1211, 864
P.2d at 110, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 30 (Panelli, J., concurring and dissenting).
19. Id. (Panelli, J., concurring and dissenting). "To deny the defendant the right to
present relevant evidence would create serious problems under the due process
clause." Id. (Panelli, J., concurring and dissenting).
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make it harder for these defendants to escape a harsher sentence the
second time around.

ERIC WEITZ

C.

Proceedings to determine the truth of prior conviction
allegations held after a jury returns its verdict and has
been discharged are permissible when the defendantfails
to object before the court determines the truth of the prior
conviction allegations or gives a jury waiver as to those
allegations: People v. Saunders.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In People v. Saunders,' the California Supreme Court considered
whether there is a statutory or constitutional double jeopardy prohibition
of proceedings held to determine the truth of alleged prior convictions,
held after the jury returned a guilty verdict in a bifurcated hearing, the
results of which the defendant released without objection.2
In Saunders, the prosecution charged the defendant with attempted
murder, burglary, and assault with a firearm. The prosecution further
alleged that the defendant had been convicted of various prior offenses.'
The defendant's first trial resulted in a mistrial. Prior to the second trial,
the trial court granted the defendant's motion to bifurcate the determination of truth of the alleged prior convictions. However, the court stated
that if the defendant testified, the prosecution could use his prior convictions for impeachment purposes.
At the second trial, the jury found the defendant guilty of burglary,
but not guilty of attempted murder or assault.4 After the trial court dismissed the jury and scheduled further hearings for the next day, the defendant waived his right to a jury determination regarding the truthfulness of his alleged prior convictions. On the following day, however, the
defendant's attorney withdrew the waiver, claiming that she had been
unaware that the court had dismissed the jury at the time she had
waived the defendant's right.
Upon withdrawal, the defendant moved for dismissal of the alleged
prior convictions based on a "once in jeopardy" claim the trial court

1. 5 Cal. 4th 580, 853 P.2d 1093, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 638 (1993). Justice George wrote
the majority opinion, with Chief Justice Lucas, and Justices Panelli, Arabian, and
Baxter concurring. Id. at 585, 853 P.2d at 1094, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 639. Justices Mosk
and Kennard wrote separate dissenting opinions. Id. at 597, 601, 853 P.2d at 1103,
1105, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 648, 650.
2. Id. at 585, 853 P.2d at 1094, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 639.
3. These charges included the following: that the defendant had been convicted and
served prison time on three separate occasions for possession of stolen mail, two
counts of rape, two counts of oral copulation, assault with a deadly weapon, three
counts of burglary, six counts of robbery, and attempted robbery. Id. at 585-86, 853
P.2d at 1094, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 639.
4. Saunders, 5 Cal. 4th at 586, 853 P.2d at 1095, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 640.
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denied.' A second jury found the allegations regarding the defendant's alleged prior convictions to be true. The defendant received a three year
prison sentence for the burglary charge, in addition to one year for each
of the three prior prison terms. The defendant appealed, claiming that
the second jury trial placed him twice in jeopardy. The court of appeal
affirmed the lower court's decision6 and the supreme court granted the
defendant's petition for review.7
II.

TREATMENT

Majority Opinion

A.

The supreme court began by analyzing sections 1025' and 1164' of
the California Penal Code. The court determined that the trial court violated the provisions of both statutes by dismissing the jury before deciding the truth of the defendant's alleged prior convictions.'" However,
because the defendant did not contest this issue before the trial court in
a timely manner, the supreme court ruled that he was "precluded...
from arguing on appeal that reversal of the judgment is required""

5.
6.
7.
8.

Id. at 587, 853 P.2d at 1095, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 640.
15 Cal. App. 4th 518, 285 Cal. Rptr. 485 (1991).
818 P.2d 1152, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 391 (1991).
Section 1025 provides in pertinent part:
When a defendant who is charged in the accusatory pleading with having
suffered a previous conviction pleads either guilty or not guilty of the offense
charged against him, he must be asked whether he has suffered such previIf he answers that he has not . . . the question whether
ous conviction ....
or not he has suffered such previous conviction must be tried by the jury
which tries the issue upon the plea of not guilty ....

In case the defendant

pleads not guilty, and answers that he has suffered the previous conviction,
the charge of the previous conviction must not be read to the jury, nor alluded to in the trial.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1025 (West 1985). See generally 22 CAL JUR. 3D Criminal Law
§§ 3384-87, 3390 (1985 & Supp. 1993) (discussing prior convictions and procedures).
9. Section 1164(b) provides in pertinent part:
No jury shall be discharged until the court has verified on the record that
the jury has either reached a verdict or has formally declared its inability to
reach a verdict on all issues before it, including, but not limited to, the degree of the crime or crimes charged, and the truth of any alleged prior conviction whether in the same proceeding or in a bifurcated proceeding.
CAL PENAL CODE § 1164 (West Supp. 1994).

10. Saunders, 5 Cal. 4th at 589, 853 P.2d at 1097, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 642.
11. Id. at 591, 853 P.2d at 1098, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 643. The court relied on the

Although the court found the defendant's failure to properly object
in the trial court constituted a forfeiture of his right to object on appeal,
the majority maintained the defendant was not prohibited from arguing
he had been placed twice in jeopardy because the trial court choose a
new jury to determine the truth of the defendant's alleged prior convictions.12
The court first noted that the policy behind the prohibition of double jeopardy was to protect individuals from being punished more than
once for the same crime. 13 The majority also commented that the "standards for determining when a double jeopardy violation has occurred
should not be applied mechanically."' 4
The court then looked to other cases for guidance on this issue. 5

rule that states, "'[aln appellate court will ordinarily not consider procedural defects or
erroneous rulings, in connection with relief sought or defenses asserted, where an objection could have been, but was not, presented to the lower court by some appropriate method.'" Id. at 589-90, 853 P.2d at 1097, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 642 (quoting Doers v.
Golden Gate Bridge Dist., 23 Cal. 3d 180, 184-85 n.1, 588 P.2d 1261, 1262-63 n.1, 151
Cal. Rptr. 837, 838-39 n.1 (1979)). See generally 20 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 2333
(1985 & Supp. 1993) (discussing waiver of claims by a defendant).
12. Saunders, 5 Cal 4th at 592, 853 P.2d at 1099, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 644; see Curry
v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 707, 713, 470 P.2d 345, 348, 87 Cal. Rptr. 361, 364 (1970)
(commenting that requesting an admonition on an evidentiary matter is not a waiver of
constitutional protection against double jeopardy).
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that "[n]o person
shall ... be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb . . . ." Saunders, 5 Cal. 4th at 592, 853 P.2d at 1099, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 644
(citing U.S. CONST. amend. V); see also 19 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 2063 (1984)
(discussing the rights of persons accused); 20 CAL JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 2313 (1985

& Supp. 1993) (discussing the constitutional guarantees against double
jeopardy); 1 B.E. WITKIN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAw, Defenses
§ 271 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing generally the principal of former jeopardy). "This guarantee is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment." Saunders, 5 Cal.
4th at 592-93, 853 P.2d at 1099, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 644; see also Benton v. Maryland,
395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969) (holding that the Fifth Amendment applies to states through
the Fourteenth Amendment); 13 CAL. JUR. 3D Constitutional Law § 234 (Rev. ed. 1989)
(discussing the Fourteenth Amendment and the applicability of the Bill of Rights to
states). Furthermore, the California Constitution provides that "[plersons may not twice
be put in jeopardy for the same offense." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 15.
13. Saunders, 5 Cal. 4th at 593, 853 P.2d at 1099, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 644 (citing
Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 387 (1975); see I B.E. WITKIN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAw, Defenses § 272 (2d ed. 1988 & Supp. 1993) (discussing
nature and elements of the double jeopardy defense); 21 Am. JUR. 2D Criminal Law
§§ 243, 244 (1981 & Supp. 1993) (discussing historical background and scope of double
jeopardy defense).
14. Saunders, 5 Cal. 4th at 593, 853 P.2d at 1100, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 645; see Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497 (1978) (holding that the double jeopardy standard
should not be applied mechanically).
15. Saunders, 5 Cal. 4th at 593, 853 P.2d at 1100, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 645.
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In Ohio v. Johnson," the Supreme Court held that trying a defendant on
two charges after he had already plead guilty and had been sentenced on
two related charges did not place him in double jeopardy. 7
In Swisher v. Brady,'" the Supreme Court held that a rule of procedure in juvenile proceedings, that permits a master to hear a case, followed by a judge, did not violate the double jeopardy clause.'9 The court
explained that the rule prohibited the prosecution from offering new
evidence, and "precludes the prosecutor from 'enhancing the risk that an
innocent person would be convicted' by taking the question of guilt to a
series of persons or groups empowered to make binding determinations." ' ° Additionally, the court noted that the rule did not unfairly subject "the defendant to the expense, and ordeal of a second trial""' Based
on Johnson and Swisher, the court held that in Saunders, the defendant
was not placed twice in jeopardy.' The court maintained that the defendant incorrectly relied on Stone v. Superior Court.' The court explained
that the Constitution's double jeopardy clause did not prohibit a state

16. 467 U.S. 493 (1984). In Johnson, the state indicted the defendant for murder,
involuntary manslaughter, aggravated robbery, and grand theft. At the defendant's arraignment, he plead guilty to two of the charges. The trial court then dismissed the
two other counts, erroneously holding that any further prosecution of the claims would
be in violation of the double jeopardy clause.
17. Id. at 501-02. The Court stated:
"[Tihe acceptance of a guilty plea to lesser included offenses while charges
on the greater offenses remain pending, . . . has none of the implications of
an "implied acquittal" which results from a verdict convicting a defendant on
lesser included offenses rendered by a jury charged to consider both greater
and lesser included offenses.
Id. See generally 20 CAL. JuR. 3D Criminal Law § 2322 (1985 & Supp. 1993) (discussing double jeopardy and lesser included offenses); 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 265
(1981) (discussing stopping trial for lower offenses to permit prosecution for higher
offenses); 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 251 (1989 & Supp. 1993) (discussing doctrine of
included offenses).
18. 438 U.S. 204 (1978).
19. Swisher, 438 U.S. at 215-16.
20. Id. (citing Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 504 (1978)).
21. Id. at 216-17 (citing Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957)).
22. Id. at 594-95, 853 P.2d at 1100-01, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 645-46. In concluding that
none of the interests meant to be protected by the double jeopardy clause were violated, the majority reasoned that the defendant "was not at risk during the trial . . . that
the jury would find true the prior conviction allegations, because at the defendant's request the truth of the allegations had been bifurcated from the trial of the current
charges." Id. at 594, 853 P.2d at 1100, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 645.
23. 31 Cal. 3d 503, 646 P.2d 809, 183 Cal. Rptr. 647 (1982).

statute that required a second jury in a bifurcated hearing, to determine
the truthfulness of alleged prior convictions, after the trial court found
the defendant guilty of the charged offense.' Finally, the court explained that it found no evidence indicating that they should interpret the
double jeopardy clause of the California Constitution any differently than
its federal counterpart, and therefore, concluded that the trial court's
procedure was not in violation of article I, section 15 of the California
Constitution."
B.

Justice Mosk's Dissenting Opinion

Justice Mosk began his discussion by noting that the California Supreme Court has previously held that "jeopardy attaches to trial enhancement allegations when the jury is sworn to try the underlying offenses."' Furthermore, Justice Mosk commented that, in accord with
the holding in People v. Wojahn,7 although bifurcation separates issues
at trial, it does not create two separate trials. Justice Mosk therefore
argued that the majority erred in determining the defendant was not
placed in double jeopardy.'
In support of his position, Justice Mosk criticized the majority's reliance on Ohio v. Johnson, and Swisher v. Brady.' Moreover, Justice
Mosk attacked the majority's claim that "no interest of [the] defendant's

24. Saunders, 5 Cal. 4th at 595, 853 P.2d at 1101, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 646. In Stone,
the supreme court referred to "the defendants' right to have his trial completed by a
particular tribunal." Stone, 31 Cal. 3d at 516 n.7, 646 P.2d at 818 n.7, 183 Cal. Rptr. at
656 n.7. However, the Saunders court pointed out that nothing in Stone "suggests that,
in a bifurcated trial, the double jeopardy clause guarantees the defendant the right to
have the truth of prior conviction allegations determined by the same jury that considers the current offenses." Saunders, 5 Cal. 4th at 595, 853 P.2d at 1101, 20 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 646.
25. Id. at 596, 853 P.2d at 1102, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 647. Saunders undermines the
contrary holdings in People v. Wojahn, 150 Cal. App. 3d 1024, 198 Cal. Rptr. 277
(1984); People v. Hockersmith, 217 Cal. App. 3d 968, 266 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1990); People
v. Dee, 222 Cal. App. 3d 760, 272 Cal. Rptr. 208 (1990); and People v. West, 224 Cal.
App. 3d 1283, 274 Cal. Rptr. 524 (1990). Id. at 597 n.9, 853 P.2d at 1102 n.9, 20 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 647 n.9.
26. Saunders, 5 Cal. 4th at 598, 853 P.2d at 1103, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 648 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting). See generally 20 CAL JUR. 3D Criminal Law §§ 2325, 2336 (1985 & Supp.
1993) (discussing when jeopardy attaches in jury trial); 1 B.E. WrrKN & NORMAN L.
EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Defenses § 279 (1988) (stating that jeopardy attaches when the court selects and swears in the jury); 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law
§ 260 (1981 & Supp. 1993) (discussing attachment of jeopardy in jury trial).
27. 150 Cal. App. 3d 1024, 198 Cal. Rptr. 277 (1984).
28. Saunders, 5 Cal. 4th at 598-99, 853 P.2d at 1103, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 648 (Mosk,
J., dissenting)
29. Id. at 599-600, 853 P.2d at 1103-04, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 648-49 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
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that is protected by the double jeopardy clause is injured by the proceedings that occurred in this case. " ' Lastly, Justice Mosk argued that it was
the duty of the prosecutor and the court, not the defendant, to assure
"that the jury was not dismissed before trial of the prior conviction allegations."3 Thus, according to Justice Mosk, the defendant's failure to
object to the dismissal of the jury did not result in a forfeiture of his
error claim under section 1025.32
C.

Justice Kennard's Dissenting Opinion

Justice Kennard began her opinion by attacking the majority's assertion that the defendant's failure to object in the trial court automatically
resulted in a forfeiture of the right to appeal.' She argued that, "a
defendant's failure to act results in a forfeiture only if the law imposes
on the defendant an obligation to act," and that, here, the defendant had
no such obligation.' Justice Kennard denounced the majority's decision,
claiming that it "circumvented" the statutory language of section
1164(b)' and "confuse[d] the roles of the respective parties in a judicial
proceeding," by holding that "defense counsel must interpose an objection that could result in substantial detriment to the client."'
Justice Kennard then discussed the retroactivity of the majority's

30. Id. at 600, 853 P.2d at 1104, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 649 (Mosk, J., dissenting). Justice Mosk claimed that the right to have an entire case heard by one jury is a fundamental right protected by the double jeopardy clause. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting); see
United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 128 (1980); Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 35
(1978).
31. Saunders, 5 Cal. 4th at 600, 853 P.2d at 1104, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 649 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
32. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting).
33. Id. at 601, 853 P.2d at 1105, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 650 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 603, 853 P.2d at 1106, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 651 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
"'The defendant is under no duty to object in order to claim the protection of the constitutional guarantee, and his mere silence in the face of an ensuing discharge cannot
be deemed a waiver.'" Id. (citing Curry v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 707, 713, 470 P.2d
345, 348, 87 Cal. Rptr. 361, 364 (1970)) (Kennard, J., dissenting).
35. Saunders, 5 Cal. 4th at 603-04, 853 P.2d at 1106-07, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 651-52
(Kennard, J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 605-06, 853 P.2d at 1108, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 653 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
This holding, according to Justice Kennard, "is an anathema to our adversarial system,
and is contrary to the allocation of the duties and obligations of the participants in
our judicial system." Id. at 606, 853 P.2d at 1108, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 653 (Kennard, J.,
dissenting).

decision." She pointed out that, "reviewing courts have traditionally excused parties for failing to raise an issue at trial where an objection
would have been futile or wholly unsupported by substantive law then in
existence."' In Justice Kennard's opinion, the rule handed down in this
case clearly fits within this category, and thus, should not be applied
retroactively.' In conclusion, Justice Kennard criticized the majority's
decision, calling it "contrary to both statutory and decisional law" as well
as "fundamentally unfair.""
III.

CONCLUSION

In holding that the defendant forfeited his right to appeal, the California Supreme Court observed and supported the rule that "'a constitutional right' or a right of any other sort, 'may be forfeited in criminal...
cases by the failure to make timely assertion of the right before a tribunal [that has] jurisdiction to determine it.'"'" Moreover, the court's holding that the defendant was not placed twice in jeopardy appears to be
consistent with the decisions of the United States Supreme Court. In arriving at this decision, the court placed the burden on defendants by
requiring them to bring this type of procedural irregularity to the attention of the trial court in a timely manner or forfeit their right to appeal
such irregularities in later proceedings.

ERIC WEITZ

37. Id. at 606, 853 P.2d at 1108, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 654 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
38. Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting); see People v. Turner, 50 Cal. 3d 668, 703, 789 P.2d
887, 905, 268 Cal. Rptr. 706, 724 (1990) (holding that there is no waiver when change
in law is too unforeseeable).
39. Saunders, 5 Cal. 4th at 607, 853 P.2d at 1109, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 654 (Kennard,
J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 609, 853 P.2d at 1100, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 655 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 590, 853 P.2d at 1097, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 642 (quoting U.S. v. Olano, 113
S. Ct. 1770, 1776 (1993)).
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VI.

FAMILY LAW
Under section 361.5 of the California Welfare and Institutions Code, a biologicalfather is not entitled to receive
state reunificationservices with a child in court custody
unless the father can also establish that he is the presumed father of the child, and the request is made within
of the eighteen-month statutory limit; under section
361.2 of the code, a noncustodial parent may obtain
custody of a dependent child only at a time immediately
following the child's first removal from the home of the
custodial parent, and only if the noncustodial parent
qualifies as a presumed parent: In re Zacharia D.

I.

INTRODUCTION

In re Zacharia D.' enabled the California Supreme Court to clarify
certain ambiguities in the California Welfare and Institutions Code sections governing juvenile dependency proceedings.2 The uncertainties
arose when a court took custody of a minor as a result of the custodial
parents' alleged drug abuse.' Several months later, the minor's biological

1. 6 Cal. 4th 435, 862 P.2d 751, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 751 (1993).
2. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 361.2, 361.5 (West Supp. 1994).
3. Zacharia D., 6 Cal. 4th at 43940, 862 P.2d at 753-54, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 753-54.
Justice Arabian authored the unanimous opinion, joined by Chief Justice Lucas, and
Justices Mosk, Panelli, Kennard, Baxter, and George. Zacharia D. was born with traces
of an illicit drug in his body. As a result of this finding, the child was taken from the
home of his custodial parents into protective custody by the court. The two custodial
parents at the time of the child's birth, Wendy and Lee, received state-sponsored reunification services, giving them time to establish that they were fit to retake custody
of their child. Despite the services, continuing drug problems and a failure to comply
with the reunification plan led to the termination of Wendy and Lee's parental rights.
Zacharia D.'s natural father, Javan, came forward to establish custodial rights in the
aftermath of Wendy's failure to regain custody. His claim to custody, however, postdated the statutory maximum of 18 months allotted for the reunification procedure.
Javan defended his position by asserting that, as a natural parent, he was entitled to
state reunification services under § 361.5. He also claimed that he was not barred by
the 18 month time limit because he did not know that he was Zacharia's natural father
until nearly 18 months after Zacharia was declared a dependent of the court. Javan
argued that rejecting his claim would deny him the opportunity to establish his fitness
as a parent. In addition, he contended that § 361.2 entitled him to immediate custody
of Zacharia D. The trial court found that a grant of custody to Javan, a known drug
user, would be detrimental to Zacharia's welfare, and accordingly terminated Javan's

father stepped forward to claim custody under the applicable provisions
of the Welfare and Institutions Code.' The first question was whether a
biological father with no prior custody of the child can rely on the relevant code provisions to support a determination of custody in his favor.' The second question was whether a parent can defeat certain statutorily prescribed time limits for custody claims by asserting ignorance of
the child's birth.6
Section 361.5 of the code requires that the state offer reunification
services to a "parent" of the minor, but leaves unclear the definition of
"parent."7 That same section also limits a parent's entitlement to those
services for a maximum of eighteen months.8
Section 361.2 of the code requires that upon removal of the minor
from the custodial parents for any reason, the court must place the child
in the custody of a noncustodial parent if the court determines that (1)

parental rights. Id. at 43944, 862 P.2d at 753-57, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 753-57. On appeal,
Javan argued that the court erred on several grounds in denying him custody. Finding
some validity to Javan's claims, the court of appeal held that under § 361.5, his status
as biological father was sufficient to award him the right to receive reunification services, and that the statutory time limit did not bar his entitlement because the delay
was "not so egregious as a matter of law as to obviate the statutory requirement that
he be offered reunification services." Id. at 444, 862 P.2d at 757, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
757. The court of appeal also held that § 361.2 applied and entitled Javan, as the biological father, to immediate custody of Zacharia. This statute grants a non-custodial
parent custody of the minor under the facts presented. Further, there was insufficient
evidence showing that Javan's custody would detrimentally impact Zacharia D. Id. at
444-45, 862 P.2d at 757, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 757. The California Supreme Court granted
review. Id. at 43945, 862 P.2d at 753-58, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 753-58.
4. Id. at 442, 862 P.2d at 755, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 755.
5. Id. at 447-52, 862 P.2d at 759-62, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 759-62. One apparent motive for Javan's pursuit of custody was that the natural mother, Wendy, had begun
living with Javan after the displacement of Zacharia D. into court custody. Id. at 443,
862 P.2d at 756, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 756. The record indicated that the two had
planned to marry. Id.
6. Id. at 452-53, 862 P.2d at 762-63, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 762-63.
7. Section 361.5 of the California Welfare and Institutions Code, subdivision (a)
reads in relevant part:
Except as provided in subdivision (b), whenever a minor is removed from a
parent's . . . custody, the juvenile court shall order the probation officer to
provide child welfare services to the minor and the minor's parents'. . . for
the purpose of facilitating reunification of the family within a maximum time
period not to exceed 12 months .... Services may be extended up to an
additional six months if it can be shown that the objectives of the service
plan can be achieved within the extended time period. Physical custody of
the minor by the parents or guardian during the 18-month period shall not
serve to interrupt the running of the period.
CAL. WELF. & .INST. CODE § 361.5(a) (West Supp. 1994).
8. Id. The normal statutory period for reunification is 12 months, but the court can
extend it for another six, for a total period of 18 months. See supra note 7.
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there is such a parent, and (2) placement of the child in such a setting
will not detrimentally impact the child's welfare.'
The California Supreme Court determined that under section 361.5
only a presumed father, not merely a biological father, may demand reunification services from the state. This demand may be made only if the
statutory limit of eighteen months has not expired.'" The court further
held that under section 361.2, only a presumed parent may claim entitlement to custody of a minor as mandated by that section, and that the
parent must make any claim at the time the court removes the child
from the home of the custodial parents."

H. TREATMENT
A.

Section 361.5

The reunification scheme, according to the court, is an attempt to
balance the goals of parental recognition by "assist[ing] the parent in
overcoming the problems that led to removal," with the goals of child
protection by "prevent[ing] children from spending their lives in the uncertainty of foster care."' 2 Although the purpose of the section was
clear, the legislature did not elaborate on the applicable definition of
"parent", and no prior decisions had defined it.'3
In attempting to define "parent", the supreme court referred to a set
of statutes in the California Civil Code that addressed the distinction
between natural and presumed fathers.'4 Those statutes, the court not-

9. Section 361.2, subdivision (a) of the Welfare and Institutions Code reads:
When a court orders removal of a minor pursuant to Section 361, the court
shall first determine whether there is a parent of the minor, with whom the
minor was not residing at the time that the events or conditions arose ...
who desires to assume custody of the minor. If such a parent requests custody the court shall place the minor with the parent unless it finds that placement with that parent would be detrimental to the minor.
CAL. WELF. AND INST. CODE § 361.2(a) (West 1984 and Supp. 1994).
10. Zacharia D., 6 Cal. 4th at 452-53, 862 P.2d at 762-63, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 762-63.
11. Id. at 453-54, 862 P.2d at 763-64, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 763-64. Javan's request
under § 361.2(a) came after 20 months had passed since the initial removal of Zacharia
D. from the home of his custodial parents. Id.
12. Id. at 446, 862 P.2d at 758, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 758 (quoting In re Marilyn H., 5
Cal. 4th 295, 308, 851 P.2d 826, 834, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 544, 552 (1993) (holding that
courts should not consider the reunification of a dependent child with a biological parent at a permanency planning hearing)).
13. Id. at 448, 862 P.2d at 759-60, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 759-60.
14. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 7000-21 (West 1983) (repealed and replaced by CAL FAM.

ed, consistently favored presumed fathers over natural fathers in the area
of parental rights. 5 The court next observed that the terms "presumed"
and "natural" had been incorporated into other provisions of the California Code." One of these was a Civil Code provision'7 whereby presumed fathers achieved a similar status. The supreme court accordingly
inferred from these observations that the legislature must have intended
to limit section 361.5 to presumed fathers. 8
Addressing the eighteen-month limit on reunification services under
section 361.5, the court reiterated the strong policy in favor of certainty
in the child's parental status, and asserted that strict compliance with the
eighteen-month statutory bar furthers this goal. 9 Thus, the parent's own
failure to "ascertain the existence of his child" or his "decision to wait
until the 18-month hearing to assert his paternity claim" barred him from

CODE §§ 7600-7730. This set of statutes, known as the Uniform Parentage Act, has
been interpreted by courts to favor presumed parents over biological ones. See, e.g., In
re Sarah C., 8 Cal. App. 4th 964, 974, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 414, 419 (1992) (denying parental rights to father who did not qualify as presumed father); In re Shereece B., 231
Cal. App. 3d 613, 622, 282 Cal. Rptr. 430, 436 (1991) (holding that the difference in
treatment of presumed and biological fathers differently does not violate equal protection guarantees); Michael U. v. Jamie B., 39 Cal. 3d 787, 790, 705 P.2d 362, 364, 218
Cal. Rptr. 39, 40-41 (1985) (holding that granting natural parent custody of child to
enable the parent to qualify as presumed father was abuse of discretion). Although the
Uniform Parentage Act was repealed effective January 1, 1994, its provisions may now
be found in the California Family Code. See CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7600-7730 (West Supp.
1994).
15. Zacharia D., 6 Cal. 4th at 447-50, 862 P.2d at 759-61, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 759-61.
(citing CAL Civ. CODE §§ 7000-7021 (West 1983) (repealed and replaced by CAL FAMILY
CODE §§ 7600-7730 (West Supp. 1994))); see supra note 14. Under § 7004(a)(4) of the
Uniform Parentage Act, a natural father may become a presumed father, if, among
other things, "[hie receives the child into his home and openly holds out the child as
his natural child." Zacharia D., 6 Cal. 4th at 449, 862 P.2d at 760, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
760 (quoting CAL CIV. CODE § 7004(a)(4) (West 1983) (repealed and replaced by CAL.
FAM. CODE § 7611(d) (West 1994))). For a synopsis of the parent's right to custody
and the entitlement of a presumed father to custody of a minor, see generally 10 B.E.
WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Parent and Child § 91 (9th ed. 1989).
16. See also CAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 366.23 (West Supp. 1994) (providing that
notice shall be given to both biological and presumed parents when a juvenile dependency hearing is held).
17. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 197 (West 1982 & Supp. 1991) (establishing that only a
presumed father is entitled to custody of a minor child). See generally 32 CAL. JUR. 3D
Family Law § 168 (1977 & Supp. 1994) (stating that a man is presumed to be the
natural father if he receives the child in his home and holds the child out as his
own); 10 B.E. WITIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw, Parent and Child §§ 409-10, 413
(9th ed. 1989) (discussing the Uniform Parentage Act, the definition of the parent-child
relationship therein, and how the parent-child relationship may be established between
a child and his natural father).
18. Zacharia D., 6 Cal. 4th at 448-51, 862 P.2d at 760-62, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 760-62.
19. Id. at 452, 862 P.2d at 762, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 762.
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claiming the benefit of reunification services.'
B.

Section 361.2

The court next decided whether a biological father may use section
361.2 of the Welfare and Institutions Code to obtain custody of a child
removed from the home of his custodial parents.2' The court determined
that such a parent may not rely on this section.' The court reasoned
that: (1) the language of the statute suggests that a parent can apply it
only upon the first removal of the child from the custodial parent's
home;' (2) for the same reasons as in section 361.5, a mere biological
father is not entitled to assume custody of his child under section
361.2; 2 and (3) in any event, the biological parent in the present case
did not produce sufficient evidence showing his competency as a father.'

20. Id. The court was not sympathetic to Javan's claim that he was unable to ascertain the birth of his child so that he could file a claim for reunification services in a
timely fashion. Addressing this point, the court noted that Javan had "engaged in at
least a dozen acts of sexual intercourse with Wendy over a two-week period." Id. at
452, 862 P.2d at 762, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 762. The court said, "[t]here is no evidence
that he had any reason to expect that this sexual relationship had not resulted in pregnancy." Id. In this respect, the court pronounced that any delay in the filing for reunification was, in reality, the fault of the biological father himself. Id. at 452,
862 P.2d at 763, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 763.
21. Id. at 453, 862 P.2d at 763, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 763.
22. Id. at 454, 862 P.2d at 764, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 764.
23. Id. at 453-54, 862 P.2d at 763-64, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 763-64. The court also expressed that "[nlothing in this statute suggests that custody must be immediately
awarded to a noncustodial parent regardless of when in the dependency process the
parent comes forward." Id. at 453, 862 P.2d at 763, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 763.
24. Id. at 454, 862 P.2d at 764, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 764. For a discussion of presumed and biological fathers, and reunification and custody procedures in California,
see generally Christian Reichel Van Deuses, The Best Interest of the Child and the
Law, 18 PEPP. L. REV. 417 (1991); Suzette M. Haynie, Biological Parents v. Third Parties: Whose Right to Child Custody is Constitutionally Protected?, 20 GA. L. REV. 705
(1986) (discussing the constitutionality of denying biological fathers custody in favor of
third parties).
25. Zacharia D., 6 Cal. 4th at 454, 862 P.2d at 764, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 764. The
court pointed out that at the time Javan made a custody claim, he had been "incarcerated for drug use." Id. Furthermore, a social worker had testified that "Javan required at least six months of services before he could even attain the parental competence to be able to visit Zacharia, let alone have custody of him." Id. See generally
67A C.J.S Parent and Child § 46 (1978 & Supp. 1993) (discussing the relevant evidence
in ascertaining fitness of a parent and potential detriment to the child if custody is

III.

CONCLUSION

As a result of the court's decision in Zacharia D., biological fathers
who are unable to qualify as presumed fathers before the expiration of
the statutory eighteen-month limit are precluded from obtaining reunification services in California.' Moreover, a biological father who is not
deemed by the court to be a presumed father may not rely on the statute
granting custody of displaced children to non-custodial parents.27 Finally, even a presumed father must make a reunification request within a
reasonable time after displacement of the child into court custody, or the
eighteen-month statutory bar will jeopardize his claim for reunification.'
The Zacharia D. court was particularly concerned with maintaining
the legislature's balance between the rights of parents to raise their own
children, and the interest of the child in having the certainty and harmony of a secure, well-adjusted home life.' Because it is the presumed
father, and not necessarily the biological father, who acknowledges the
child and contributes to the child's care and support, the court's grant of
greater parental rights to presumed parents furthers an important social
policy. It will encourage parents to support and acknowledge their children, while discouraging those who contribute to their children's feelings
of displacement and uncertainty by unduly delaying custodial requests.

MICHAEL G. OLEINIK

awarded).
26. Zacharia D., 6 Cal. 4th at 451, 862 P.2d at 762, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 762. Even
the 18 month period is technically at the discretion of the court. The normal period
for reunification is 12 months. See supra note 8.
27. Zacharia D., 6 Cal. 4th at 454, 862 P.2d at 764, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 764. For a
general overview on child custody and the rights of parents, see 59 AM JUR. 2D Parent
and Child §§ 23-36 (1987 & Supp. 1994).
28. Zacharia D., 6 Cal. 4th at 453, 862 P.2d at 763, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 763. Even
presumed parents must make a timely request for reunification services. The fact that
one has achieved presumed parent status does not justify extending the normal statutory period for longer than 18 months.
29. Id. at 446-47, 862 P.2d at 758-59, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 758-59. See In re Marilyn
H., 5 Cal. 4th at 308, 851 P.2d at 834, 19 Cal Rptr. 2d at 552 (discussing the balance
that the legislature sought to achieve by the preceding provisions of the Welfare and
Institutions Code).
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VII.

INSURANCE LAW
A. When an attorney's commission of separate acts of
negligence occurs within the same matter, thereby
resulting in his client's inability to recover, the
attorney's malpractice insurer is liablefor only one
claim under the policy: Bay Cities Paving & Grading,
Inc. v. Lawyers' Mutual Insurance Co.

I.

INTRODUCTION

In Bay Cities Paving & Grading, Inc. v. Lawyer's Mutual Insurance Co.,' the California Supreme Court determined whether a claim
limit on a malpractice insurance policy2 rendered the contractor's lawsuit against its former attorney a single claim, or whether each act of
negligence, and its concomitant cause of action, were entitled to the full
claim limit.' The court first examined the language of the policy and
applied the "'primary rights'" theory in finding that there was only one
claim because there was only one injury. The insurance policy stated

that multiple incidents could be considered a single claim if they arose
out of a series of related acts, errors, or omissions.' The court consid-

1. 5 Cal. 4th 854, 855 P.2d 1263, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 691 (1993). Justice Baxter wrote
the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Panelli, Mosk, Arabian,
and George. Id. at 857, 855 P.2d at 1264, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 692. Justice Kennard
wrote a separate concurring opinion. Id. at 873, 855 P.2d at 1275, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
703 (Kennard, J., concurring).
2. While lawyers' professional liability insurance was virtually unheard of prior to
World War II, today attorneys are aware of their need for malpractice insurance coverage. See John C. Williams, Annotation, Lawyers' Professional Liability Insurance, 84
A.L.R. 3d 187 (1978). One commentator has described the current crisis regarding
lawyers' professional liability insurance "as a three-fold problem based on a significant
increase in the frequency of malpractice claims, soaring rates for liability coverage, and
an accompanying decrease in the number of companies offering such coverage, as well
as the scope of that coverage." Id. at 190. Professional liability policies generally insure
against error, mistake, omission, or malpractice. 39 CAL JUR. 3D Insurance Contracts
§ 322 (1977).
3. Bay Cities, 5 Cal. 4th at 857-58, 855 P.2d at 1264, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 692. The
court noted that this was an issue of first impression. Id. at 857, 855 P.2d at 1264, 21
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 692.
4. Id. at 860, 855 P.2d at 1265, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 693 (quoting Slater v.
Blackwood, 15 Cal. 3d 791, 795, 543 P.2d 593, 594, 126 Cal. Rptr. 225, 226 (1976)).
5. Id. at 859, 855 P.2d at 1265, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 693. The "Limits of Liability"

ered whether the two claims presented by the plaintiff were "related"
under the policy's language. Ultimately, the court concluded that the two
incidents would be considered a single claim under the applicable insurance policy.6 II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Bay Cities Paving and Grading, Inc. (Bay Cities), a licensed general
contractor, completed work on a project but was unable to collect a
considerable portion of the total amount due. Bay Cities retained attorney Robert Curotto in an attempt to collect payment. Unfortunately,
Curotto failed to serve a stop notice on the project's construction lender
after filing a mechanic's lien for Bay Cities. Additionally, he failed to seek
timely foreclosure on the mechanic's lien. Consequently, Bay Cities sued
Curotto for legal malpractice alleging negligence in the two omissions.!
Curotto's professional liability insurance carrier, Lawyers' Mutual Insurance Company (Lawyers' Mutual), undertook responsibility for his defense.'
The trial court determined that the two omissions qualified as two
unrelated acts of legal malpractice under the terms of the policy.'
Lawyers' Mutual appealed and the appellate court affirmed, finding that
"(1) each of Curotto's two errors gave rise to a separate claim under the
policy, and (2) the two claims [were] not 'related' within the meaning of
the policy.""0 The California Supreme Court granted review and reversed
the judgment."

section of the policy stated that "'(tiwo or more claims arising out of a single act,
error or omission or a series of related acts, errors or omissions shall be treated as
a single claim.'" Id. (emphasis in original).
6. Id. at 873, 855 P.2d at 1275, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 703.
7. Id. at 858, 855 P.2d at 1264, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 692.
8. Several aspects of the policy were stipulated to by all parties. The policy limited
coverage to $250,000 per claim with an annual aggregate of $750,000. Curotto was dismissed from the action and Lawyers' Mutual was designated as the defendant. Id. at
858, 855 P.2d at 1264-65, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 692-93.
9. Id. at 858, 855 P.2d at 1265, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 693.
10. Id. at 858-59, 855 P.2d at 1265, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 693.
11. Id. at 873, 855 P.2d at 1275, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 703. Review was granted on December 12, 1991. Bay Cities Paving & Grading, Inc. v. Lawyers' Mut. Ins. Co., 2 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 490, 820 P.2d 1000 (1991).
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III.
A.

TREATMENT

Majority Opinion
1.

The Meaning of "Claim" Under the Policy

The court began its discussion by determining that the meaning of

"claim" 2 under the attorney's malpractice liability policy was not dependent on the number of negligent acts committed by the attorney. 3 The
court determined that an inability to collect on one construction project

constituted a single injury thereby giving rise to a single cause of action
against the attorney. 4 In other words, "Bay Cities had one primary
right-the right to be free of negligence by its attorney in connection
with the particular debt collection for which he was retained," regardless
of the number of means by which he may have breached that right."5

Accordingly, the court found that the availability of multiple forms
of relief did not give rise to multiple claims when these claims arose out

of the same transaction. 6 The availability of two procedures for collection, namely foreclosure of the mechanics' lien and serving a timely stop
notice on the project's construction lenders, did not belie the fact that
they were merely two remedies for the non-payment of a single amount
owed to Bay Cities. Hence, Bay Cities was held to have the right to

12. The liability policy stated: "'"Claim" whenever used in this policy means a demand, including service of suit or institution of arbitration proceedings, for money
against the insured.'" Bay Cities, 5 Cal. 4th at 859, 855 P.2d at 1265, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 693 (emphasis in original).
13. Id. at 860, 855 P.2d at 1266, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 694.
14. Id. at 860, 855 P.2d at 1265, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 693; see Andrew S. Hanen &
Jett Hanna, Legal Malpractice Insurance: Exclusions, Selected Coverage and Consumer
Issues, 33 S. TEx. L REV. 75, 135 (1992) (discussing whether a series of demands or
lawsuits constitutes one claim or separate claim).
15. Bay Cities, 5 Cal. 4th at 860, 855 P.2d at 1266, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 694. "'California has consistently applied the 'primary rights' theory, under which the invasion of
one primary right gives rise to a single cause of action.'" Id. at 860, 855 P.2d 1265, 21
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 693-94 (quoting Slater v. Blackwood, 15 Cal. 3d 791, 795, 543 P.2d 593,
594, 126 Cal., Rptr. 225, 226 (1975)). See generally 4 B.E. WITIGN, CAUFORNIA PROCEDURE, Pleading § 29 (3d ed. 1985) (distinguishing the primary right, or cause of action,
from the remedy or relief sought).
16. Bay Cities, 5 Cal. 4th at 860, 855 P.2d at 1266, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 694; see Big
Boy Drilling Corp. v. Rankin, 213 Cal. 646, 649, 3 P.2d 13, 14 (1931) (seeking several
kinds of relief for the enforcement of a single right does not establish different causes
of action in a contractor's attempt to recover money owed for work already completed).
17. Bay Cities, 5 Cal. 4th at 860-61, 855 P.2d at 1266, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 694.

receive payment for the project."'
The court identified several policy reasons for rejecting Bay Cities'
argument that each omission constituted a separate injury. First, an attorney committing one act of negligence would be inclined to make as
many additional errors as possible, so as to increase the coverage provided under his policy."' In addition, an attorney and possibly other clients may be prejudiced when a single client consumes the aggregate
policy limit by counting multiple errors as claims, despite the existence
of only a single injury.2'" By allowing multiple claims, there would be
little or no coverage for other clients, thus placing the attorney's personal assets at risk to satisfy those clients' claims.2
The court rejected Bay Cities' contention that multiple causes of a
single injury should prevail when attempting to determine the number of
insurance claims.' The court reasoned that two clients, each with a single injury, should not receive different recoveries based exclusively on
the serendipity of the number of errors committed by the attorney.'
Finally, the court distinguished the cases cited by Bay Cities as each
contained different policy language or different factual situations. 4 The
court pointed out, for example, that occurrence policies differ from the
"claims-made" policy at issue in this case.25 Under an "occurrence" poli-

18. Id. at 860, 855 P.2d at 1266, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 694. The court believed that the
appellate court mistakenly determined the existence of two causes of action from the
fact that there were two pleading counts, as pleading counts can be merely different
ways of stating the same cause of action. Id. at 860 n.1, 855 P.2d at 1266 n.1, 21 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 694, n.1 (citing Slater, 15 Cal. 3d at 796, 543 P.2d at 594, 126 Cal. Rptr. at
226).
19. Id. at 861, 855 P.2d at 1266-67, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 694-95.
20. Id. at 861, 855 P.2d at 1267, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 695.
21. Id. at 861-62, 855 P.2d at 1267, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 695. Moreover, the attorney
would be liable for the satisfaction of each and every deductible on a particular claim.
In the past, insurers have asserted multiple claims to mitigate their liability by increasing the overall amount paid by the insured's deductible. Id. at 862, 855 P.2d at
1267, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 695.
22. Id. at 862-63, 855 P.2d at 1267-68, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 695-96.
23. Id. at 863, 855 P.2d at 1268, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 696.
24. The court in Bay Cities relied on Michigan Chemical Corp. v. American Home
Assur. Co. to assert that multiple causes with a single injury should result in multiple
claims. Bay Cities, 5 Cal. 4th at 862-63, 855 P.2d at 1267-68, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 69596; see Michigan Chem. Corp. v. American Home Assur. Co., 728 F.2d 374 (6th Cir.
1984) (noting that a single cause resulting in multiple injuries constituted a single occurrence under applicable insurance policy); see also Home Indem. Co. v. City of Mobile, 749 F.2d 659 (11th Cir. 1984) (determining that multiple suits by homeowners
against the city's planning and operation of its water drainage system after three rainstorms had three separate causes of damage, and thus, separate occurrences under the
policy).
25. While the court acknowledged that whether an insurance policy is claims-made
or occurrence may not be significant in some contexts, it found that such cannot be

(Vol. 22: 247, 1994]

California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

cy, coverage is determined by occurrences, which are identified by the
number of causes, rather than by the number of injuries. 26 A claimsmade policy, on the other hand, identifies claims by the number of injuries.'
2.

Construing "Related" Acts, Errors, and Omissions

The supreme court next considered the meaning of "related" as a
policy term.' The court of appeal's decision had rested heavily on its
supposition that the lack of definition for related in the policy rendered
the term ambiguous. 9 Finding some ambiguity, the court of appeal construed related to mean errors which were solely related to each other

causally.'
Disagreeing with the court of appeal, the supreme court declined to
find that the absence of definition in a policy necessarily created ambiguity, and further reasoned that it would be too burdensome to require a
policy to include multitudinous definitions.3 ' Consequently, the supreme
court applied a "plain meaning" interpretive approach, in which the definition of a term is derived from the intent of the parties and the provisions of the contract are interpreted in their "'ordinary and popular
sense. ' 'n3 The court commented that "'[a]n insurance policy provision is
ambiguous when it is capable of two or more constructions both of

which are reasonable. ' "' It was further noted that a court will avoid

true in all contexts. The court denounced the statement in Beaumont-Gribin-Von Dyl
Management Co. v. California Union Insurance Co., 63 Cal. App. 3d 617, 624, 134 Cal.
Rptr. 25, 28 (1976) suggesting that whether an insurance policy is labeled claims-made
or occurrence is insignificant to a policy's interpretation. Bay Cities, 5 Cal. 4th at 865
n.5, 855 P.2d at 1269 n.5, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 697 n.5.
26. Id. at 864-65, 855 P.2d at 1269, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 697.
27. Id.
28. The policy term stated: "Two or more claims arising out of a single act, error or
omission or a series of related acts, errors or omissions shall be treated as a single
claim." Id. at 866, 855 P.2d at 1270, 21 Cal Rptr. 2d at 698.
29. 15 Cal. App. 4th 1474, 1480, 285 Cal. Rptr. 174, 178 (1991).
30. Bay Cities, 5 Cal. 4th at 866, 855 P.2d at 1270, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 698.
31. Id. (citing Bank of the West v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 4th 1254, 1264-65, 833
P.2d 545, 551-52, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 538, 544-45 (1992)).
32. Id. at 867, 855 P.2d at 1270, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 698. See generally CAL. CIV.
CODE § 1644 (West 1985) (stating that "[tihe words of a contract are to be understood
in their ordinary and popular sense").
33. Bay Cities, 5 Cal. 4th at 867, 855 P.2d at 1271, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 699 (quoting
Suarez v. Life Ins. Co. of North America, 206 Cal. App. 3d 1396, 1402, 254 Cal. Rptr.

reaching a theoretical interpretation" because the "'language in a contract must be construed in the context of that instrument as a whole,
and in the circumstances of the case, and cannot be found to be ambiguous in the abstract." '
The court then examined whether the term related was ambiguous
as it pertained to the applicability of per-claim limitation.' Determining
that because the term related can include a broad assortment of relationships, the court found that this did not make the term ambiguous in the
context of the applicable policy and facts of this case.37 Nevertheless,
Bay Cities contended that the term related was ambiguous.' Bay Cities
asserted that related could mean that the totality of services rendered by
the attorney, in relation to collection on the contract for Bay Cities, were
related.' Alternatively, Bay Cities noted that related could also indicate,
as the court of appeal determined, only causally related acts by the attorney.' The supreme court, however, found no ambiguity since causally
related acts yield "a chain of causation that leads to an injury, that is, a
single claim," subject to the policy's per-claim limitation. '
Bay Cities asserted that unless errors are causally related, they constitute independent claims.42 The court dismissed this argument on the
basis that independent errors may potentially result in a single injury,
explaining that "when two or more errors lead to the same injury, they
are-for that very reason-'related' under any fair and reasonable
meaning of the word."43

377, 380 (1988)).
34. Id.; see Reserve Ins. Co. v. Pisciotta, 30 Cal. 3d 800, 807, 640 P.2d 764, 767-68,
180 Cal. Rptr. 628, 631-32 (1982).
35. Bay Cities, 5 Cal. 4th at 867, 855 P.2d at 1271, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 699 (quoting
Bank of the West, 2 Cal. 4th 1254, 1265, 833 P.2d 545, 552, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 545
(italics omitted)); see also Producers Dairy Delivery Co. v. Sentry Ins. Co., 41 Cal. 3d
903, 916 n.7, 718 P.2d 920, 927 n.7, 226 Cal. Rptr. 558, 565 n.7 (1986) ("[Ijanguage is to
be interpreted in context with regard to its intended function in the policy."). "The
whole of a contract is to be taken together, so as to give effect to every part, if reasonably practicable, each clause helping to interpret the other." CAL Civ. CODE § 1641
(West 1985).
36. Bay Cities, 5 Cal. 4th at 867-68, 855 P.2d at 1271, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 699.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 868, 855 P.2d at 1271, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 699.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 867-68, 855 P.2d at 1271, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 699; see Arizona Prop. & Cas.
Ins. Guar. Fund v. Helme, 153 Ariz. 129, 136, 735 P.2d 451, 457-58 (1987) (finding that
several negligent acts of physicians had a causal relationship to one injury, thereby
yielding one occurrence under an "occurrence" policy).
42. Bay Cities, 5 Cal. 4th at 869, 855 P.2d at 1272, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 700.
43. Id.
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Having rejected a definition of related as meaning only occurrences
with a causal connection, the court adopted the interpretation adopted in
Gregory v. Home Insurance Co.' The court in Gregory found that the
"term 'related' as it is commonly understood and used encompasses both
logical and causal connections."45 The Bay Cities court noted that this
does not embrace every possible logical relationship.4" For instance,
tenuous relationships which a reasonable insured could not have anticipated as being considered a single claim under the policy should not
result in hardship or surprise. Such could be averted by the "rule of restrictive reading of broad language."47 Reasoning that the two errors by
Curotto were related because they arose out of the same transaction,
concerned the same client, and resulted in the same injury, the court
held that "[no] objectively reasonable insured under this policy could
have expected that he would be entitled to coverage for two claims under the policy."'
B.

ConcurringOpinion

Justice Kennard concurred with the majority's holding but arrived at
the decision by focussing on principles of contract interpretation. 4" Justice Kennard characterized the case as an insurance dispute, believing
that the majority's introduction of the "primary rights" civil pleading doctrine, into an insurance dispute was misplaced.' Furthermore, she
found that the majority's determination of the scope of related acts or
omissions uncler the insurance contract went beyond finding whether
there was a single claim under the policy's language."' Accordingly,
Kennard concluded that the majority decided the issue with unnecessarily broad terms.52
The primary rights doctrine, as explained by Justice Kennard, con-

44. 876 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that lawsuits by multiple investors and others arising out of erroneous information provided by an attorney resulted in a single
claim under a policy with an identical claims related provision).
45. Bay Cities, 5 Cal. 4th at 873, 855 P.2d at 1274, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 702.
46. Id. at 872, 855 P.2d at 1274, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 703.
47. Id. at 872-73, 855 P.2d at 1274, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 702 (citing G?egory, 876 F.2d
at 606).
48. Id. at 873, 855 P.2d at 1275, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 703.
49. Id. at 874, 855 P.2d at 1275, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 703 (Kennard, J., concurring).
50. Id. at 874, 855 P.2d at 1275, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 703 (Kennard, J., concurring).
51. Id. at 873-74, 855 P.2d at 1275, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 703 (Kennard, J., concurring).
52. Id. (Kennard, J., concurring).

cerns pleadings filed in court, while the determination of rights under an
insurance policy is a question of contract law.' Parties to a contract
may define claim independent of any rules of civil pleading in their bargain making. In this case, the parties defined "claim" as "'a demand...
for money against the [i]nsured.""r Bay Cities sent Curotto a demand
letter which sought payment for a single amount that was owed to Bay
Cities for the completed construction. Thus, in asserting two claims
based on two acts of negligence within one demand letter, Bay Cities
made a single demand for money against the insured.'
Justice Kennard disapproved of the majority's decision to consider
whether, assuming Bay Cities had in fact made two claims, the claims
were related within the meaning of the policy. According to Justice
Kennard, review was granted to resolve whether Bay Cities made a single
claim and not to consider the separate issue of whether the claims would
be related, an issue which she believed was an unnecessary and misleading consideration.'
Because the term related was undefined in Curotto's malpractice
insurance policy, Justice Kennard disagreed with the majority's finding
that the policy language was unambiguous.67 She believed that a limiting
construction should have been imposed on the term "related acts or
omissions."' Justice Kennard explained, "[w]hen the language of an insurance policy is ambiguous the courts look to the expectations of a
reasonable insured."' In this case, according to Kennard, a reasonable
insured would have thought that the two claims would be categorized as
"related, but only because the element of damages from each was
identical."' Therefore, Justice Kennard explained that because there are
several ways in which two acts resulting in claims under a malpractice
insurance policy could be related, the term required a limiting construction.6"

53. Id. at 874, 855 P.2d at 1275, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 703 (Kennard, J., concurring).
54. Id. (Kennard, J., concurring).
55. Id. (Kennard, J., concurring).
56. Id. at 875, 855 P.2d at 1276, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 704 (Kennard, J., concurring).
57. Id. at 876, 855 P.2d at 1276, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 704 (Kennard, J., concurring).
58. Id. at 875, 855 P.2d at 1276, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 704 (Kennard, J., concurring).
59. Id. at 876, 855 P.2d at 1276, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 704 (Kennard, J., concurring)
(citing American Star Ins., Co. v. Insurance Co. of the West, 232 Cal. App. 3d 1320,
1331, 284 Cal. Rptr. 45, 51 (1991).
60. Id. at 876, 855 P.2d at 1276, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 704 (Kennard, J., concurring).
61. Id. at 875-76, 855 P.2d at 1276, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 704 (Kennard, J., concurring).
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IV.

CONCLUSION

In Bay Cities, the California Supreme Court concluded that multiple
errors leading to a single injury constitute one claim for purposes of a
malpractice insurance policy's "per claim" maximum coverage.' The
decision promoted an efficient use of resources because it precludes a
client from multiplying claims in order to reap a windfall when a lawyer's
multiple errors result in a single injury to the client. The holding also
diminishes the risk of insufficient coverage for the attorney and other
clients when the attorney's policy has an aggregate limit.
Further, the court's judgment that the term related applies to logically related acts, as well as causally related acts, reduces the potential
number of claims an insurance provider will be liable for. Ultimately,
under Bay Cities, unless a client can demonstrate that multiple injuries
resulted from a lawyer's multiple acts of negligence, a claims-made insurance policy will restrict the insurance provider's potential liability to the
maximum coverage offered for a single claim.

LORI ELLEN AUSTEIN

62. Id. at 873, 855 P.2d at 1275, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 703.

B.

Extrinsic evidence to the underlying complaint is admissible to defeat an insurer's duty to defend. The duty to
defend, however, arises upon a showing of the ' possibility" or '!potential" that the underlying suit falls within the
policy coverage, and is not confined to a "reasonable"
possibility standard:
Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Superior Court.

In Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Superior Court,' the California Supreme Court addressed the scope of a liability insurer's duty to defend
the claims brought against the insured,2 and decided, in an unanimous
decision,3 that extrinsic evidence can be admitted to determine whether

1. 6 Cal. 4th 287, 861 P.2d 1153, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 467 (1993). The dispute sought to
determine whether various liability insurance carriers of Montrose Chemical Corp., a
former manufacturer of DDT, had a duty to defend Montrose in numerous suits arising
out of alleged liability for environmental contamination. Id. at 292-93, 861 P.2d at 1155,
24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 469. Montrose was accused of dumping DDT into the Santa Monica
Bay. Id. at 292, 861 P.2d at 1155, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 469; see also Insurance: Industry
Suffers Major Setback in CA Case, GREENWIRE, Nov. 24, 1993. Although Montrose was
insured by seven different insurance carriers, all seven of the insurance companies
refused to defend the claim against Montrose. Montrose, 6 Cal. 4th at 293 n.1, 86 P.2d
at 1155 n.1, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 469 n.1. The insurance companies attempted to introduce extrinsic evidence to show that Montrose's liability, if any, arose from it's regular
business practices, and was not an "occurrence" as covered by the policies. Montrose,
6 Cal. 4th at 293-94, 861 P.2d at 1156, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 470. The insurers claimed
they had no duty to defend because "dumping was part of Montrose's normal business
practices," and was, therefore, outside the coverage of the policy. California Supreme
Court Tightens Rule on Duty to Defend, LIABILITY WEEK, Vol. 8, No. 46, Nov. 29, 1993.
2. The court noted that the issue of whether extrinsic evidence can be admitted to
defeat an insurer's duty to defend had received inconsistent treatment in the courts of
appeal. Montrose, 6 Cal. 4th at 296, 861 P.2d at 1158, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 472. See
generally 39 CAL. JuR. 3D, Insurance Contracts and Coverage §§ 414-418 (1977 & Supp.
1994) (discussing duty to defend); 6 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CAUIFORNIA LAw, Torts
§§ 1135-1142 (9th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1993) (discussing an insurer's duty to defend).
The court considered this issue in the scope of a declaratory relief action brought
by the plaintiff to determine whether its insurer owed a duty to defend. Montrose, 6
Cal. 4th at 293, 861 P.2d at 1156, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 470. The trial court denied the
motion, holding that a triable issue of fact existed as to whether the complaint alleged
facts within the coverage, and that the extrinsic evidence "could support the inference"
that it was not within the coverage. Id. at 293-94, 861 P.2d at 1156, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
470. The appellate court reversed, allowing the extrinsic evidence, but finding that such
evidence merely put the duty to defend issue in dispute and "[sluch a dispute could
not defeat the potential for liability or the concomitant duty to defend." Montrose
Chem. Corp. v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. App. 1201, 1398, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 687, 694
(1992).
3. Justice Panelli wrote the opinion of the court, joined by Chief Justice Lucas, and
Justices Mosk, Arabian, Baxter, and George. Justice Kennard wrote a concurring opinion. See infra note 11 for a discussion of Justice Kennard's opinion.
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the underlying suit is potentially within the coverage of the policy.4 The
court held that such evidence is admissible to defeat a claim that the
insurer's duty to defend has arisen, as well as to prove such a claim.5
In reaching its holding, the court first considered numerous allegedly conflicting appellate court decisions.7 Although the court affirmed
the appellate court's decision that extrinsic evidence should be admitted,8 the court also stated that extrinsic evidence will not defeat the duty
to defend unless it conclusively establishes that no potential for liability
exists that the policy would cover.'

4. Montrose, 6 Cal. 4th at 291, 861 P.2d at 1154-55, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 468-69; see
39 CAL. JUR. 3D Insurance Contracts & Coverage § 415 & n.ll (1977 & Supp. 1994).
5. Montrose, 6 Cal. 4th at 291, 861 P.2d at 1155, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 469.
6. After reviewing the relevant precedent, the court ultimately noted that the cases
were not truly in conflict with the issue, but distinguishable or inapplicable. The court
observed that "[in none of these cases . . . was the principle that an insurer may not
resort to extrinsic evidence to defeat a duty to defend embodied in the holding." Id. at
297, 861 P.2d at 1158, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 472.
7. The court discussed four cases which held that extrinsic evidence could be used
to defeat the duty to defend: State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Flynt, 17 Cal. App. 3d
538, 95 Cal. Rptr. 296 (1971); Saylin v. California Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 179 Cal. App. 3d
256, 224 Cal. Rptr. 493 (1986); Fire Ins. Exch. v. Jiminez, 184 Cal. App. 3d 437, 229
Cal. Rptr. 83 (1986); Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. App. 4th 1201,
1398, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 687, 694 (1992). The court dismissed as dictum a contrary rule
expressed in CNA Casualty v. Seaboard Sur. Co., 176 Cal. App. 3d 598, 222 Cal. Rptr.
276 (1986), noting that the decision was based on a distinguishable case which addressed whether an insurer had a duty to defend a case that lacked merit, rather than
one with merit, but outside the coverage of the policy. Montrose, 6 Cal. 4th at 298,
861 P.2d at 1159, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 273.
8. In affirming the appellate court decision, the court held that, "where extrinsic
evidence establishes that the ultimate question of coverage can be determined as a
matter of law on undisputed facts, we see no reason to prevent an insurer from seeking summary adjudication that no potential for liability exists and thus that it has no
duty to defend." Id. at 298, 861 P.2d at 1159, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 473.
9. Id. at 299-300, 861 P.2d at 1160, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 474. The court further instructed that "[alny doubt as to whether the facts establish the existence of the defense duty must be resolved in the insured's favor." Id.
The court found that the extrinsic evidence presented by the defendants merely
put the issue of whether the alleged liability of Montrose was within the polices in
dispute. It noted that a showing that some of Montrose's allegedly tortious actions
were within its regular business practices did not negate the possibility that some of
the harm resulted from an "occurrence" as defined in the policies. Id. at 304-05, 861
P.2d at 1164, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 478.
For a discussion on the general trend of the duty to defend, see James M.
Fischer, Broadening the Insurer's Duty to Defend: How Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co.
Transformed Liability Insurance Into Litigation Insurance, 25 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 141

The decision, hailed by the insurance industry as "one of the most
important for the industry in recent decades,""' was particularly significant because of the vast sums of money that insurance companies spend
defending their insureds in environmental damages suits. Specialists are
split, however, in predicting the impact of the decision on the volume of
litigation. While several commentators argue that a broad reading of the
duty to defend could expedite settlements," others maintain that, because many of the alleged perpetrators are judgment proof, in the absence of insurance coverage, "no one would have bothered to sue." 2

MARJORIE ANN WALTRIP

(1991). The Montrose court relied heavily on its decision in Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co.,
65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1966), and rejected amicus curiae
arguments that Gray is inconsistent with its Montrose decision. Montrose, 6 Cal. 4th at
298, 861 P.2d at 1160, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 474.
10. Harriet Chiang, Setback for Insurers in Environmental Cases: High Court Rules
on Who Must Pay for Trial Defense, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 23, 1993, at A15.
11. Scott Graham, On the Straight and Narrow; The California Supreme Court
Maintained a Steady, Conservative Course in its 1993 Civil Rulings. Some lawyers
would like them to be more expansive, THE RECORDER, Dec. 30, 1993, at 1.
Justice Kennard wrote separately to emphasize her view that, while an insurer
may be entitled to declaratory relief as to the duty to defend, such relief may be
stayed where such an action would prejudice the insured in the liability action.
Montrose, 6 Cal. 4th 305, 861 P.2d 1164, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 478.
12. Graham, supra note 11.
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VIII. JUVENILE LAW
An order terminating reunification services and setting
a selection and implementation hearing is reviewable on
appealfrom a final ordermade at a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing:In re Matthew C.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the case of In re Matthew C.,' the California Supreme Court considered whether an order terminating reunification services and setting a
selection and implementation hearing is reviewable on appeal from a
final order made at a section 366.26 hearing.! The supreme court re-

1. 6 Cal. 4th 386, 862 P.2d 765, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 765 (1993). Justice Arabian
authored the majority opinion of the court with Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Mosk,
Kennard, and Baxter concurring. Id. at 388, 862 P.2d at 766, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 766.
Justice Panelli filed a dissenting opinion. Id. at 401, 862 P.2d at 775, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 775 (Panelli, J., dissenting). Justice George also filed a separate dissenting opinion.
Id. at 405, 862 P.2d at 778, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 778. (George, J., dissenting).
2. Id. at 393, 862 P.2d at 769, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 769; see CAL. WEL'. & INST.
CODE § 366.26 (West Supp. 1994).
In April 1989, Matthew C. was declared a dependant of the court and was removed from his mother's custody. At the dispositional hearing, the court approved a
reunification plan for Deborah C., Matthew's mother. Subsequently, at the 12-month review hearing, the juvenile court ordered the reunification services terminated and set a
§ 366.26 hearing. The juvenile court judge found that it was unlikely that the parent
and child could be reunified because of the detrimental impact the reunification would
have on Matthew C. Upon rehearing, at Deborah C.'s request, the juvenile court judge
determined that because she had failed to participate in the reunification programs, the
court should terminate reunification services and set a 366.26 hearing.
In November 1990, the juvenile court commissioner entered a final order terminating Deborah C.'s parental rights at the 366.26 hearing. Deborah C. sought to appeal
the decision ordered at the 12-month review hearing (§ 366.21) and the decision ordered at the hearing terminating parental rights (§ 366.26). Deborah C. argued there
was insufficient evidence for the juvenile court's finding that Matthew could not be
returned to her custody within the next six months. Matthew C., 6 Cal. 4th at 390, 862
P.2d at 767, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 767. Deborah C. also contended that the trial court
abused its discretion when it refused to grant a one-day continuance at the 12-month
review hearing. Id.
The court of appeal held that the order, entered at the 12-month review hearing
terminating reunification services and setting a § 366.26 hearing, was not appealable.
Id. The court, relying on § 366.26(k), determined that such an order was reviewable
only by extraordinary writ filed prior to the § 366.26 hearing. Id. The court of appeal
affirmed the decision of the juvenile court and the California Supreme Court granted
review. Id.

versed the ruling of the appellate court, which denied the mother's petition for rehearing, and remanded the case for consideration on the merits.:' The supreme court determined that Deborah C. had a right to appeal a final order issued by the juvenile court at the end of the reunification phase.' The court reasoned that the statutory interpretation was
consistent with the legislative intent of section 366.26, subdivision (k).'
II. TREATMENT
A.

The Majority Opinion

In Cynthia D. v. Superior Court,' the California Supreme Court described the general procedures in dependency proceedings as follows:
jurisdiction, disposition, reunification and implementation of a permanent
plan.7 The supreme court acknowledged that the findings of the lower

3. Id. at 401, 862 P.2d at 775, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 775. California Welfare and Institutions Code § 366.26 applies to "[h]earings terminating parental rights or establishing
guardianship of minors adjudged dependent children of [the] court." CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE § 366.26 (West Supp. 1994).
4. Matthew C., 6 Cal. 4th at 401, 862 P.2d at 775, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 775.
5. Id. California Welfare and Institutions Code § 366.26(k) provides that "[an order
by the court directing that a hearing pursuant to this section be held is not an appealable order, but may be the subject of review by extraordinary writ." CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE § 366.26(k) (West Supp. 1994). See generally 10 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF
CALIFORNIA LAw, Parent and Child §§ 639, 719 (9th ed. 1989 & Supp. 1993) (discussing
juvenile dependency orders and the possibility of an appeal); 9 B.E. WrriuN, CALIFORNIA
PROCEDURE, Appeal § 2 (3d ed. 1985) (noting that where the right to appeal is ambiguous as a result of statutory construction, the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of
the right); 27 CAL. JUR. 3D Delinquent and Dependent Children §§ 176, 196, 218 (1987
& Supp. 1993) (discussing reunification services, permanency planning hearings and
appealable orders).
6. 5 Cal. 4th 242, 851 P.2d 1307, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 698 (1993), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 1221 (1994) (holding that the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof for
termination of a parent's rights satisfies due process requirements).
7. Matthew C., 6 Cal. 4th at 390-91, 862 P.2d at 767-68, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 767-68
(citing Cynthia D. v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. 4th 242, 248-49, 851 P.2d 1307, 1309-10, 19
Cal. Rptr. 2d 698, 700-01 (1993)). At the jurisdiction phase, a hearing is held to determine "'whether the allegations in the petition that the [child] comes within section 300,
and thus within the juvenile court's jurisdiction, are true.'" Id. at 391, 862 P.2d at 768,
24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 768 (quoting Cynthia D., 5 Cal. 4th at 248, 851 P.2d at 1310, 19
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 701). Subsequently, the juvenile court conducts a disposition hearing,
where the court "'considers whether the child may remain with the parents' or must
be removed." Id. The reunification phase commences when the child is removed from
the custody of the parents. The reunification phase terminates when the court finds
that the parents and child are unable to reunify within 12 months or if "'the return of
the child would create a substantial risk of detriment to the physical or emotional
well-being of the minor.'" Id. (quoting Cynthia D., 5 Cal. 4th at 249, 851 P.2d at 1310,
19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 701); see CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 361.5, 366.21(e), 366.22(a)
(West Supp. 1994). The court implements a permanent plan if it decides to terminate
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court at the jurisdictional, dispositional and termination of parental rights
phases are reviewable on appeal.' The court, however, has never addressed the issue of whether orders made pursuant to the reunification
phase are reviewable on appeal"
The California Supreme Court accepted the petitioner's contention
that an order by a court terminating reunification services is reviewable
on appeal from a subsequent final judgment."0 The court reasoned that
while an order setting a section 366.26 hearing is not appealable immediately, it can be appealed once a final judgment is entered." Accordingly, section 366.26(k) does not preclude the appellate review of final judgments concerning the reunification process. 2
To preclude the right to appeal a lower court's decision, the legislature must clearly state such an intention within the statute.' 3 The court
examined the statutory language of section 366.26 and determined that
the legislature did not expressly proscribe the right to appeal a lower
court's decision concerning reunification. 4 Therefore, the court found it

reunification efforts and set a hearing under § 366.26, which governs permanent selection within 18 months of the original removal order. Id. at 391-92, 862 P.2d at 768, 24
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 768 (quoting Cynthia D., 5 Cal. 4th at 249, 851 P.2d at 1310, 19 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 701); see CAL. WEuF. & INST CODE § 366.21(g) (West Supp. 1994).
8. Matthew C., 6 Cal. 4th at 392-93, 862 P.2d at 769, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 769; see
Cynthia D., 5 Cal. 4th at 249, 851 P.2d at 1310, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 701; cf. In re Troy
Z., 3 Cal. 4th 1170, 1178-79, 840 P.2d 266, 271, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 724, 729 (1992) (holding that parents' plea of no contest waived their right to appeal the legal applicability
of § 300(e) to their conduct). See generally California Welfare and Institutions Code
§ 366.26(h) which provides: "[a]ny order of the court permanently terminating parental
rights under this section shall be conclusive and binding ... but nothing under this
section shall be construed to limit the right to appeal the order." CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE § 366.26(h) (West Supp. 1994).
9. Matthew C., 6 Cal. 4th at 393, 862 P.2d at 769, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 769.
10. Id.; see Rao v. Campo, 233 Cal. App. 3d 1557, 1565, 285 Cal. Rptr. 691, 696
(1991) (holding that interlocutory orders are generally not appealable until there is a
final judgment because such appeals are too time consuming and costly).
11. Matthew C., 6 Cal. 4th at 393-94, 862 P.2d at 770, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 770.
12. Id. at 394, 862 P.2d at 770, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 770.
13. Id.; see People v. Bank of San Luis Obispo, 152 Cal. 261, 264, 92 P. 481, 482
(1907) (holding that where there is doubt as to whether there is a right to an appeal,
the court should find in favor of the right); Bailey v. Fosca Oil Co., 211 Cal. App. 2d
307, 309, 27 Cal. Rptr. 454, 455 (1962) (similar holding). See also 9 B.E. WITKIN, CAWFORNIA PROCEDURE, Appeal § 2 (3d ed. 1985) (noting that where the right to appeal is
ambiguous, as a result of statutory construction, the ambiguity should be resolved in
favor of the right).
14. Matthew C., 6 Cal. 4th at 395, 862 P.2d at 771, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 771; cf Peo-

would be inconsistent with the legislature's intent to construe the words
"not an appealable order" as preventing a party from the ability to appeal
a final judgment."'
The court analogized the appealability of orders terminating reunification services and setting section 366.26 hearings to pre-1989 orders
authorizing the filing of petitions terminating parental rights under Civil
Code section 232, or orders initiating guardianship proceedings." Courts
that found the orders nonappealable reasoned that there was no immediate injury, as required to appeal, until a parent's rights were actually
terminated.' Those courts assumed that a final order terminating parental rights would be reviewable on appeal. 8 Although orders terminating
reunification services and setting selection and implementation hearings
are interlocutory and not appealable, this court recognized that such
orders are reviewable on appeal once the order is final. 9
The supreme court examined the legislative history of section
366.26(k), in particular, Senate Bill Number 551.2" The court found ,no
express legislative intent precluding appellate review of orders that terminated reunification services and set section 366.26 hearings.' The

ple v. Hull, 1 Cal. 4th 266, 275, 820 P.2d 1036, 1042, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 526, 532 (1991)
(holding that the language "not an appealable order and may be reviewed only by a
writ of mandate" implies that a writ of mandate is the only manner in which appellate
review can be granted).
15. Matthew C., 6 Cal. 4th at 397, 862 P.2d at 772, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 772.
16. Id. at 397, 862 P.2d at 772, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 772. Courts faced with determining the appealability of such orders were split in their opinions on the issue. Compare
In re Linda P., 195 Cal. App. 3d 99, 105, 240 Cal. Rptr. 474, 478 (1987) (holding such
orders appealable) and In re Sarah F., 191 Cal. App. 3d 398, 404, 236 Cal. Rptr. 480,
483 (1987) (similar holding) and In re Lorenzo T., 190 Cal. App. 3d 888, 891-93, 235
Cal. Rptr. 680, 682-83 (1987) (similar holding) and In re Joshua S., 186 Cal. App. 3d
147, 154-55, 230 Cal. Rptr. 437, 44142 (1986) (similar holding) with In re Debra M.,
189 Cal. App. 3d 1032, 1039, 234 Cal. Rptr. 739, 74344 (1987) (holding such orders
nonappealable) and In re Lisa M., 177 Cal. App. 3d 915, 919-20, 225 Cal. Rptr. 7, 9-10
(1986) (similar holding) and In re Candy S., 176 Cal. App. 3d 329, 331, 222 Cal. Rptr.
43, 43, (1985) (similar holding).
17. Matthew C., 6 Cal. 4th at 397, 862 P.2d at 772, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 772; see also
In re Candy S., 176 Cal. App. 3d at 331, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 43; cf. In re T.M., 206 Cal.
App. 3d 314, 315-16, 253 Cal. Rptr. 535, 536, (1988) (holding that the right to appeal an
order authorizing termination of parental rights may be retroactively terminated).
18. Matthew C., 6 Cal. 4th at 398, 862 P.2d at 772, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 772.
19. Id. at 399, 862 P.2d at 774, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 774.
20. Id. at 399, 862 P.2d at 773, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 773; see also CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE § 366.26(k) (West Supp. 1994).
21. Matthew C., 6 Cal. 4th at 399, 862 P.2d at 773, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 773. Senate
Bill No. 551 provides, in pertinent part:
'[Plarents cannot appeal a juvenile court order to hold a hearing to
consider terminating parental rights ....

[TIhe bill requires that orders to

hold hearings to terminate parental rights are subject to appellate review by
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court concluded that the statutory language may be construed to mean
that although such orders are not immediately appealable, the orders are
reviewable on appeal from a final judgment.'
The majority reasoned that the legislative purpose in enacting section 366.26(k) was to eliminate the relitigation of dependency proceedings.' The court noted, however, that the legislature did not intend to
preclude appellate review of all orders pertaining to the termination of
reunification services, but only appellate review of interim orders.24 The
court concluded that although appellate review of orders terminating
reunification services delays the permanent placement of a child, to eliminate appellate review of final orders would be contrary to the
legislature's intent.' Thus, the supreme court reversed the court of appeal decision and remanded the case to be decided on the merits.2"
B.

The Dissenting Opinions
Justice Panelli dissented because he believed that section 366.26(k)

permits a parent to seek appellate review only by extraordinary writ.'
Justice Panelli reasoned that the legislature drafted this provision to
protect the best interests of the child by assuring prompt, permanent

placement.'
Justice Panelli acknowledged that section 366.26 is ambiguous in its
statement that: "[a]n order by the court directing that a [permanency

extraordinary writ. Under current law, parents can appeal juvenile court orders to hold termination hearings to the court of appeals.'
Id. at 399, 862 P.2d at 773-74, 24 Cal. Rptr. at 773-74 (citations omitted).
22. Matthew C., 6 Cal. 4th at 399, 862 P.2d at 774, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 774.
23. Id. at 400, 862 P.2d at 774, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 774; see CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE § 366.26(k) (West Supp. 1994). In enacting the statute, the legislature considered
the child's interest in "'a placement that is stable, permanent, and which allows the
caretaker to make a full emotional commitment to the child,'" and the parents' "'interest in the companionship, care, custody and management' of their child." Id. (quoting
In re Marilyn H., 5 Cal. 4th 295, 306, 851 P.2d 826, 833, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 544, 551
(1993) (holding that the placement of a child at a permanency planning hearing is
limited by the statutory options)).
24. Matthew C., 6 Cal. 4th at 400, 862 P.2d at 774, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 774.
25. Id. at 400, 862 P.2d at 774-75, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 774-75.
26. Id. at 401, 862 P.2d at 775, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 775.
27. Id. at 405, 862 P.2d at 777-78, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 777-78 (Panelli, J., dissenting);
see CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 366.26(k) (West Supp. 1994).
28. Matthew C., 6 Cal. 4th at 402, 862 P.2d at 775, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 775 (Panelli,
J., dissenting).

planning] hearing pursuant to this section be held is not an appealable
order, but may be the subject of review by extraordinary writ. "2 Nevertheless, Justice Panelli criticized the majority's interpretation that the
order is not appealable on an interlocutory basis.' The use of specific
words by the legislature may not necessarily be used by the courts in the
same way.:" In an attempt to resolve the statute's ambiguity, Justice
Panelli examined the legislative history of the statute.' The legislative
purpose in enacting section 366.26(k) was to eliminate any unnecessary
delay in the child's permanent placement.' Justice Panelli criticized the
majority's interpretation of section 366.36(k) because the majority failed
to uphold the legislative intent to expedite the permanent placement of
the child.'
Justice Panelli suggested that section 366.26(k) be interpreted to
provide appellate review of orders terminating reunification services only
by extraordinary writ, rather than on appeal from a final judgment."* If
the courts allowed appeals from final judgments, then the child's right to
prompt, permanent placement would be sacrificed. ' Allowing appellate
review of orders terminating reunification services only by extraordinary
writs protects both the child's right to prompt permanent placement and
the parent's right to review.' Believing that it is in the best interest of
the child not to delay his or her permanent placement, Justice Panelli
would have affirmed the appellate court judgment and denied review of
orders terminating reunification services without extraordinary writs. '
29. Id. (Panelli, J., dissenting) (quoting CAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 366.26(k) (West
Supp. 1994)).
30. Id. at 402, 862 P.2d at 775, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 775 (Panelli, J., dissenting).
31. Id. at 402, 862 P.2d at 775-76, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 775-76 (Panelli, J., dissenting);
see Harris v. Capital Growth Investors, 52 Cal. 3d 1142, 1157, 805 P.2d 873, 880, 278
Cal. Rptr. 614, 621 (1991) (noting that the legislature's "primary concern is not to study
and refine the language used in judicial decisions, but to accomplish practical results").
32. Matthew C., 6 Cal. 4th at 403, 862 P.2d at 776, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 776 (Panelli,
J., dissenting).
33. Id. (Panelli, J., dissenting); see Cynthia D. v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. 4th 242, 247,
851 P.2d 1307, 1309, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 698, 700 (1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1221
(1994) (articulating that the purpose of § 366.26 was to prevent the delay of permanent
placement); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 366.26(k) (West Supp. 1994).
34. Matthew C., 6 Cal. 4th at 404, 862 P.2d at 777, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 777 (Panelli,
J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 404, 862 P.2d at 777, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 777 (Panelli, J., dissenting); see
CAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 366.26 (West Supp. 1994).

36. Matthew C., at 405, 862 P.2d at 777, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 777 (Panelli, J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 405, 862 P.2d at 777, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 777 (Panelli, J., dissenting); see
In re Kristin W., 222 Cal. App. 3d 234, 247, 271 Cal. Rptr. 629, 636 (1990) (holding appellate review by writ to be prompt and effective); CAL R. CT. 39.2A(b) (West 1994)
("[e]xtraordinary writs are encouraged to review orders in child custody proceedings").
38. Matthew C., 6 Cal. 4th at 405, 862 P.2d at 777-78, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 777-78
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Justice George also wrote a separate dissenting opinion and argued
that the appellate court decision should have been affirmed.' Justice
George observed that many appellate court decisions support interpreting section 366.26(k) to preclude appellate review of orders terminating
reunification services and scheduling a 366.26 hearing.'
Justice George criticized the majority's interpretation as contrary to
the legislative intent to minimize the delay in implementing the permanent plan for the placement of dependent children." Justice George proposed that the statute be interpreted to preclude appellate review of
orders setting up a section 366.26 hearing unless an extraordinary writ is
issued. 2 This interpretation upholds the legislative goal of expediting
the permanent placement process for dependent minors.' Believing that
section 366.26(k) precludes review from a final order entered at a section
366.26 hearing, Justice George would have affirmed the appellate court
judgment."
III.

CONCLUSION

The California Supreme Court decided that an order terminating reunification services and setting a section 366.26 hearing is appealable
from a subsequent final order terminating parental rights.45 The supreme

(Panelli, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 405, 862 P.2d at 778, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 778 (George, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 406, 862 P.2d at 778, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 778 (George, J., dissenting); see
CAL. WELr. & INST. CODE § 366.26 (West Supp. 1994); In re Amanda B., 3 Cal. App.
4th 935, 940, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 922, 925 (1992) (holding that once a judgment in a selection and implementation hearing had been made a parent could not appeal from a
referral hearing); In re Taya C., 2 Cal. App. 4th 1, 8-9, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 810, 813-14
(1991) (holding that a petition for an extraordinary writ is required for appellate review of orders terminating parental rights); In re Rebecca H., 227 Cal. App. 3d 825,
836, 278 Cal. Rptr. 185, 190 (1991) (holding that an order denying reunification is reviewable on appeal only by extraordinary writ).

41. Matthew C., 6 Cal. 4th at 406, 862 P.2d at 778, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 778 (George,
J., dissenting).

42. Id. at 406-07, 862 P.2d at 778, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 778 (George, J., dissenting);
see CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 366.26 (West Supp. 1994).
43. Matthew C., 6 Cal. 4th at 407, 862 P.2d at 778-79, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 778-79
(George, J., dissenting); see In re Amanda B., 3 Cal. App. 4th 935, 93940, 4 Cal. Rptr.

2d 922, 925 (1992) (noting that the statutory
permanent placement of minors).
44. Matthew C., 6 Cal. 4th at 408, 862 P.2d
J., dissenting); see CAL WELF. & INST. CODE §
45. Matthew C., 6 Cal. 4th at 401, 862 P.2d

objective is to eliminate delays in the
at 779, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 779 (George,
366.26 (West Supp. 1994).

at 774-75, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 774-75; see

court rejected the appellate court's decision that concluded such orders
were appealable only by extraordinary writ." The decision clarifies the
statutory ambiguity of section 366.26(k) in favor of allowing appellate
review of final orders terminating parental rights as well as appellate
review by extraordinary writ.47

JEANNE M. MACCALDEN

CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
46. Matthew C., 6 Cal.
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
47. Matthew C., 6 Cal.
CAL WELF. & INST. CODE

§ 366.26 (West Supp. 1994).
4th at 401, 862 P.2d at 774-75, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 774-75; see
§ 366.26 (West Supp. 1994).
4th at 401, 862 P.2d at 774-75, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 774-75; see
§ 366.26(k) (West Supp. 1994).
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IX.

PUBLIC IMPROVEMENTS
The Landscaping and Lighting Act of 1972 authorizes
special assessments on residential property for maintaining public improvements constructed or installed
prior to the Act when the property receives benefits from
the maintenance of the improvement equivalent to the
amount of the assessment: Knox v. City of Orland.

The Landscaping and Lighting Act of 1972 (the Act) allows special
assessments on residential property for building and maintaining public
landscaping and lighting improvements.' In Knox v. City of Orland,2 the

1. 4 Cal. 4th 132, 136, 841 P.2d 144, 146, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 159, 161 (1992). The Act,
codified in California Streets and Highways Code §§ 22500-22509, authorizes special

benefit-related assessments, subject to certain procedural limitations, on residential landowners. CAL. SmS. & HIGH. CODE §§ 22500-22509 (West Supp. 1994). See generally 51
CAL. JUR. 3D Public Improvements §§ 52-73 (1979 & Supp. 1993) (outlining the procedural requirements for creating districts and levying assessments). The local legislative
body wishing to impose the assessment must first pass a resolution proposing the
formation of a district, describing the improvement, and ordering an engineer's report.
CAL. Sis. & HIGH. CODE § 22585 (West Supp. 1994). Following the approval of the
engineer's report, the local legislative body must hold a noticed public hearing, considering all oral statements and written protests. Id. at §§ 22588, 22590. If the owners of
more than 5096 of the assessable land file written protests, the local body must either
abandon the assessment scheme or overrule the protest by a four-fifths majority vote.
Id. at 33 22592, 22593, 22594. The local body determines the boundaries of the district
based on the benefits realized by property owners surrounding the public improvement.
Id. at § 22503. The Act requires a noticed public hearing with proper notice and an
engineer's report annually for each assessment imposed in subsequent years. Id. at
§§ 22620-22631.
2. 4 Cal. 4th 132, 841 P.2d 144, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 159 (1992). Justice Baxter
authored the majority opinion in which Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Mosk, Panelli,
Arabian, and George concurred. Justice Kennard wrote a separate dissenting opinion.
Id. at 151, 841 P.2d at 155, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 170.
Pursuant to the Landscaping and Lighting Act, the City of Orland assessed residential property owners for the maintenance of parks built prior to the Act that the
city previously maintained with general tax revenues. Four residential property owners
challenged the assessment. The trial court granted summary judgment to the city on
the procedural ground that the plaintiffs failed to challenge the defendant's statement
of "undisputed facts" and on the substantive ground that no triable issue of fact existed as to the validity of the special assessment. Id. at 137-38, 841 P.2d at 146-47, 14
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 161-62. The court of appeal affirmed, basing its decision on the substantive ground. Id. The California Supreme Court granted review because of the importance of the legal issue to the governing bodies of California cities and counties.
See id. at 138 n.9, 841 P.2d at 147 n.9, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 162 n.9 (stating that three

California Supreme Court considered whether the Act allows special assessments for maintaining public improvements, constructed or installed
prior to the Act, that a city previously funded with general tax revenues.'
The court first addressed whether the Act authorizes special assessments for maintenance of public parks not constructed pursuant to the
Act.4 Streets and Highways Code section 22525 specifically authorizes assessments for "improvements," including "[t]he installation of park or
recreational improvements,"' and "[t]he maintenance or servicing, or
both, of any of the foregoing."' All of the enumerated "improvements"
are installations except for the latter quoted provision for maintenance
and servicing that refers to the "foregoing" improvements.7 The court
held that special assessments for maintenance of public improvements
made prior to the Act are independently authorized "improvements" under the Act.8 The court reasoned that the express language used in section 22525 to describe improvements includes maintenance and servicing, 9 section 22605 specifically allows the consolidation of districts created under other assessment schemes,"0 and the legislative intent of the
Act was to simplify the procedural muddle created by prior special assessment schemes."
The court next addressed whether the assessment was a valid special assessment or whether it was a special tax and thus subject to con-

amicus curiae briefs were filed on behalf of at least twelve cities and three counties in
support of the City of Orland); see also, CAL. R. CT., Rule 29(a) (listing grounds for
supreme court review).
3. Knox, 4 Cal. 4th at 138, 841 P.2d at 147, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 162.
4. Id. The plaintiff landowners contended that the Act authorized maintenance assessments only for public improvements constructed or installed under the Act. Id.
Justice Kennard agreed with the plaintiffs' narrow construction of the Act and dissented on this ground. See infra note 23.
5. Knox, 4 Cal. 4th at 138, 841 P.2d at 147, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 162 (quoting CAL
STs. & HIGH. CODE § 22525(e) (West Supp. 1994)).
6. Id. at 138, 841 P.2d at 147-48, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 162-63 (quoting CAL STS. &
HIGH. CODE § 22525(0 (West Supp. 1994)). "Maintenance" is "the furnishing of services
and materials for the ordinary and usual maintenance, operation, and servicing of any
improvement." CAL. STs. & HIGH. CODE § 22531 (West Supp. 1994) (emphasis added).
7. See id. at § 22525(a)-(e) (West Supp. 1994) (describing all of the improvements
except the provision for maintenance and servicing as "[t]he installation ofr some improvement). The plaintiffs' argued "the foregoing" language in the provision for maintenance and servicing referred to the foregoing "installations," and were not themselves
"improvements." Knox, 4 Cal. 4th at 138-39, 841 P.2d at 148, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 163.
The court, however, rejected the plaintiffs' narrow interpretation of the Act. See infra
text accompanying notes 8-11.
8. Knox, 4 Cal. 4th at 140, 841 P.2d at 149, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 164.
9. Id. at 139, 841 P.2d at 148, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 163.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 139-40, 841 P.2d at 148-49, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 163-64.
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stitutional limitations. 2 Under the California Constitution, any part of a
charge on real property in excess of specific benefits to the people or
property charged is a special tax and is subject to constitutional limitations. :,
The court explained the critical difference between special assessments and taxes." A special assessment is a charge levied on real property that stands to benefit from a local public improvement to defray the
costs of that improvement. 5 Revenue derived from special taxes, however, is not necessarily spent on improvements which benefit assessed
persons or property.'"
The court reaffirmed its pre-Proposition 13 statement in Dawson v.
Town of Los Altos Hills,'7 providing that the standard for reviewing a
special assessment imposed pursuant to statutory guidelines is one of
deference and the court will not overturn the assessment unless it is
disproportionately high compared to benefits bestowed on assessed
property. 8 In Knox, the city complied with all statutory procedural requirements to impose the assessment.'9 The required engineer's report
indicated that the twenty-four dollar per dwelling unit charge was for the
cost of maintaining "the pools, playgrounds, picnic and barbecue areas,

12. Id. at 140-41, 841 P.2d at 149, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 164.
13. Knox, 4 Cal. 4th at 148, 841 P.2d at 154-55, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 169-70. Proposition 13, enacted by voter initiative in 1978, added Article XIII A to the California Constitution. Id. Article XIII A, § 4 requires two-thirds voter approval before a government
locality can levy special taxes. Id.;see also id. at 142-43, 841 P.2d at 150, 14 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 165 ("Accordingly, if an assessment for park maintenance improvements provides
a special benefit to the assessed properties, then the assessed property owners should
pay for the benefit they receive. If it does not, the assessment effectively amounts to a
special tax upon the assessed property owners for the benefit of the general public.").
14. Id. at 14142, 841 P.2d at 149-50, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 164-65; see also 51 CAL.
JUR. 3D Public Improvements § 2 (1979 & Supp. 1993) (distinguishing special assessments from taxes); 9 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Taxation § 110 (1989
& Supp. 1993) (same).
15. Knox, 4 Cal. 4th at 141-42, 841 P.2d at 150, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 165; see also 51
CAL. Jun. 3D Public Improvements §§ 22-26 (1979 & Supp. 1993) (outlining the requirements for valid special benefit assessments).
16. Knox, 4 Cal. 4th at 142, 841 P.2d at 150, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 165.
17. 16 Cal. 3d 676, 685, 547 P.2d 1377, 1082-83, 129 Cal. Rptr. 97, 102-03 (1976).
18. Knox, 4 Cal. 4th at 145-47 & n. 19, 841 P.2d at 152-53 & n. 19, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 167-68 & n. 19; see also 51 CAL. JUR. 3D Public Improvements § 36 (1979 & Supp.
1993) (providing that the amount of the assessment is for the local body to decide,
subject to judicial review under an abuse of discretion standard).
19. Knox, 4 Cal. 4th at 147-48, 841 P.2d at 154, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 169; see supra
note 1 for a synopsis of the procedural requirements.

bicycle paths, baseball and softball fields, tennis and volleyball courts,
and horseshoe pits located at the various parks" in the assessment districts.' The record also did not contradict the city's benefit determination.2 Furthermore, the court did not think it was relevant that the city
shifted funding for the maintenance of parks from general tax revenues
to special assessment districts.' Therefore, the court concluded the assessment was not a special tax and did not mandate two-thirds voter
approval because the city imposed the charge on the real property that
benefitted from the "improvement" in an amount equal to the assessment
and in conformity with statutory procedural requirements.'
In Knox v. City of Orland, the California Supreme Court held that
special assessments for maintenance of pre-Act public improvements are
independently authorized "improvements" under the Act.24 The court
also concluded the assessment in Knox was not a special tax requiring
two-thirds voter approval because the city imposed the charge on real
property benefitted by the "improvement" in an amount equal to the
assessment and in conformance with statutory procedural requirements."
Many commentators have concluded that this decision gives local
governments wider latitude to impose special assessments for

20. Knox, 4 Cal. 4th at 147, 841 P.2d at 154, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 169; see 9 B.E.
SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw, Taxation § 24 (1989 & Supp. 1993) (stating that
substantive due process rights are implicated by assessments "without or in excess of
benefits").
21. Knox, 4 Cal. 4th at 148, 841 P.2d at 155, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 170.
22. Id. at 150, 841 P.2d at 155-56, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 170-71 ("Plainly, if an improvement provides a special benefit, that benefit exists whether or not the public entity
was correct in first financing it out of its general fund . . . . Accordingly, section 4
does not preclude a public entity from shifting funding for an improvement from its
general fund to special assessment, so long as the requisite special benefit exists.").
Earlier in its opinion, the majority clarified that it was addressing a traditional benefit
assessment. Id. at 144-45, 841 P.2d at 151-52, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 166-67. This governmental shifting factor may be relevant to determine the validity of an assessment for
non-traditional purposes; see also 51 CAL. JuR 3D Public Improvements § 3 (1979 &
Supp. 1993) (providing that funding questions are for the legislature to decide based on
whether benefits will accrue to the public in general or whether some special benefit
is bestowed on an identifiable group).
23. Knox, 4 Cal. 4th at 151, 841 P.2d at 156, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 171. Justice
Kennard dissented because she concluded that the "maintenance of preexisting facilities
cannot be considered an 'improvement' within the meaning of the [Act] . . . ." Id. at
154, 841 P.2d at 158, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 173 (Kennard, J., dissenting). Justice Kennard
stated that she never would have reached the special tax issue because she would
have reversed on the ground that maintenance is not an authorized improvement. Id.
at 151, 841 P.2d at 156, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 171 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
24. Id. at 140, 841 P.2d at 149, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 164.
25. Id. at 151, 841 P.2d at 156, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 171.
WITKIN,
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non-traditional purposes without a public vote. 6 While there is much
speculation about whether local governments now will use special assessments for atypical sources of funding, the court in Knox specifically
found that parks have historically been the subject of special assessments. 7 The court made no mention of atypical subjects of special assessment funding.' Furthermore, procedural due process rights to notice and a hearing before the imposition of a special assessment, while
not equivalent to a public vote, are significant deterrents to overzealous
locally elected governing officials. 9 The court in Knox did not, as others
speculated, authorize the widespread shifting of funding sources from
general tax revenues to special assessments.'

MICHAEL EMMET MURPHY

26. See, e.g., Brad Altman, Expanded Assessment Powers Are Seen In California,
But Opposition Building, THE BOND BUYER, Oct. 11, 1993, at 1 (reporting the liberalized use of special assessment districts after Knox "for such atypical purposes as

cleaning up graffiti and funding library services" and recognizing a shift from general
tax revenues to special assessments); Brad Altman, Open House On Assessment Levies
May Soon Be Closed, THE BOND BUYER, Oct. 7, 1993, at 1A (outlining recent legislation
introduced by taxpayer watchdog groups that require voter approval for special assessments and thus limit the government's ability to circumvent the limitations imposed by
Proposition 13); Joel Fox, Pterodactyl California Is Swooping Down on Local Governments, THE SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, July 4, 1993, at G6 (citing the state's budgetary
shifting of school funding to local governments as the cause behind more creative and
non-traditional subjects of special assessments); Homeowner's Relief Measure Calls For
Assessment Vote, CALIFORNIA PUBuC

FINANCE,

Mar. 8, 1993, at 1 (outlining recent legis-

lation introduced by taxpayer watchdog groups that require voter approval for special
assessments and thus limit the government's ability to circumvent the limitations imposed by Proposition 13); Brian S. Currey, Benefit Assessment Ruling: An Invitation to
Experiment, CALIFORNIA PUBLIC FINANCE, Feb. 22, 1993, at 6 (briefing the Knox decision

and arguing that special assessments for school facilities and other non-traditional subjects of assessments such as police stations, fire stations, and libraries are valid under
Knox if the governing body complies with the statutory administrative requirements);
Benefit for Localities Seen In Court Assessment Ruling, CALIFORNIA PUBLIC

FINANCE,

Feb. 8, 1993, at 1 (citing Knox as the impetus for expanded non-traditional use of
assessment powers).
27. Knox, 4 Cal. 4th at 144-45, 841 P.2d at 151-52, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 166-67.
28. Id.
29. See 9 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Taxation § 20 (1989 & Supp.
1993) (outlining the constitutional requirements of notice and a hearing implicated by
the imposition of a special assessment).
30. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.

X.

RECORDS LAW
Neither the CaliforniaPublic Records Act nor the Brown
Act compel public disclosure of lettersfrom the city attorney to the city counsel that express legal opinions on
matters before the city counsel:
Roberts v. City of Palndale.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Roberts v. City of Palmdale,' the California Supreme Court held
that a letter from a city attorney to the city counsel which expresses an
opinion on a pending legal matter' does not fall within the California
Public Records Act 3 and is, therefore, not subject to public disclosure.4
The court determined that the correspondence in question did not
constitute a "meeting" as defined by the Ralph M. Brown Act,5 (Brown
Act). In addition, it concluded that a recent amendment to the Brown
Act did not abrogate the attorney-client privilege with respect to legal
correspondence by a city attorney to local governing bodies.6
II.

TREATMENT

The court first examined the city of Palmdale's claim that, according
to the Public Records Act, the attorney-client privilege protected the
letter from any public disclosure.7 Finding the letter to be a public re-

1. 5 Cal. 4th 363, 853 P.2d 296, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 330 (1993). Justice Mosk authored
the unanimous opinion.
2. Roberts sought to have the Palmdale city counsel disclose a letter from the city
attorney advising the city of its legal position with respect to a parcel map application
approved by the planning commission. Id. at 367-68, 853 P.2d at 497-98, 20 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 331-32. He had appealed the proposed map to the Palmdale city counsel and
threatened legal action. After receiving a confidential letter on the matter from the city
attorney, the city counsel held a public meeting to discuss the issues raised in the
letter. At the meeting, Roberts did not seek disclosure of the letter, and, subsequently,
the city counsel approved the map. Several days later, he demanded a copy of the letter, and the city counsel refused to provide it. Id. at 368, 853 P.2d at 498, 20 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 332.
3. The California Public Records Act refers to California Government Code § 6250
and the following sections. See CAL GOV'T CODE § 6250-6265 (West 1980 & Supp.
1994).
4. Roberts, 5 Cal. 4th at 367, 853 P.2d at 497, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 331.
5. Id. The Brown Act refers to California Government Code § 54950 and the following sections. See CAL GOV'T CODE § 54950-54961 (West 1983 & Supp. 1994).
6. Roberts, 5 Cal. 4th at 367, 853 P.2d at 497, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 331.
7. Id. at 369-70, 853 P.2d at 499, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 333. Section 6253(a) provides
that "[p]ublic records are open to inspection at all times during the office hours of the
state or local agency and every person has a right to inspect any public record, except
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cord,' the court reasoned that Government Code section 6254(k) still excepted all public records within the attorney-client privilege' from disclosure.' In support, the court cited numerous authorities arguing that the
attorney-client privilege applies to public entities."
The court determined that section 6254(b) did not limit the
attorney-client privilege solely to matters in litigation." Although Section
6254(b) specifically exempts from disclosure any documents pertaining
to pending litigation, the court insisted that the code did not imply the
converse, that documents not pertaining to pending litigation must be
disclosed. 3 Thus,
according to the court, section 6254(b) did not limit
4
the privilege.
The court then addressed appellant's claim that the Brown Act 5

as hereafter provided." CAL GOV'T CODE § 6253(a) (West 1980 & Supp. 1994).
8. Roberts, 5 Cal. 4th at 370, 853 P.2d at 499, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 333. Section
6252(d) defines a public record as any "writing containing information relating to the
conduct of the public's business prepared, owned, used, or retained by any state or
local agency regardless of physical form or characteristics." CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6252(d)
(West 1980).
9. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 950 (West 1980).
10. Section 6254(k) does not require disclosure of records which are "exempted or
prohibited pursuant to federal or state law, including, but not limited to, provisions of
the Evidence Code relating to privilege." CAL. GOV' CODE § 6254(k) (West 1980 &
Supp. 1994).
11. Roberts, 5 Cal. 4th at 370, 853 P.2d at 499, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 333; see also
EVID. CODE § 175 (West 1980) (defining a person within the meaning of the statute to
include public entities). See generally Vela v. Superior Court, 208 Cal. App. 3d 141, 255
Cal. Rptr. 921 (1989); Sutter Sensible Planning, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, 122 Cal.
App. 3d 813, 176 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1981); Holm v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. 2d 500, 267
P.2d 1025 (1954); 2 B.E. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE, Witnesses § 1114 (3d ed. 1986 &
Supp. 1993).
12. Roberts, 5 Cal. 4th at 371, 853 P.2d at 500, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 334. Section
6254(b) exempts from disclosure "[r]ecords pertaining to pending litigation to which the
public agency is a party, or to claims made pursuant to Division 3.6 (commencing with
section 810), until the pending litigation or claim has been finally adjudicated or otherwise settled." CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6254(b) (West 1980 & Supp. 1994).
13. Roberts, 5 Cal. 4th at 371-72, 853 P.2d at 500, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 334. The court
noted that § 6254(b) made no mention of privilege. Id. at 372, 858 P.2d at 500, 20 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 334. Furthermore, the court explained that to compel disclosure under
6254(b) would be to imply an exception to 6254(k) for records protected by the
attorney-client privilege. Id. at 372, 858 P.2d at 501, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 335.
14. Id. at 373, 853 P.2d at 501, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 335. The court concluded that
the local government body is the keeper of the attorney-client privilege, and that such
privilege could be asserted whether or not the writing relates to pending litigation. Id.
15. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.

and its subsequent amendments abrogated the attorney-client privilege
for government entities with respect to non-litigation matters.' The
court noted that the language of the Brown Act abrogated the
attorney-client privilege only when the communication takes place at a
"closed-session meeting" or "closed session".17 Looking to the plain
meaning of the statute, the court concluded that the word "meeting" in
section 54956.9 did not contemplate correspondence, but rather a
"'gathering'" or '"assembly... of members... for the transaction of
business.'"'8
Relying on letters from proponents of the legislation," the court determined that the intent of the legislature was to "close a loophole" that
extended the privilege to a government body's meeting with counsel over
non-litigation matters.' Therefore, the court found no clear intent to
limit the privilege with respect to written communication," and thus
refused to interpret the Brown Act as repealing, by implication, the
attorney-client privilege. '
To further support its holding, the court examined section

16. Roberts, 5 Cal. 4th at 373, 853 P.2d at 501, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 335.
17. Id. at 375, 853 P.2d at 502, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 336. California Government Code
§ 54956.9 states in pertinent part:
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to prevent a legislative body of a
local agency, based on advice of its legal counsel, from holding a closed
session to confer with, or receive advice from, its legal counsel regarding
pending litigation when discussion in open session concerning those matters
would prejudice the position of the local agency in the litigation.
CAL GOV'T CODE § 54956.9 (West 1983 & Supp. 1994).
18. Roberts, 5 Cal. 4th at 376, 853 P.2d at 503, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 337 (quoting
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1404 (3d ed. 1981)). The court also
relied on Sacramento Newspaper Guild v. Sacramento County Bd. of Supervisors, 263
Cal. App. 2d 41, 69 Cal. Rptr 480 (1968), to refute appellant's claim that private correspondence between a government body and its legal counsel constituted a meeting for
purposes of § 54956.9. Roberts, 5 Cal. 4th at 376, 853 P.2d at 503, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
337. Sacramento Newspaper Guild stated that a "meeting" and "session" involve "[a)
collective decision-making process" and "[a]
deliberative gathering." Sacramento Newspaper Guild, 263 Cal. App. 2d at 47-48, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 485. The Roberts court indicated that the term "meeting" had been interpreted to connote some type of "collective
action". Roberts, 5 Cal. 4th at 376, 853 P.2d at 503, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 337.
19. Id. at 378, 858 P.2d at 504, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 338.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 377, 858 P.2d at 504, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 338.
22. Id. at 378-79, 858 P.2d at 505, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 339; see also Nicklesberg v.
Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 54 Cal. 3d 288, 295-96, 814 P.2d 1328, 1333-34, 285
Cal. Rptr. 86, 90-91 (1991) (discussing the judicial presumption against repeals by implication); Board of Supervisors v. Lonegran, 27 Cal. 3d 855, 868, 616 P.2d 802, 810,
167 Cal. Rptr 820, 828 (1980) (stating that legislation intended to supersede existing
laws "must constitute a revision of the entire subject" in order to overcome the presumption against implied repeals).
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54957.5(a), which the court of appeal interpreted as a limitation to the
privilege.' Although section 54957.5 (a) defines public records as any
writings under consideration by a legislative body or agency,24 the court
noted that the statute exempted privileged communication under section
6254.2
Observing that "[a] city counsel needs freedom to confer with its
lawyers confidentially in order to obtain adequate advice," the court
noted that the privilege benefitted the public interest, and thus found
that the statute did not abrogate the attorney-client privilege as to written advice from counsel to a government body. 6
III.

CONCLUSION

Finding no clear legislative intent to limit the attorney-client privilege with respect to written legal advice to a government body,27 and
recognizing the necessity of a government body to receive legal advice in
confidence,' the California Supreme Court held that neither the Public
Records Act nor the Brown Act compelled disclosure of legal advice
given to the city counsel.' In clarifying the circumstances in which communications may be kept confidential, the court's decision should facili-

23. Roberts, 5 Cal. 4th at 379, 853 P.2d at 505, 20 Cal. Rptr." 2d at 339.
24. Section 54957.5 (a) provides:
Notwithstanding Section 6255 or any other provisions of law, agendas of
public meetings and other writings, when distributed to all, or a majority of
all, of the members of a legislative body of a local agency by a member,
officer, employee, or agent of such body for discussion or consideration at a
public meeting of such body, are public records under the California Public
Records Act (Chapter 3.5 (commencing with Section 6250) of Division 7 of
Title 1) as soon as distributed, and shall be made pursuant to Sections 6253
and 6256. However, this section shall not include any writing exempt from
public disclosure under Section[s] 6253.5, 6254, or 6254.7.
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 54957.5(a) (West 1983 & Supp. 1994).
25. Roberts, 5 Cal. 4th at 379, 853 P.2d at 505, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 339.
26. Id. at 380-81, 853 P.2d at 506, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 340. For an argument against
extending the privilege to government entities, see Lory A. Barsdate, Attorney-Client
Privilege for the Government Entity, 97 YALE L.J. 1725 (1988).
27. Id. at 378-79, 853 P.2d at 505, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 339.
28. Id. at 380-81, 853 P.2d at 506, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 340.
29. Id. at 381, 853 P.2d at 506, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 340.

tate communications between a government entity and its respective
counsel.

SANFORD A. TOYEN
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XI.

SECURITIES LAW
When pleading a cause of action for deceit, securities
investors must plead actual reliance upon alleged mis-

representations;plaintiffs may not assert the 'fraud-onthe-market" theory to establish a presumption of reliance:
Mirkin v. Wasserman.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Mirkin v. Wasserman,' the California Supreme Court clarified
the elements required for a claim of deceit involving securities fraud.2
The court granted review in Mirkin to determine whether plaintiffs may
assert the "fraud-on-the-market" theory,' which establishes a presumption of reliance, or whether plaintiffs must allege actual reliance, in order
to properly plead a cause of action for deceit.' The court declined to

1. 5 Cal. 4th 1082, 858 P.2d 568, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101 (1993). Justice Panelli delivered the majority opinion, in which Justices Arabian, Baxter, George, and Turner concurred. Id. at 1082-1108, 858 P.2d at 568-84, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 101-17. Justice Turner,
the Presiding Justice of the court of appeal, second appellate district, division five, was
assigned to the court to fill the vacancy created by the temporary absence of Chief
Justice Lucas. Justice Kennard filed a separate concurring and dissenting opinion, and
was joined by Acting Chief Justice Mosk. Id. at 1108-24, 858 P.2d at 584-94, 23 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 117-27 (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
2. Id. at 1091-1100, 858 P.2d at 572-78, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 105-11. See generally 9
B.E. WrrIN, SUMMARY OF CAUFORNIA LAW, Corporations § 299 (9th ed. 1989 & Supp.
1993) (discussing fraud or misrepresentations in the purchase or sale of securities); 57
CAL. JuR. 3D Securities Regulations § 78 (1980 & Supp. 1994) (discussing civil liability
for securities fraud).
3. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241-47 (1988).
The fraud on the market theory is based on the hypothesis that, in an open
and developed securities market, the price of a company's stock is determined by the available material information regarding the company and its
business .... Misleading statements will therefore defraud purchasers of
stock even if the purchasers do not directly rely on the misstatements ....
The causal connection between the defendants' fraud and the plaintiffs' purchase of stock in such a case is no less significant than in a case of direct
reliance on misrepresentations.
Id. at 24142 (quoting Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160-61 (3d Cir. 1986)). See generally Note, The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 95 HARv. L REV. 1143 (1982) (examining
the utility of the "fraud-on-the-market" theory and whether it should replace the actual
reliance requirement); 57 CAL. JUR. 3D Securities Regulations § 86 (1980 & Supp. 1994)
(discussing market manipulation and the fraud-on-the-market doctrine).
4. Mirkin, 5 Cal. 4th at 1087, 858 P.2d at 569, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 102. Between

adopt the fraud-on-the-market theory, holding instead that plaintiffs must
plead actual reliance upon misrepresentations in order to establish a
legitimate cause of action under California Civil Code section 1709.'
II.

A.

TREATMENT OF THE CASE

Majority Opinion
1.

The Fraud-on-the-Market Doctrine

The court began its analysis by evaluating the applicability of the
fraud-on-the-market doctrine.' While the plaintiffs attempted to apply the
principle to a common law action of deceit, the court noted that the
doctrine pertained primarily to actions brought under Rule 10b-5 of the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).' The court recognized how-

October 17, 1985 and February 29, 1988, the plaintiffs, Gerald Mirkin and Charles Miller, purchased common stock in Maxicare Health Plans, Inc. (Maxicare). Although
Maxicare appeared to experience significant economic growth in 1985 and 1986, the
corporation suffered substantial losses during the following period. Maxicare reported
losses of $22,000,000 in the fourth quarter of 1986, followed by losses of $255,000,000
in 1987, and $21,300,000 in the first quarter of 1988.
The plaintiffs filed suit against Maxicare. Ernst & Young, the corporation's accounting firm, as well as Salomon Brothers, Inc. and Montgomery Securities, Inc., the
corporations which underwrote public offerings of Maxicare stock, were also named in
the action. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants intentionally misrepresented
Maxicare's financial status in economic prospectuses and documents filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Allegedly, such misrepresentations artificially inflated the price of Maxicare stock.
On this basis, the plaintiffs filed a cause of action for deceit and negligent misrepresentation. The defendants demurred on the grounds that the plaintiffs had not
sufficiently plead actual reliance, a required element of these torts. Id. at 1088.
The plaintiffs subsequently amended their complaint, alleging that they had purchased Maxicare stock "'[ln reliance upon the integrity of the securities market and
the securities offering process, and the fidelity, integrity and superior knowledge of defendants.'" Id. at 1088, 858 P.2d at 570, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 103. Nevertheless, the trial
court sustained the defendants' demur without leave to amend, and dismissed the complaint. Id.
The plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the fraud-on-the-market theory established a
presumption of reliance in situations where misrepresentations would potentially affect
the market price of a stock. Id. Rejecting this argument, however, the court of appeal
affirmed the trial court decision. Id. Subsequently, the supreme court granted review.
Id.
5. Id. at 1107, 858 P.2d at 585, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 118.
6. Section 1709 provides: "One who willfully deceives another with intent to induce
him to alter his position to his injury or risk, is liable for any damage which he thereby suffers." CAL. Civ. CODE § 1709 (West 1985).
7. Mirkin, 5 Cal. 4th at 1089, 858 P.2d at 571, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 104; see supra
note 3.
8. Id. Rule lob-5 provides, in pertinent part: "It shall be unlawful for any person,
directly or indirectly . . . [tlomake any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit

[Vol. 22: 247, 19941

CaliforniaSupreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

ever, that the elements of a private, lOb-5 action are neither derived
from, nor directly analogous to, a common law action of deceit
In fact, state appellate courts have uniformly rejected any incorporation of fraud-on-the-market into common law deceit actions.'" Similarly,
federal courts applying California law have declined to apply the doctrine
to state law fraud claims." Following such persuasive precedent, the
court in Mirkin refused to apply the doctrine's presumption of reliance
to an action of deceit under Civil Code section 1709."2
2.

The Requirement of Actual Reliance

The court next addressed the argument that California law does not
expressly require a showing of actual reliance in actions for deceit. 3 In
support of this contention, the plaintiffs noted that Civil Code section
1709 does not establish a specific requirement of reliance.'4 Similarly,
section 1710 fails to expressly enumerate an element of reliance in defining deceit.'5
The court acknowledged the lack of a statutory requirement of actu-

to state a material fact .. .in connection with the purchase or sale of any security."
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1992). See generally Michael P. Whalen, Causation and Reliance
in Private Actions Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 13 PAc. L.J. 1003 (1982).
9. Mirkin, 5 Cal. 4th at 1089, 858 P.2d at 571, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 104.
10. Id. at 1090 & n.3, 858 P.2d at 571 & n.3, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 104 & n.3; see also
Piel v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1163 n.17 (3d Cir. 1986) ("[N]o state courts have adopted the [fraud-on-the-market] theory, and thus direct reliance remains a requirement of a
common law securities fraud claim.").
11. Mirkin, 5 Cal. 4th at 1091, 858 P.2d at 572, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 105.
12. Id. at 1108, 858 P.2d at 584, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 117.
13. Id. at 1091, 858 P.2d at 572, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 105.
14. Id.; see CAL Civ. CODE § 1709 (West 1985); see also supra note 6.

15. Mirkin, 5 Cal. 4th at 1091, 858 P.2d at 572, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 105. Section
1710 provides, in pertinent part:
A deceit, within the meaning of [§1709], is either.
1. The suggestion, as a fact, of that which is not true, by one who
does not believe it to be true;
2. The assertion, as a fact, of that which is not true, by one who has
no reasonable ground for believing it to be true;
3. The suppression of a fact, by one who is bound to disclose it, or
who gives information of other facts which are likely to mislead for want of
communication of that fact; or,
4. A promise, made without any intention of performing it.
CAL CiV. CODE § 1710 (West 1985).

al reliance."' Nevertheless, the court asserted that deceit, like other torts
in California, is derived from a combination of both statutory and common law principles. 7 California civil provisions, which serve to codify
common law torts, "'must be construed as continuations thereof, and not
as new enactments.". Following this principle, courts have recognized
that Civil Code sections 1709 and 1710 represent continuations of the
common law."
Therefore, California courts have consistently required plaintiffs to
plead the common law element of actual reliance, in order to establish a
legitimate cause of action for deceit." Applying such reasoning, the
court in Mirkin maintained that plaintiffs must plead actual reliance."'
B.

Justice Kennard's Concurringand Dissenting Opinion

Justice Kennard, joined by Acting Chief Justice Mosk, concurred in
the judgment "only to the extent it declines to apply the fraud-on-themarket principle to claims for negligent misrepresentation."' Kennard
dissented, however, with respect to the majority's opinion regarding
actual reliance in actions for intentional deceit.'
Justice Kennard adamantly disagreed with the majority's implication
that reliance established under the fraud-on-the-market theory represents
"something other than actual reliance." Rather Kennard maintained

16. Mirkin, 5 Cal. 4th at 1091, 858 P.2d at 572, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 105.
17. Id.
18. Id. (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 5 (West 1982)).
19. Id. at 1091-92, 858 P.2d at 752, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 105; see also Lacher v. Superior Court, 230 Cal. App. 3d 1038, 1043 n.1, 281 Cal. Rptr. 640, 641 n.1 (1991).
20. Mirkin, 5 Cal. 4th at 1092, 858 P.2d at 752-53, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 105-06; see,
e.g., Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n, 46 Cal. 3d 1092, 1108, 762 P.2d 46, 53, 252 Cal. Rptr.
122, 129 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1084 (1989); Seeger v. Odell, 18 Cal. 2d 409,

414, 115 P.2d 977, 980 (1941). See generally 5 B.E.

WITION, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA

Torts §§ 675, 711 (9th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1993) (enumerating elements of deceit
cause of action and discussing the requirement of actual reliance); 34 CAL. JUR. 3D
F aud and Deceit § 75 (1977 & Supp. 1993) (discussing reliance requirement of fraud
cause of action).
21. Mirkin, 5 Cal. 4th at 1092, 858 P.2d at 753, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 106. The court
also rejected the plaintiffs' contention that actual reliance could not be required in
cases of deceit involving an omission of material information. Id. at 1093, 858 P.2d at
573-74, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 106-07. The court reasoned, "it is not logically impossible to
prove reliance on an omission. One need only prove that, had the omitted information
been disclosed one would have been aware of it and behaved differently." Id. at 1093,
858 P.2d at 574, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 107.
22. Id. at 1108, 858 P.2d at 584, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 117 (Kennard, J., concurring and
dissenting).
23. Id. at 1108-24, 858 P.2d at 584-94, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 117-27 (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
24. Id. at 1121, 858 P.2d at 593, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 126 (Kennard, J., concurring and
LAW,
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that the fraud-on-the-market doctrine is a legitimate means for establishing that "one who has purchased a security at an artificially inflated
price, believing that the price-setting mechanism is untainted, has indirectly relied on the public misrepresentations that caused the price distortion."' As such, Kennard suggested that the majority erroneously rejected application of the fraud-on-the-market doctrine.26 In fact, Kennard
argued that such a holding directly conflicts with California case law regarding indirect reliance.27 Therefore, Kennard would have reversed the
decision of the court of appeal.'

I1. CONCLUSION
The court's decision in Mirkin serves to clarify the elements required for an action for deceit under Civil Code section 1709.' By rejecting incorporation of the fraud-on-the-market doctrine, the court reiterated the need to plead actual reliance.' Nevertheless, the decision
does not eliminate the availability of alternative causes of action, including SEC Rule lOb-5, which allow the plaintiff to establish a presumption
of reliance by asserting fraud-on-the-market. 3 Application of market reliance in common law deceit cases would allow plaintiffs to circumvent

dissenting).
25. Id. (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
26. Id. at 1124, 858 P.2d at 595, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 128 (Kennard, J., concurring and
dissenting).
To drive up the value of a security by means of knowingly false public statements is actual fraud. Innocent investors who purchase the security at the
inflated price in ignorance of the falsehood suffer actual loss when the falsehood is revealed and the value of the security declines. When these actual
victims of actual fraud seek compensation for actual losses, it requires no
revolution in judicial thinking to hold that the traditional tort action for fraud
provides a remedy.
Id. at 1124-25, 858 P.2d at 595, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 128. (Kennard, J., concurring and
dissenting).
27. Id. (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting); see, e.g., Committee on Children's
Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp., 35 Cal. 3d 197, 673 P.2d 660, 197 Cal. Rptr.
783 (1983). See generally 34 CAL. JUR. 3D Fraud and Deceit § 38 (1977 & Supp. 1993)
(discussing fraud cause of action based upon indirect misrepresentations).
28. See Mirkin, 5 Cal. 4th at 1124, 858 P.2d at 595, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 128
(Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
29. Id. at 1091-1100, 858 P.2d at 572-78, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 105-11.
30. See id. at 1091, 858 P.2d at 572, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 105.
31. Id. at 1090, 858 P.2d at 572, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 105.

the balancing principles imposed by such alternatives.' Thus, as a matter of public policy, the court appropriately declined to eliminate the
pleading of actual reliance.

MICHAEL ALDEN MILLER

32. Id. at 1107, 858 P.2d at 583-84, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 116-17. For example, under
Rule 10b-5, a plaintiff must prove that he actually purchased or sold securities. Id. at
1107, 858 P.2d at 584, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 117; see also Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730-55 (1975). Additionally, a plaintiff must prove that a defendant had scienter, a degree of fault involving intent or reckless disregard. Mirkin, 5
Cal. 4th at 1107, 858 P.2d at 584, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 117; see also Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194-215 (1976). These requirements, coupled with a shorter
statute of limitations, are intended to balance the advantages created by the fraud-onthe-market presumption of reliance. Mirkin, 5 Cal. 4th at 1107, 858 P.2d at 584, 23 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 117.
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XII.

TORT LAW
A. Business landlords do not have a duty to hire security guards to protect patrons, tenants, or tenants'
employee's against the criminal acts of third parties
unless the landowners have notice of prior similar
incidents of violent crimes on the premises:
Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center.
I. INTRODUCTION

In Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center,' the California Supreme Court considered whether the owner of a shopping center owes a
duty to its patrons, tenants, and tenants' employees to hire security
guards to secure the premises against the criminal acts of third parties!
The court emphasized that foreseeability is the crucial factor to consider
in determining the existence or scope of a landowner's duty to take precautionary measures In the 1985 case of Isaacs v. Huntington Memo-

1. 6 Cal. 4th 666, 863 P.2d 207, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 137 (1993). Justice Panelli
authored the majority opinion, in which Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Kennard,
Arabian, Baxter, and George concurred. Id. at 670, 863 P.2d at 209, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
139. Justice Mosk filed a separate dissenting opinion. Id. at 680, 863 P.2d at 216, 25
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 146.
2. Id. at 670, 863 P.2d at 209, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 139. See generally CAL CIV. CODE
§ 1714 (West 1985 & Supp. 1994) (stating that a property owner is responsible for an
injury to another person which results from his lack of care in the management of his
property); 6 B.E. WrrITN, SUMMARY OF CAUFORNA LAW, Torts § 933 (9th ed. 1988 &
Supp. 1993) (discussing the duty of a landowner to take affirmative action to control
the wrongful acts of third parties); 50 CAL. JUR. 3D Premises Liability §§ 3842 (1993)
(discussing liability for injuries caused by the wrongful acts of third parties); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 344 (1965) (stating that when business premises are open
to the public, the failure of a landowner to exercise reasonable care may subject him
to liability for harm caused by the acts of third persons); WILLIAM L. PROSSER, PROSSER
ON TORTS § 61, at 395 (4th ed. 1971) (stating that a possessor of land must exercise
control over the conduct of a third person to prevent injury to a business visitor); Uri
Kaufman, When Crime Pays: Business Landlord's Duty to Protect Customers from
Criminal Acts Committed on the Premises, 31 S. TEX. L REV. 89 (1990).
3. Pacific Plaza, 6 Cal. 4th at 676, 863 P.2d at 214, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 144. See
generally 6 B.E. WITIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts § 934 (9th ed. 1988 &
Supp. 1993) (explaining that liability is only imposed where a landowner "has reasonable cause to anticipate the misconduct of third persons"); 50 CAL. JUR. 3D Premises
Liability § 39 (1993) (stating that a landowner only has a duty to protect against
"known or reasonably foreseeable" risks); PROSSER, supra note 2, § 61 (explaining that
the occupier of property only has a duty to protect the business visitor from foresee-

rial Hospital,' the California Supreme Court held that foreseeability
should be assessed in light of the "totality of circumstances" and that evidence of foreseeability should not be limited to "prior similar incidents"
of crime.' In Pacific Plaza, the court changed its position with respect
to hiring security guards because of its concern over imposing unfair
burdens on landlords.' The court concluded that prior similar incidents
of violent crime on the landowner's premises will almost always be a
prerequisite for finding that a landowner has a duty to provide security
guards.' The court reasoned that without this high degree of foreseeability requirement, landlords would, in essence, become the insurers of
public safety-a responsibility which would create significant financial
and social burdens.
II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The plaintiff, Ann M., brought a civil action against the Pacific Plaza
Shopping Center after she was raped on the premises.9 The plaintiff was
employed by a photo store, which was located in a secluded area of the

able dangers).
4. 38 Cal. 3d 112, 695 P.2d 653, 211 Cal. Rptr. 356.
5. Id. at 127-29, 695 P.2d at 659-61, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 362-64. In Isaacs, a doctor
brought an action against a hospital for injuries he suffered as a result of being shot
in the hospital parking lot. The doctor claimed that the hospital was negligent for failing to provide adequate security measures. Id. at 120, 695 P.2d at 655, 211 Cal. Rptr.
at 358. In order to prove that the hospital had a duty to protect the plaintiff and other
visitors from third-party crime, the plaintiff had the burden to prove that the attack on
him was foreseeable. The California Supreme Court considered the issue of whether
foreseeability could be established without evidence of prior similar incidents of crime.
Id. The court held that "foreseeability is determined in light of all the circumstances
and not by a rigid application of a mechanical 'prior similars' rule. Id. at 126, 695 P.2d
at 659, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 362. Accordingly, the court considered several facts: the hospital was in a high crime area, the parking lot was not well lit, several threatened assaults and thefts had been reported in the area, and the parking lot was devoid of any
security at the time of the shooting. This led the court to conclude that the issue of
whether these circumstances, together, established the foreseeability of the assault
should have been submitted to the jury. Id. at 130, 695 P.2d at 661-62, 211 Cal. Rptr.
at 364-65.
6. Pacific Plaza, 6 Cal. 4th at 679, 863 P.2d at 215-16, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 145-46.
7. Id. at 679, 863 P.2d at 215, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 145.
8. Id. at 679, 863 P.2d at 216, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 146; see also 50 CAL. JUR. 3D
Premises Liability § 39 (1993) (stating that the owner or possessor of property is "not
an insurer of the safety of persons on the premises"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 344 cmt. f (1965) (stating that the possessor of land is not an insurer of the visitor's
safety); PROSSER, supra note 2, § 61 (stating that the occupier of land is not an insurer of the safety of visitors).
9. Pacific Plaza, 6 Cal. 4th at 670, 863 P.2d at 209, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 139. The
shopping center was a strip mall located in the Pacific Beach area of San Diego. Id.
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defendant's mall."° The lease between the photo store and the shopping
center did not impose any specific obligation on the shopping center to
police either the common areas or those areas within the exclusive control of the merchants." However, the plaintiff presented evidence that
there had been assaults and robberies in the shopping center prior to her
being raped 2 and that the employees and tenants were concerned about
their safety and the lack of security. 3
After the rape, the plaintiff filed a complaint against the shopping
center in superior court, alleging that it was "negligent in failing to provide adequate security to protect her from an unreasonable risk of
harm." 4 The defendant shopping center filed a motion for summary
judgment, claiming that it had no legal duty to protect the plaintiff because the attack on her was unforeseeable. 5 The trial court granted the
motion, finding that the defendant owed no duty of care to the plaintiff.6 The court of appeal affirmed the trial court decision, but for different reasons."
Contrary to the opinion of the trial court, the court of appeal found
that the defendant did owe a duty to the tenants and their employees to
keep the premises safe and to take "reasonable" precautionary measures

10. Id. There were approximately 25 stores in the shopping center. Id.
11. Id. at 670-71, 863 P.2d at 209-10, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 139-40.
12. The plaintiff presented evidence that there had been several prior bank robberies
and purse snatchings. Id. at 671, 863 P.2d at 210, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 140. The plaintiff
also testified that there was a transient running around the shopping mall pulling down
women's pants. Id. at 671 n.3, 863 P.2d at 210 n.3, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 140 n.3.
13. Id. at 671, 863 P.2d at 210, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 140. The tenants and employees
were particularly concerned about the transients who congregated in the common areas
of the shopping mall. Id. The tenants also complained about the presence of transients
and the lack of security at the merchants' association meetings, an organization to
which all the tenants belonged. Id. at 672, 863 P.2d at 210, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 140.
According to the plaintiffs deposition, the merchants' association requested that the
defendants provide security patrols but that none were provided. Id.
14. Id. at 672, 863 P.2d at 210-11, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 140-41. The plaintiff also filed
suit against the owner of the photo store for negligence, but she withdrew that claim
in order to receive workers' compensation benefits. (Under Labor Code § 3602,
workers' compensation is an exclusive remedy.) Id. at 672 n.4, 863 P.2d at 211 n.4, 25
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 141 n.4; see CAL. LAB. CODE § 3602 (West 1989 & Supp. 1994). The
court stated that it would not consider the issue of the possible liability of the tenant/employer. Pacific Plaza, 6 Cal. 4th at 672 n.4, 863 P.2d at 211 n.4, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 141 n.4.
15. Id. at 672-73, 863 P.2d at 211, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 141.
16. Id. at 673, 863 P.2d at 211, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 141.
17. Id.

to protect them against foreseeable, criminal acts of third parties.'8 The
court of appeal concluded, however, that the evidence presented did not
show that the defendant acted unreasonably in failing to provide security
guards."' The California Supreme Court granted review.'
III.
A.

TREATMENT OF THE CASE

Relationship Between the Plaintiffand the Defendant

Under California law, a landlord owes a duty to its tenants and patrons "to secure common areas against foreseeable criminal acts of third
parties."2' Pacific Plaza argued that it did not owe a duty to the plaintiff
because she was neither a patron nor a tenant, but rather an employee of
a tenant.' The court rejected this argument, concluding that in the business context, it is appropriate to extend the duty owed to tenants to
their employees.' It reasoned that in the commercial context, the tenant
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 674, 863 P.2d at 212, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 142; see Frances T. v. Village
Green Owners Ass'n, 42 Cal. 3d 490, 499, 723 P.2d 573, 576-77, 229 Cal. Rptr. 456, 45960 (1986) (holding that a homeowners' association, which functioned as a landlord in
maintaining the common areas of a condominium, had a duty to exercise due care for
the residents' safety); Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hospital, 38 Cal. 3d at 123, 695
P.2d at 657, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 360 (stating that it is "well settled" that an owner of
land has a duty to control the wrongful acts of third parties where the owner has
"reasonable cause to anticipate such acts"). See generally 6 B.E. WITIIN, SUMMARY OF
CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts § 934 (9th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1993) (explaining that liability is
imposed where a landowner "has reasonable cause to anticipate the misconduct of
third persons"); 50 CAL JUR. 3D Premises Liability § 39 (1993) (stating that a landowner has a duty to protect against "known or reasonably foreseeable" criminal acts of
third parties).
22. Pacific Plaza, 6 Cal. 4th at 674, 863 P.2d at 212, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 142. The
court noted that in the state of California, "duties are no longer imposed on an occupier of land solely on the basis of rigid classifications of trespasser, licensee, and invitee." Id. In other words, a landowner owes a duty to every person who enters his
property to protect against foreseeable risks. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714 (West 1985 &
Supp. 1994) (making no distinction among the types of persons injured as a result of a
landowner's negligence in managing his property); see also Rowland v. Christian, 69
Cal. 2d 108, 119, 443 P.2d 561, 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 104 (1968) (holding that the status of the person harmed is not determinative with respect to a landowner's liability),
superseded by statute as stated in Perez v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 218 Cal. App.
3d 426, 467, 267 Cal. Rptr. 100, 102 (1990). See generally 6 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF
CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts §§ 894-896 (9th ed. 1988) (discussing the traditional classifications of trespasser, licensee, and invitee and the modern repudiation of these distinctions); 50 CAL. JUR. 3D Premises Liability § 43 (1993) (stating that although the status
of a person on the premises is "not determinative of the duty of care owed to the
person," there has not been a "total abandonment of such classifications").
23. Pacific Plaza, 6 Cal. 4th at 675, 863 P.2d at 212, 25 Cal. Rptr. at 142; see also
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is usually not a natural person and must therefore act through its
employees.24
B.

Lack of Control Over the Premises Where the Crime Occurred

Pacific Plaza also contended that it owed no duty to the plaintiff
because the crime took place on property which was not in its possession and control.' Rather, the plaintiff was raped in the photo store,
which was within the exclusive control and management of the merchant." The court dismissed this argument, citing Frances T. v. Village
Green Owners Ass'n. 7 and O'Hara v. Western Seven Trees Corp.' as
precedent. These cases established that if the landlord's failure to secure
the common areas contributed to the tenant's injuries, then the fact that
the criminal activity occurred in an area within the exclusive control of
the tenant will not relieve the landlord of liability.'
1.

Foreseeability, When Analyzed to Determine Duty, is a Question
of Law

A landlord only has a duty to take precautionary measures to prevent the criminal acts of third parties when such criminal activity is foreseeable.' While duty is a question of law for the court, foreseeability is

50 CAL. JUR. 3D Premises Liability § 54 (1993) (stating that anyone working on the
premises in the interest of the owner has the same status as the owner).
24. Pacific Plaza, 6 Cal. 4th at 675, 863 P.2d at 212-13, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 142-43.
25. Id. at 675, 863 P.2d at 213, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 143.
26. Id. at 671, 863 P.2d at 210, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 140.
27. Id. at 676, 863 P.2d at 213, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 143 (citing Frances T. v. Village
Green Owners Ass'n, 42 Cal. 3d 490, 723 P.2d 573, 229 Cal. Rptr. 2d 456 (1986)).
28. Id. at 676-77, 863 P.2d at 213, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 143 (citing O'Hara v. Western
Seven Trees Corp. Intercoast Management, 75 Cal. App. 3d 798, 142 Cal. Rptr. 487

(1977)).
29. Pacific Plaza, 6 Cal. 4th at 675-76, 863 P.2d at 213, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 143. In
both Frances T. and O'Hara, a tenant was raped inside her apartment. In each case,
the court found that the negligence of the landlord in failing to provide adequate security measures in the common areas contributed to the rape inside the tenant's unit,
and, therefore, the landlord in each case was held liable. Frances T., 42 Cal. 3d at 498,
723 P.2d at 578, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 461; O'Hara, 75 Cal. App. 3d at 803, 142 Cal. Rptr.
at 490. In O'Hara, the court of appeal stated that "since only the landlord is in the
position to secure common areas, he has a duty to protect against types of crimes of
which he has notice and which are likely to recur if the common areas are not secure." O'Hara, 75 Cal. App. 3d at 802-03, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
30. Pacific Plaza, 6 Cal. 4th at 676, 863 P.2d at 214, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 144; see

normally a question of fact for the jury.' However, the court in Pacific
Plaza held that when foreseeability is analyzed to determine the existence or scope of a duty, it is a question of law to be decided by the
court.' This seems to contradict a number of other courts which have
explained that although the existence of a duty as a whole is a question
of law, foreseeability as a factor in determining duty is a question of fact
for the jury.' One possible means of reconciling Pacific Plaza with
these other decisions is to interpret the Pacific Plaza opinion as saying
that the degree of foreseeability required to impose a particular duty will
be a question of law for the court, but the jury will evaluate the specific
facts of the case based on that standard.'
Hollywood Boulevard Venture v. Superior Court, 116 Cal. App. 3d 901, 905, 172 Cal.
Rptr. 528, 530 (1981) (stating that a landlord "is not required to take precautions
against attacks by third parties which he has no reason to anticipate"), disapproved by
Frances T, 42 Cal. 3d at 502-03, 723 P.2d at 579, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 462. See generally
6 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts § 934 (9th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1993)

(explaining that liability is only imposed where a landowner "has reasonable cause to
anticipate the misconduct of third persons"); 50 CAL. JuR. 3D Premises Liability § 39
(1993) (stating that a landowner only has a duty to protect against "known or reasonably foreseeable" risks); PROSSER, supra note 2, § 61 (explaining that the occupier of
property only has a duty to protect the business visitor from foreseeable dangers).
31. Weirum v. RKO Gen., Inc., 15 Cal. 3d 40, 46, 539 P.2d 36, 39, 123 Cal. Rptr. 468,
472 (1975); see 6 B.E. WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw, Torts § 748 (9th ed. 1988

& Supp. 1993) (stating that the existence of a legal duty is a question of law).
32. Pacific Plaza, 6 Cal. 4th at 678, 863 P.2d at 215, 25 Cal. Rptr. at 145 (citing
Ballard v. Uribe, 41 Cal. 3d 564, 573 n.6, 715 P.2d 624, 629 n.6, 224 Cal. Rptr. 664, 669
n.6 (1986)). In Ballard, the court stated that "[s]ome confusion has arisen over the
respective roles played by the court and the jury" with respect to "foreseeability." 41
Cal. 3d 564, 573 n.6, 715 P.2d 624, 629 n.6, 224 Cal. Rptr. 664, 669 n.6. The court explained that in some contexts it is a question of fact for the jury and in other contexts, such as the "boundaries" of duty, it is a question of law for the court. Id. The
Ballard court further explained that foreseeability is a question of law only when determining whether a category of negligent conduct is likely to result in harm. Id. In
contrast, foreseeability is a question of fact for the jury when determining whether a
particular plaintiffs injury was foreseeable and whether a particular defendant's conduct was negligent. Id.
33. See Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hospital, 38 Cal. 3d at 124-26, 695 P.2d at
658-59, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 361-62 (stating that "[iun considering whether one owes another a duty of care, several factors must be weighed, including 'the foreseeability of
harm to the plaintiff,'" and that it is "well established" that foreseeability is a question
of fact); Weirum, 15 Cal. 3d at 46, 539 P.2d at 39, 123 Cal. Rptr. 471 (stating that
"foreseeability of the risk is a primary consideration in establishing the element of
duty . .. (and] foreseeability is a question of fact for the jury"); Cohen v. Southland
Corp., 157 Cal. App. 3d 130, 138, 203 Cal. Rptr. 572, 576 (1984) (stating that
"[fjoreseeability of the harm is of primary importance in establishing the element of
duty . . . [and] it is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury"); Gomez v. Ticor, 145
Cal. App. 3d 622, 627, 193 Cal. Rptr. 600, 603 (1983) (explaining that foreseeability of
harm is the most important factor in determining the existence of a duty and that
foreseeability is a question of fact for the jury).
34. The court stated that "'in cases where the burden of preventing future harm is
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2.

Standard for Establishing Foreseeability

In Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hospital,' the California Supreme Court pronounced that foreseeability of third-party crime should
be determined in light of the "totality of the circumstances."' Under this
rule, foreseeability could be established without evidence of prior criminal activity on the landlord's premises.37 The Pacific Plaza court asserted that the rule articulated in Isaacs needed "refinement."'
The court in Pacific Plaza emphasized that the scope of a
landlord's duty to protect against third-party crime should be determined
by balancing the foreseeability of harm against the burden and effectiveness of the proposed security measures.' Using this analysis, the court
found that the hiring of security guards is a significant financial burden.4" Furthermore, the court suggested that even if a landlord does hire
security guards, such measures may not be adequate to deter criminal

conduct." Finally, the court asserted that it is against the social policy
of the state to force private landowners "to become the insurers of public safety."'
great, a high degree of foreseeability may be required.'" Pacific Plaza, 6 Cal. 4th at
678-79, 863 P.2d at 215, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 145 (quoting Isaacs, 38 Cal. 3d at 125, 695
P.2d at 658, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 361). "'On the other hand, in cases where there are
strong policy reasons for preventing the harm, or the harm can be prevented by simple
means, a lesser degree of foreseeability may be required.'" Id. (quoting Isaacs, 38 Cal.
3d at 125, 695 P.2d at 658, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 361). In Isaacs, the court stated that
"[t]he degree of foreseeability necessary to warrant the finding of a duty will thus vary
from case to case." 38 Cal. 3d at 125, 695 P.2d at 658, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 361.
35. 38 Cal. 3d 112, 695 P.2d 653, 211 Cal. Rptr. 356 (1985).
36. Id. at 127, 695 P.2d at 659-60, 211 Cal. Rptr, at 362-63; see supra notes 4 and 5
and accompanying text; see also Kaufman, supra note 2, at 97 (stating that California
was the only jurisdiction to adopt a "totality of the circumstances rule"). Other rules
which various jurisdictions have adopted with respect to a landowner's duty include:
(1) the "limited duty rule," where foreseeability arises only in those instances where
the criminal act was imminent; (2) the "prior similar incidents rule," where foreseeability requires that there have been prior criminal incidents on or near the premises; (3)
the "first line of defense rule," which requires a landowner to provide basic security
measures; and (4) the "tempting target rule," which obligates business landlords to protect customers when the business is by its nature particularly conducive to crime. Id.
at 95-98.
37. Isaacs, 38 Cal. 3d at 127, 695 P.2d at Q59, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 362.
38. Pacific Plaza, 6 Cal. 4th at 678, 863 P.2d at 215, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 145.
39. Id. at 678-79, 863 P.2d at 215, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 145.
40. Id. at 679, 863 P.2d at 215, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 145.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 679, 863 P.2d at 216, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 146. See Hollywood Boulevard

The court explained that because the financial and social burden of
hiring security guards is so significant, a "high degree of foreseeability" is
required in order to find that a landlord has a duty to provide these security measures.' As a result, the court concluded that "the requisite degree of foreseeability rarely, if ever, can be proven in the absence of
prior similar incidents of violent crime on the landowner's premises."'
The court further asserted that a landowner must have notice of these
prior similar incidents of crime in order for future criminal activity to be
foreseeable.45
Applying this analysis to the facts of the present case, the court
found that Pacific Plaza did not have notice of any violent criminal acts
occurring on its premises." The court further found that the prior assaults and robberies which allegedly occurred on the defendant's property were not similar enough in nature to the violent rape that the plaintiff suffered.47 Accordingly, the court seemed to suggest that even if the
defendant did have notice of the prior assaults and robberies, those
crimes were not sufficiently violent to impose a duty on the defendant to
hire security guards."
IV.

IMPACT

While the Pacific Plaza decision clearly represents a victory for
business landlords, it provides a disincentive for landlords to make their
property safe from crime. The majority obviously felt that a policy
shielding business landlords from liability outweighed a policy encouraging landlords to take precautionary security measures." This is evi-

Venture v. Superior Court, 116 Cal. App. 3d 901, 905, 172 Cal. Rptr. 528, 530 (1981)
(stating that "[a] proprietor of premises is not the insurer of the safety of persons on
those premises"); 50 CAL. JUR 3D Premises Liability § 39 (1993) (stating that "the
owner or possessor of property is not an insurer of the safety of persons on the premises"). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 344 cmt. f (1965) (stating
that the possessor of land is not an insurer of the visitor's safety); PROSSER, supra
note 2, § 61 (stating that the occupier of land is not an insurer of the safety of visitors).
43. Pacific Plaza, 6 Cal. 4th at 679, 863 P.2d at 215, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 145.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 679, 863 P.2d at 216, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 146. The court stated that a
"landowner's duty includes the duty to exercise reasonable care to discover that criminal acts are being or are likely to be committed on its land." Id. (citing Peterson v.
San Francisco College Dist., 36 Cal. 3d 799, 807, 685 P.2d 1193, 1197, 205 Cal. Rptr.
842, 846 (1984)).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 680, 863 P.2d at 216, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 146.
48. Id.
49. Id. Justice Mosk, in his dissenting opinion, stated that "'the rule leads to results
which are contrary to public policy.'" Id. at 681, 863 P.2d at 217, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
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denced by the very nature of the "prior similar incidents" rule, which requires that there be at least one victim of violent crime on the premises
before a duty to hire security guards will be imposed.'
Because Pacific Plaza dealt specifically with a landlord's duty to
provide security guards, it is unclear what degree of foreseeability will be
required for other security measures. The court seemed to suggest that
when the financial burden of providing a particular security measure is
significant, the test for foreseeability will be "prior similar incidents" of
violent crime.5 Conversely, the court also implied that if a certain security measure imposes only a minimal burden, foreseeability might be assessed in light of the "totality of the circumstances."'

APRIL LERMAN

147. (Mosk, J., dissenting) (quoting Isaacs, 38 Cal. 3d at 125, 695 P.2d at 658, 211 Cal.
Rptr. at 361). He continued that, "'[t]he rule has the effect of discouraging landowners
from taking adequate measures to protect premises which they know are dangerous.'"
Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 681, 863 P.2d at 217, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 147 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
"'Surely, a landowner should not get one free assault before he can be held liable for
criminal acts which occur on his property.'" Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting) (quoting Isaacs,
38 Cal. 3d at 126, 695 P.2d at 658, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 361). "'[Ujnder the rule, the first
victim always loses, while subsequent victims are permitted recovery.'" Id. at 681, 863
P.2d at 117, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 147. (Mosk, J., dissenting) (quoting Isaacs, 38 Cal. 3d
at 125, 695 P.2d at 658, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 361).
51. The court stated that "'in cases where the burden of preventing future harm is
great, a high degree of foreseeability may be required.'" Id at 678, 863 P.2d at 215, 25
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 145 (quoting Isaacs, 38 Cal. 3d at 125, 695 P.2d at 658, 211 Cal. Rptr.
at 361).
52. The court quoted Isaacs, stating that "'in cases where there are strong policy
reasons for preventing the harm, or the harm can be prevented by simple means, a
lesser degree of foreseeability may be required.'" Id. at 678-79, 863 P.2d at 215, 25 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 145 (quoting Isaacs, 38 Cal. 3d at 125, 695 P.2d at 658, 211 Cal. Rptr. at
361).
The Pacific Plaza decision did not directly overrule the Isaacs court's "totality of
the circumstances rule," but rather stated that a "refinement of the rule enunciated in
Isaacs is required." Id. at 678, 863 P.2d at 115, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 145. However, Pacific Plaza effectively overruled Isaacs by reviving the "prior similar incidents" test in
situations where the burden imposed on landlords is significant.

B.

A court should not rule as a matter of law for specific
disclosure requirements in an informed consent case
because the ruling would invade the province of the jury;
informed consent does not take into account nonmedical
interests; and experts may be used to explain decisions
on the withholding of information: Arato v. Avedon.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Arato v. Avedon,' the California Supreme Court addressed issues
arising from the doctrine of "informed consent."2 The controversy at bar
concerned a physician's decision not to disclose the life expectancy of a
patient with pancreatic cancer when recommending a course of treatment.3 The court determined that the defendant physicians had not
breached their duty to obtain informed consent from the plaintiff patient
by failing to disclose the high statistical mortality rate of the procedure.4
At the trial court level, the jury found that the defendants disclosed
"all relevant information" and, therefore, allowed the patient to make an
informed decision regarding the cancer treatment.5 The court of appeal

1. 5 Cal. 4th 1172, 858 P.2d 598, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 131 (1993). Justice Arabian delivered the unanimous opinion of the court, joined by Chief Justice Lucas, and Justices
Panelli, Kennard, Baxter, and George.
2. Id. at 1175, 858 P.2d at 599, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 132. For a general discussion
on the doctrine of informed consent, see 5 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CAUFORNIA LAW,
Torts §§ 359-62 (1988 & Supp. 1993); 36 CAL. JUR. 3D Healing Arts and Institutions
§§ 152-53 (1977 & Supp. 1993).
3. Arato, 5 Cal. 4th at 1176, 858 P.2d at 599, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 132. Originally,
Mr. Arato's internist diagnosed a kidney problem. During surgery, the operating surgeon
discovered and removed a tumor on the pancreas. The surgeon then referred Mr. Arato
to a group of oncologists who recommended chemotherapy treatment. Mr. Arato went
through the treatment but died a short while later. Mrs. Arato and family brought an
action against the operating surgeon and oncologists for failure to obtain informed
consent before treating Mr. Arato. Id. at 1176-78, 858 P.2d at 600-01, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 133-34.
4. Id. at 1176, 858 P.2d at 599-600, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 132-33. For a complete discussion on the development and background of informed consent, see Jay Katz, Informed Consent - A Fairy Tale?, 39 U. Pirr. L. REV. 137 (1977).
5. Arato, 5 Cal. 4th at 1181, 858 P.2d at 603, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 136. The trial
court instructed the jury with a modified form of BAJI No. 6.11 ("Reality of Consent"
instruction), along with other BAJI instructions concerning legal duties of physicians
and their standard of care. Id. at 1180-81, 858 P.2d at 602-03, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 13536. BAJI No. 6.11 states in pertinent part:
(I]t is the duty of the physician to disclose to the patient all material
information to enable the patient to make an informed decision regarding the
proposed operation or treatment.
Material information is information which the physician knows or should
know would be regarded as significant by a reasonable person in the
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reversed the decision and ordered a new trial on a number of grounds.'
The supreme court unanimously reversed the court of appeal decision,
remanding the case with the instruction to reinstate the original trial
court decision.7

II. TREATMENT
In addressing each reason given by the court of appeal separately,8
the supreme court relied on Cobbs v. Grant in deciding the informed
consent issue."0 The supreme court rejected the court of appeal's decision to incorporate specific disclosure requirements, such as life expectancy for cancer patients." The court explained that, although Cobbs

patient's position when deciding to accept or reject a recommended medical

procedure.
CA BAJI 6.11 (approving instruction for reality of consent or physician's duty of disclosure). BAJI No. 6.11 is based on Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 505 (1972) (discussing physician's duty of disclosure).
6. Arato, 5 Cal. 4th at 1181, 858 P.2d at 603, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 136. The court of
appeal reversed on a number of grounds, including that the failure to disclose the life
expectancy constituted a breach of duty while causing financial hardship. Id. at 1182,
858 P.2d at 604, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 137. In addition, the court of appeal held that the
trial court's instructions were both improper and misleading, and that the lower court
erred in allowing the defendant's expert testimony. Id.
7. Id. at 1192, 858 P.2d at 611, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 144.
8. Id. at 1182-92, 858 P.2d at 604-11, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 137-44.
9. 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972).
10. Arato, 5 Cal. 4th at 1182-84, 858 P.2d at 604-05, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 137-38.
Cobbs discussed the theory of informed consent in the form of "postulates" as follows:
[Platients are generally persons unlearned in the medical sciences and therefore . . . courts may safely assume the knowledge of patient and physician
are not in parity ....
[A] person of adult years and in sound mind has the

right, in the exercise of control over his own body, to determine whether or
not to submit to lawful medical treatment ....
[Tihe patient's consent to
treatment .

.

. must be an informed consent ....

And .

.

. the patient, be-

ing unlearned in medical sciences, has an abject dependence upon the trust
in his physician for the- information upon which he relies during the decisional process, thus raising an obligation in the physician that transcends
arms-length transactions.
Cobbs, 8 Cal. 3d at 242, 502 P.2d at 9, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 513. For cases developing the
theory of informed consent, see Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972); Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093 (1960);
Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170
(1957).
11. Arato, 5 Cal. 4th at 1186-87, 858 P.2d at 607, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 140.

calls for the disclosure of information, each case is unique, and the trier
of fact should determine the necessary extent of disclosure based on a
materiality of information standard." Therefore, the supreme court emphasized that the court of appeal "invaded the province of the trier of
fact" 3by requiring the disclosure of life expectancy figures as a matter of
law. 1
The supreme court also rejected the suggestion by the court of appeal that the duty to disclose information involves both medical and
nonmedical interests.'4 The court stressed that the basis for mandating
informed consent is to enable the patient to make an educated decision
regarding medical treatment to the body." According to the court, a
"therapeutic limitation" exists within the doctrine of informed consent
which allows for the withholding of information under certain circumstances.'6 Therefore, the trial court did not err in refusing to give an instruction which required the physician to disclose "all facts which materially affect the patient's rights and interests." 7
The court next considered whether the defendants improperly employed expert testimony on the standard of care used with the treatment
of pancreatic cancer.'8 The court noted that certain situations allow for
the withholding of information, unless there exists the risk of serious
harm or death from that particular procedure."6 Therefore, in some situ12. Id. at 1187, 858 P.2d at 607, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 140. The court relied on the
language in BAJI No. 6.11, supra note 5, which allows for the jury to determine the
materiality of information. Id.; see also Truman v. Thomas, 27 Cal. 3d 285, 293-94, 611
P.2d 902, 907, 165 Cal. Rptr. 308, 313 (1980) (noting that a court may not rule as a
matter of law whether a physician has a duty to disclose).
13. Arato, 5 Cal. 4th at 1187, 858 P.2d at 608, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 141.
14. Id. at 1188, 858 P.2d at 608, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 141. The plaintiffs argued that
the defendants must disclose the life expectancy figures because those figures would
influence financial decisions by Mr. Arato. Id. The plaintiffs relied on Bowman v.
McPheeters, 77 Cal. App. 2d 795, 800, 176 P.2d 745, 748 (1947) (noting that a physician
has a duty to. disclose all information affecting a patient's rights and interest), to support their contention. Arato, 5 Cal. 4th at 1188, 858 P.2d at 608, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
141.
15. Arato, 5 Cal. 4th at 1188, 858 P.2d at 608, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 141; see also
Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 51 Cal. 3d 120, 131 n.10, 793 P.2d 479, 485 n.10,
271 Cal. Rptr. 146, 152 n.10 (1990) (noting that a "physician is not the patient's financial adviser").
16. Arato, 5 Cal. 4th at 1189, 858 P.2d at 609, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 142; see also supra note 5 (text of BAJI No. 6.11). The language in BAJI No. 6.11 suggests that the
duty to disclose information only pertains to medical interests of the patient.
17. Arato, 5 Cal. 4th at 1189, 858 P.2d at 609, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 142.
18. Id. at 1190-91, 858 P.2d at 610-611, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 14344. In these informed
consent cases, a "therapeutic exception" exists, allowing the physician to withhold information in appropriate circumstances. Id. at 1191, 858 P.2d at 611, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 144.
19. Id. at 1190, 858 P.2d at 610; 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 143. See also Cobbs v. Grant, 8
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ations, expert testimony may be justified to allow a jury to better understand the reasoning behind a decision to withhold information.'
III.

CONCLUSION

The court in Arato v. Avedon reinstated the trial court's ruling on
the informed consent issues.2 The court held that the trier of fact
should determine the propriety of withholding information pertaining to
a medical procedure or treatment.' In addition, the court held that the
doctrine of informed consent only applies to the medical interests of the
patient.' Finally, the court held that the disclosure of information in a
procedure not involving any risk of serious harm or death is measured
on a medical community standard, and therefore, expert testimony
should be allowed to assist the trier of fact in assessing the physician's
decision to withhold information.24
The doctrine of inlormed consent is a highly controversial area of
the law.25 Some scholars argue that the body is sacred and all information should be disclosed. Other scholars argue that the requirement of
full disclosure simply inhibits the practice of medicine. Through Arato,
the supreme court allows the trier of fact to decide.

ERIC MASAKI TOKUYAMA

Cal. 3d 229, 243, 502 P.2d 1, 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 514 (mandating information on
procedures potentially involving serious harm or death). For a general discussion on
the defenses to informed consent see 5 B.E. WITIGN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW,
Torts § 362 (1988 & Supp. 1993); 36 CAL. JUR. 3D, Healing Arts and Institutions § 153
(1977 & Supp. 1993).
20. Arato, 5 Cal. 4th at 1190, 858 P.2d at 610-11, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 143-44. Expert
testimony assists the jury in determining whether a decision complies with the medical
community's standard of disclosure. Id.
21. Id. at 1192, 858 P.2d at 611, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 144.
22. Id. at 1186-87, 858 P.2d at 607, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 140.
23. Id. at 1188, 858 P.2d at 608, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 141.
24. Id. at 1190-91, 858 P.2d at 610-11, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 143-44.
25. For further discussions on the issue of informed consent see generally Alan J.
Weisbard, Informed Consent: The Law's Uneasy Compromise With Ethical Theory, 65
NEB. L. REV. 749 (1986); Marjorie M. Shultz, From Informed Consent to Patient Choice:
A New Protected Interest, 95 YALE L.J. 219 (1985); Alan Meisel, The "Exceptions" to the
Informed Consent Doctrine: Striking a Balance Between Competing Values in Medical
Decisionmaking, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 413.

C.

Under Government Code section 835, a person injured
while working on public grounds may not use res ipsa
loquitur to establish a primafacie case against a public
entity without demonstrating that the public entity had
actual or constructive notice of the allegedly dangerous
condition: Brown v. Poway Unified School District.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Brown v. Poway Unified School District,' the California Supreme Court discussed whether a worker may establish a cause of action
using the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur when he sustained injuries while
on school district property.! The court analyzed the case under Government Code section 8353 which outlines the exclusive conditions under
which a public entity may be held liable for an injury caused by a dangerous condition which exists on its premises.4 The court held that the
plaintiff may not use the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in a section 835
action unless there is evidence that the school district had notice of the
dangerous condition.5
The plaintiff, Francis Brown, a self-employed computer repairman,
slipped and fell in a school district building while delivering computers.'

1. 4 Cal. 4th 820, 843 P.2d 624, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 679 (1993). Justice Panelli wrote
the majority opinion in which Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Kennard, Arabian,
Baxter, and George joined. Id. at 823-38, 843 P.2d at 626-36, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 681-91.
Justice Mask issued a dissenting opinion. Id. at 83842, 843 P.2d at 636-38, 15 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 691-93 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
2. Id. at 828-38, 843 P.2d at 629-35, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 684-90.
3. Government Code § 835 provides:
Except as provided by statute, a public entity is liable for injury caused by a
dangerous condition of its property if the plaintiff establishes that the property was in a dangerous condition at the time of the injury, that the injury was
proximately caused by the dangerous condition, that the dangerous condition
created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred, and either:
(a) A negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the
public entity within the scope of his employment created the dangerous condition; or
(b) The public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition under section 835.2 a sufficient time prior to the injury to have
taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition.
CAL. GOVT CODE § 835 (West 1980). See generally 35 CAL. JUR. 3D Government Tort
Liability § 31 (1988 & Supp. 1994) (discussing liability for the existence of dangerous
circumstances); 5 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNA LAw, Torts § 172 (9th ed. 1988
& Supp. 1993).
4. Brown, 4 Cal. 4th at 828-38, 843 P.2d at 629-35, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 684-90.
5. Id. at 838, 843 P.2d at 636, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 691.
6. Id. at 824, 843 P.2d at 626, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 681.
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Immediately following the accident, a co-worker found a fresh piece of
lunch meat lodged in the sole of Brown's shoe.7 Brown sued the school
district for his personal injuries.8
The school district moved for summary judgment under section 835
based on the undisputed fact that it had no prior notice of the dangerous
condition and the absence of evidence showing that a district employee
created the dangerous condition.! The trial court granted the motion for
summary judgment, rejecting Brown's argument that he did not need to
show evidence of prior notice because the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
creates a presumption of negligence on the part of district employees. '°
The court of appeal reversed, holding that the facts of the case satisfied
the elements of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine and that the resulting presumption of negligence established a prima facie case under section
835(a)." The California Supreme Court reversed."
H.

A.

TREATMENT

Majority Opinion
1.

The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur

The California Supreme Court initially analyzed whether the facts in
Brown satisfied the requirements of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine.13 Under this doctrine, a presumption of negligence arises if a plaintiff proves
three conditions: "'(1) the accident must be of a kind which ordinarily

7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 824-25, 843 P.2d at 626-27, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 681-82.
10. Id. at 825, 843 P.2d at 627, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 682.
11. Id.; see supra note 3 for the statutory text.
12. Broum, 4 Cal. 4th at 838, 843 P.2d at 636, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 691.
13. Id. at 825-27, 843 P.2d at 627-29, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 682-84. The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is defined in California as "a presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence." CAL. EVID. CODE § 646(b) (West Supp. 1994). The English translation of
this Latin phrase is "the thing speaks for itself." Broum, 4 Cal. 4th at 825, 843 P.2d at
627, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 682. The phrase was first used in a case where the plaintiff
was injured by a barrel that fell from the defendant's second story window. Id. (citing
Byrne v. Boadle, 159 Eng. Rep. 299, 300 (1863)). See generally 46 CAL. JUR. 3D Negligence § 167 (1978 & Supp. 1994) (discussing res ipsa loquitur); Thomas A. Eaton, Res
Ipsa Loquitur and Medical Malpractice in Georgia: A Reassessment, 17 GA. L. REV.
33, 33-34 (1982) (providing the history of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine); William L.
Prosser, Res Ipsa Loquitur in California, 37 CAL. L. REV. 183 (1949) (discussing the
res ipsa loquitur doctrine in California case law).

does not occur in the absence of someone's negligence; (2) it must be
caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of
the defendant; (3) it must not have been due to any voluntary action or
contribution on the part of the plaintiff..'.4
As a general rule, the court noted that an ordinary slip and fall does
not dictate an automatic application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine.'"
The court stated that res ipsa loquitur may, in certain cases, apply to a
slip and fall where the evidence satisfies the three requirements."6 However, the evidence in the instant case failed to meet the first and second
conditions. 7 The plaintiff failed to show that his injury was caused by
the negligence of either a district employee or an agency or instrumentality within the school district's control. 8 Thus, the supreme court noted
that the evidence in the instant case was insufficient to raise a presumption of negligence under the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. 9

14. Brown, 4 Cal. 4th at 825-26, 843 P.2d at 627, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 682 (quoting
Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 489, 154 P.2d 687, 689 (1944)). See generally 46
CAL. JUR. 3D Negligence §§ 168, 184 (1978) (noting the conditions and evidence required for invoking res ipsa loquitur).
15. Brown, 4 Cal. 4th at 826, 843 P.2d at 627, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 683; see W. PAGE
KEETON ET AL, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 39, at 246 (5th ed.
1984)); see also Oldenburg v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 152 Cal. App. 2d 733, 741 314
P.2d 33, 36 (1957) (declining to use res ipsa loquitur in the slip and fall context);
Vaughn v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 95 Cal. App. 2d 553, 557, 213 P.2d 417, 419 (1950)
(same); Gold v. Arizona Realty Co., 12 Cal. App. 2d 676, 677, 55 P.2d 1254, 1254
(1936) (same); Finch v. Willmott, 107 Cal. App. 662, 666, 290 P. 660, 662 (1930)
(same); and Marple v. Manspeaker 88 Cal. App. 682, 685, 263 P. 1022, 1023 (1928)
(same). See generally 46 CAL. JUR. 3D Negligence § 194 (1978).
16. Brown, 4 Cal. 4th at 827, 843 P.2d at 628, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 683.
17. Id. Justice Panelli pointed to the fact that the lunch meat went undetected prior
to Brown's fall and that there were numerous equally probable explanations for the
appearance of the lunch meat on the ground: an employee of the District or a visitor
might have dropped it, it could even have fallen from one of the computers Brown
was delivering, an animal could have carried it, or it could have been tracked in from
outside the building or from Brown's van. Id.
18. Id. The court stated that in order to determine how the lunch meat turned up
on Brown's shoe, one must enter the "'field of conjecture.'" Id. at 827, 843 P.2d at 629,
15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 684 (quoting Gold v. Arizona Realty Co., 12 Cal. App. 2d 676, 677,
55 P.2d 1254, 1254). Justice Panelli observed that one must "pile conjecture upon conjecture" to find that a District employee was responsible and that the lunch meat was
under the District's exclusive control. Id. at 828, 843 P.2d at 629, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
684.
19. Id.
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2.

Government Code Section 835(a)

The California Supreme Court then discussed whether res ipsa loquitur, if its three requirements had been met, may be used to establish a
prima facie case under section 835(a).' The court first addressed the
plaintiffs argument that section 830.5" sanctioned the use of res ipsa
loquitur to hold a public entity liable under section 835(a).' The court
determined that the legislature intended to strictly apply res ipsa loquitur
under section 83 0 .5.' Res ipsa loquitur may only be used to raise a presumption that the public entity's property was in a dangerous condition.24 The court held that the plaintiff could not use res ipsa loquitur to
infer that the public entity or its employee created the dangerous condition or had prior notice with sufficient time to correct the situation.'
The court, in examining the intent of section 835(a), observed that
the California Legislature intended to adopt the then-existing rule which
presumed that the public entity had notice of the dangerous condition
when that condition was created by its employee.' Since the res ipsa

20. Id. at 828-38, 843 P.2d at 629-35, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 684-90; see supra note 3
for the statutory text. The court stated that Brown's action against the District was a
suit under § 835, and not an ordinary tort action. Brown, 4 Cal. 4th at 829, 843 P.2d
at 629, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 684. In 1963, the California Legislature enacted the Tort
Claims Act which delineates the scope of governmental tort liability and effectively
abrogates the doctrine of governmental tort immunity. 35 CAL JUR. 3D Government
Tort Liability § 1 (1988). Under the Act, government entities are liable for tort only to
the extent set forth by the statute. Id. See generally 5 B.E. WITN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts § 129 (9th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1993) (discussing the Tort Claims Act);
Robert H. O'Brien, Suing the Sovereign in Tort, 43 Los ANGELES B. ASS'N BULL. 11
(1967) (outlining the procedure for commencing a tort action against a public entity
under § 835).
21. "Except where the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable, the happening of
the accident which results in the injury is not in and of itself evidence that public
property was in a dangerous condition." CAL. GOV'T CODE § 830.5(a) (West 1980).
22. Brown, 4 Cal. 4th at 830, 843 P.2d at 630, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 685.
23. Id. at 830-32, 843 P.2d at 630-32, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 685-87. In contemplation of
the Tort Claims Act, the legislature created the California Law Revision Commission to
research the possible abrogation of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Id. at 830, 843
P.2d at 630, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 685.
24. Id. at 832, 843 P.2d at 632, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 687.
25. Id. at 833, 843 P.2d at 632, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 687.
26. Id. at 834, 843 P.2d at 633, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 688. The legislative committee
comment described § 835 as similar to the Public Liability Act pursuant to which public entities were liable for injuries resulting from a dangerous condition in their property created by their employees. Id. In such a case, actual or constructive notice on the
part of the public entity was not required. Id. at 833-34, 843 P.2d at 632-33, 15 Cal.

loquitur presumption does not require a showing of either actual or constructive notice when a defendant or its employee created the dangerous
condition, the court concluded that the presumption cannot be used to
establish a case under section 835(a).27
B.

Dissenting Opinion

In his dissent, Justice Mosk argued that the three requirements of
the res ipsa loquitur doctrine had been established.' First, Justice Mosk
observed that Brown's accident would not have ordinarily happened
absent someone's negligence.2 Second, because the element of exclusivity of control is "flexible," he argued that the second prong was also
met.' Finally, Justice Mosk concluded that Brown was not contributorily negligent.3
Therefore, there was no obstacle preventing the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur from establishing a prima facie case under section 835(a).' Justice Mosk rather summarily concluded that the school district should be
presumed negligent since all the elements of res ipsa loquitur had been

Rptr. 2d at 687-88 (citing Pritchard v. Sully-Miller Contracting Co. 178 Cal. App. 2d 246,
2 Cal. Rptr. 830 (1960) and Fackrell v. City of San Diego 26 Cal. 2d 196, 157 P.2d 625
(1945)); see CAL. GOV'T CODE § 835(a) legislative committee comment (West 1980) (discussing notice requirements).
27. Brown, 4 Cal. 4th at 836-37, 843 P.2d at 634-35, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 689-90. The
court illustrated the difference between a case involving the res ipsa loquitur doctrine
and a § 835 action. For example, a landlord would be liable for injuries under res ipsa
loquitur for failing to discover the natural deterioration of a stairway. Id. at 836-37, 843
P.2d at 635, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 690 (citing Di Mare v. Cresci, 58 Cal.
2d 292, 373 P.2d 860, 23 Cal. Rptr. 772 (1962)). If the defendant was a public entity, it
would not be liable unless it had notice of the condition with sufficient time to correct the dangerous condition. Id. See generally Alvin J. Knudson, Comment, An Unusual Defense Available to Public Entities in the Area of the Maintenance of Dangerous Conditions on Public Property, 4 U.S.F. L REV. 442 (1970) (discussing § 835 and
the possible defenses for public entities under a § 835 action).
28. Brown, 4 Cal. 4th at 838, 843 P.2d at 636, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 691 (Mosk, J., dissenting); see supra note 14 and accompanying text.
29. Brown, 4 Cal. 4th at 839, 843 P.2d at 636-37, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 691-92 (Mosk,
J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 839-40, 843 P.2d at 637, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 692 (Mosk, J., dissenting). "'Although ... the doctrine will not ordinarily apply if it is equally probable that the
negligence was that of someone other than the defendant, the plaintiff need not exclude all other persons who might possibly have been responsible where the
defendant's negligence appears to be the more probable explanation of the accident.'"
Id. at 840, 843 P.2d at 637, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 692 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (quoting
Zentz v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 39 Cal. 2d 436, 443-44, 247 P.2d 344, 368 (1952)).
31. Id. at 840, 843 P.2d at 637, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 692 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
32. Id. at 841, 843 P.2d at 638, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 693 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
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established.'
Ill.

CONCLUSION

In Brown, the California Supreme Court precluded the use of the
res ipsa loquitur doctrine as a method of establishing negligence under
Government Code section 835 because the doctrine does not require
proof of actual or constructive notice.' Without the res ipsa loquitur
doctrine, the injured plaintiff bears the difficult burden of proving either
that the public entity received notice of the dangerous condition or that
a public employee created the condition. This bar on the use of the doctrine in section 835 cases effectively insulates public entities from liability and will consequently leave many plaintiffs without compensation.

ANNA HUR

33. Id. at 841, 843 P.2d at 638, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 693 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 836, 843 P.2d at 634-35, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 689-90; see CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 835(a) (West 1980).

D.

A cause of action for damages for fear of cancer, in the
absence of physical injury, must include proof that it is
more likely than not that cancer will develop in the future, unless toxic exposure results from fraud, oppression or malice: Potter v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Potter v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co.,' a toxic tort case, the
California Supreme Court allowed damages for fear of cancer, in the
absence of physical injury, where it is proven "more likely than not" that
cancer will develop from the toxic exposure' or where the defendant's
conduct amounts to fraud, oppression, or malice.'
Regarding the issue of intentional infliction of emotional distress,
the court was consistent with another recent decision,4 and held that a
plaintiff, in order to recover damages, must prove the defendant either
directed the extreme and outrageous conduct at the plaintiff or had
knowledge to a substantial certainty that the plaintiff would suffer.5 The
court found no such proof in this case.' The court further held that comparable fault principles apply and that costs of future medical monitoring
are compensable. 7 The holding, however, was strictly limited to cases
where the plaintiffs fear of cancer stems from multiple sources, rather
than where the actual likelihood of future cancer is from multiple sourc8
es.
Two couples living adjacent to the Crazy Horse landfill9 near the
city of Salinas, California filed the action. 9 The parties brought suit af-

1. 6 Cal. 4th 965, 863 P.2d 795, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 550 (1993). Justice Baxter wrote
the opinion of the court, joined by Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Panelli and Arabian. Justices Mosk, Kennard, and George filed separate opinions concurring in part
and dissenting in part.
2. Id. at 974, 863 P.2d at 800, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 555. The court held that such a
determination must be "corroborated by reliable medical and scientific opinion." Id.
3. Id. Where such malice is found, the court held that the plaintiff need only plead
and prove fear of cancer, not the probability of its development. Id.
4. Christiansen v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. 3d 868, 820 P.2d 181, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 79
(1991).
5. Potter, 6 Cal. 4th at 974, 863 P.2d at 800, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 555.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 974, 863 P.2d at 800-01, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 555-56.
9. The landfill was classified as a "Class II" landfill, where the disposal of toxic
substances or liquids of any kind is prohibited due to the "danger that they will leach
into the groundwater and cause contamination." Id. at 975, 863 P.2d at 801, 25 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 556.
10. Id. at 976, 863 P.2d at 801, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 556. The plaintiffs were Frank and
Shirley Potter, who lived directly next to the landfill, and Joe and Linda Plescia, who
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ter discovering that their domestic water wells contained toxic chemicals." The facts, as found by the trial court, revealed that despite the
landfill's Class II status, 2 Firestone disposed of large quantities of liquid
waste at the site even after its own environmental specialist warned
them of the impropriety of such action. 3 The chemicals found in the
plaintiffs' water were identified as those dumped by Firestone.'
The trial court found for the plaintiffs on the issues of negligence,
negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and strict liability for ultrahazardous activity. 5 The trial court also allowed damages
for "general disruption of their lives and the invasion of their privacy,"
psychiatric illness and treatment, and future medical monitoring costs."
The appellate court affrmed most of the holding, 7 reversing only the
costs of medical monitoring and the post-judgment order for costs and
interest." The supreme court granted review."
II.

TREATMENT

The California Supreme Court granted review to consider four issues: (1) whether damages for emotional distress based on fear can be
recovered in the absence of physical injury; (2) whether Firestone is
liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress; (3) whether a plain-

were their neighbors. Id.
11. Id. at 976, 863 P.2d at 801-02, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 556-557. Multiple chemicals
were found, of which at least two, benzene and vinyl chloride, are carcinogenic. Id.
12. See supra note 9.
13. Potter, 6 Cal 4th at 975-76, 863 P.2d at 801-02, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 556-57.
Firestone's environmental engineer sent a memorandum to all plant managers detailing
proper waste management procedures. Id. Although there was apparently an initial
attempt at compliance, the cost of using a proper waste disposal site generated mass
noncompliance. Id. Additional memos were sent, explaining that the noncompliance
was in violation of state law, but the improper waste disposal continued due to the
high costs of complying with the law. Id,
14. Id. at 977, 863 P.2d at 802, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 557. The trial court determined
that Firestone was the only contributor of waste at Crazy Horse because the chemical
makeup of the contaminants found in the water was identical to that of the chemicals
disposed by Firestone. Id,
15. Id. at 976, 863 P.2d at 802, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 557.
16. Id. at 978, 863 P.2d at 803, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 558.
17. Potter v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 225 Cal. App. 3d 213, 15 Cal. App. 4th
490, 274 Cal. Rptr. 885 (1990).
18. Potter, 6 Cal. 4th at 979, 863 P.2d at 804, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 559.
19. Potter v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 806 P.2d 308, 278 Cal. Rptr. 836 (1991).

tiff can recover for the costs of future medical monitoring where there is
no present physical injury; and (4) whether comparable negligence principles apply.2"
In addressing the plaintiffs' negligence action for fear of cancer,
which the court noted was an issue of first impression,' the court first
addressed whether the plaintiffs had sustained physical injury. ' The
court raised the issue of impairment of the immune system or cellular
damage which has not manifested into an illness or disease and whether
such harm is nonetheless a present injury. However, the court did not
decide the question, noting that the plaintiffs did not challenge the appellate court ruling that there is not present injury "unless there is evidence
that it is probable that the disease will occur. "'
Considering whether the absence of physical injury destroys a claim
for emotional distress, the court noted that it had previously rejected a
physical injury requirement for emotional distress claims.4 The court
reiterated its decision to "discard the requirement of physical injury,"
stating that "the classification is both overinclusive and underinclusive
when viewed in the light of ... screening false claims,"? and that the
requirement "encourages extravagant pleading and distorted testimony."26 The court concluded that "imposing a physical injury requirement
represents an inherently flawed and inferior means" of limiting the class
of plaintiffs and setting guidelines.27
Although the court eliminated the physical injury requirement, it
recognized the need for limitations on the right to sue for fear of cancer.
Thus, the court required a plaintiff claiming fear of cancer after being
exposed to toxic substances to prove, using scientific and medical evidence, that their risk of cancer is "more likely than not."' The court
discussed four policy reasons for its holding, noting first that exposure
to toxic substances is an everyday occurrence, and thus, "all of us are

20. Potter, 6 Cal. 4th at 973-74, 863 P.2d at 800, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 555. The court
did not review the award for disruption of the plaintiffs' lives, or the claim that the
award for "psychiatric illness" was erroneous. Id. at 980, 863 P.2d at 804, 25 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 559.
21. Id. at 981-82, 863 P.2d at 805, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 560.
22. Id. at 981-84, 863 P.2d at 805-07, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 560-62.

23. Id. at 984 n.8, 863 P.2d at 807 n.8, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 562 n.8.
24. Id. at 985, 863 P.2d at 808, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 563. As examples, the court cited
Burgess v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 4th 1064, 831 P.2d 1197, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 615 (1992),
and Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831
(1980). Potter, 6 Cal. 4th 985, 863 P.2d at 808, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 563.
25. Potter, 6 Cal. 4th at 987, 863 P.2d at 809, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 564 (quoting
Molien, 27 Cal. 3d at 928, 616 P.2d at 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 831).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 988, 863 P.2d at 810, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 565.
28. Id. at 990, 863 P.2d at 811, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 566.
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potential fear of cancer plaintiffs."' The court rejected opening the
floodgates to such a wide class of plaintiffs. Second, the court considered the impact on the health care industry, stating that drug manufacturers would be unduly impeded in releasing new drugs if, when negative
information causes a recall of a drug, they are subject to lawsuits from
unharmed plaintiffs who, nevertheless, fear future harmful effects.' The
third policy noted was concern that the sheer number of plaintiffs, including those to whom likelihood of cancer is not probable, would overwhelm insurers and work to the detriment of those likely to suffer
physical injuries.3'
After careful consideration of these concerns, the court noted that
the "more likely than not" threshold was "sufficiently definite and predictable."' After adopting the "more likely than not" threshold, however,
the court carved out an exception for oppressive, fraudulent or malicious
conduct by the tortfeasor.' Considering the totality of the circumstances in the instant case, the court found that when Firestone knowingly
continued its illegal waste disposal it "displayed a conscious disregard of
the rights and safety of other," and fell within the exception.'
The court next considered the award of damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress and, using the standard adopted in
Christensen v. Superior Court,' required that the plaintiff prove that
the defendant "engaged in 'conduct intended to inflict injury or engaged
in with the realization that injury will result.'"' Although the court
found Firestone's conduct was extreme and outrageous, it concluded
Firestone had not directed its conduct at these particular plaintiffs nor
were they actually aware of the plaintiffs' presence, and thus the cause
of action was not sufficiently supported. 7

29. Id. at 991, 863 P.2d at 812, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 567.
30. Id. at 991-92, 863 P.2d at 812-13, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 567-68.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 997-99, 863 P.2d at 817-18, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 572-73.
34. Id.
35. 54 Cal. 3d 868, 820 P.2d 181, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 79 (1991).
36. Potter, 6 Cal. 4th at 1001-04, 863 P.2d at 819-21, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 573-76
(quoting Christensen, 54 Cal. 3d at 903, 820 P.2d at 181, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 79; see also
5 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CAUFORNtA LAW, Torts § 405 (9th ed. 1988) (noting that the
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress requires intentional or reckless conduct). See generally, 6 CAL. JUR. 3D Assault and Other Wilful Torts §§ 95-106 (1988).
37. Potter, 6 Cal. 4th at 1001-04, 863 P.2d at 819-21, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 573-76.

The court next relied on the analysis of Miranda v. Shell Oil Co.'
and determined that the estimated future cost of medical monitoring was
an appropriate element of damages." The court stressed that its holding
did not "require the court to speculate about the probability of future
injury" but, rather, merely the assessment of whether future medical
supervision is appropriate.'
The final issue addressed by the court was whether comparative
fault principles apply." The defendants argued that the court should
consider the increased risk of cancer where all four plaintiffs were longtime smokers. 2 However, the court clarified that increased likelihood of
cancer was not the injury at issue, but rather fear of cancer." The court
then noted that defendants had failed to prove that any portion of
plaintiffs' fear of cancer was attributable to their smoking, instead of the
contaminated water."
HI.

CONCLUSION

In Potter, the court reinforced its position that present physical
injury is not required to recover damages for fear of future harm. However, the court limited its holding by requiring that such plaintiffs meet the
"more likely than not" standard of probable future harm, thereby broadening the class of potential plaintiffs but imposing specific restrictions to
prevent the doors from being completely open. Regarding the elements
of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the court relied on previous
holdings, emphasizing that defendant's conduct must be specifically directed at the plaintiff, or done with knowledge to a substantial certainty
that the plaintiff would suffer. The court adopted the prevailing appellate
position allowing medical monitoring damages, but rejected a broad application of comparative fault principles.
In sum, the decision in Potter both broadened the class of available
plaintiffs by setting a standard allowing emotional distress claims in the

38. 17 Cal. App. 4th 1651, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 569 (1993).
39. Potter, 6 Cal. 4th at 1005, 863 P.2d at 822, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 577.
40. Id. at 1008-09, 863 P.2d at 824, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 579.
41. Id. at 1010-12, 863 P.2d at 825-26, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 580-81.
42. Id. The court noted that cigarette smoke contains more than 2500 times the
amount of benzene found in the plaintiffs water supply. Id.
43. Id. at 1010-12, 863 P.2d at 825-26, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 580-81.
44. Id. The court added, however, that smoking by the plaintiff may evidence
whether the fear of cancer is "reasonable and genuine," noting the fact that a plaintiff
had been a long-time smoker with no fear of cancer was relevant evidence for a jury

to consider. Id.
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absence of injury, but it also limited potential claimants by imposing a
probability standard.45

MARJORIE ANN WALTRIP

45. See Scott Graham, On the Straight and Narrow; The California Supreme Court
maintained a steady, conservative course in its 1993 civil rulings, THE RECORDER,
Dec. 30, 1993, at 1.

